



Era of STALIN's Power Years, 1928 - 1953

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Chapter III - FORCED MODERNIZATION OF THE USSR. 1928-1937

§ 1. The Ideology and Politics of Socialist Transformation

The period between October 1, 1928 and the end of 1937, when the first two five-year plans of the USSR were put into practice, was a unique experience in the world history of the construction of socialism "in a single country". The construction project was being shaped in

1924-1928 in constant disputes between peculiar "pseudo-villagers", who called for building socialism in the USSR without waiting for the victory of world revolution, and the "internationalists", who believed it was impossible to build it in Russia without world proletarian revolution and assistance of future "advanced" socialist countries of Europe and America to the deliberately "backward" USSR.

The victory of one of the parties was not easy. It was accompanied by the expulsion from the Olympus of power, from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the principled opponents of the "limited, nationalist idea". The opponents of Stalin, Politburo member and editor-in-chief of Pravda newspaper N. I. Bukharin, and during the ideological battles there were also Politburo members L. D. Trotsky, G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev and numerous supporters in the Soviet Red Army, the Comintern, (The Communist International), and the governing elites of Moscow and Leningrad.

However, it was not only a time of verbal duels. During these years, under market relations, the restoration of the national economy was completed, the country largely made up for the economic losses suffered during the Revolution and the Civil War, Capitalist enterprises and cooperatives took part in economic life along with state enterprises.

By October 1928 the national economy of the USSR was already substantially above the highest level in pre-revolutionary history in 1913. By the beginning of the first five-year plan the contours of a specific plan for the industrialization of the country began to be seen. The Supreme Soviet of National Economy, headed by

Politburo member V. V. Kuibyshev, defined it as the accelerated development of socialist industry, especially of mechanical engineering, energy, chemistry and metallurgy, with an annual growth rate of 19-20%, so that industry would become the main branch of the national economy. The industrial breakthrough was to turn a country that imported machinery and equipment into a country that produced them. Since the USSR opposed the capitalist world, it had to create a military industry without relying on imports of strategically important goods from capitalist countries. The basic means for creating industry had to come from the socialistly rebuilt countryside.

It goes without saying that such large-scale perestroika in the conditions of "dictatorship of the proletariat" could not do without forcing both individual members of the ruling party and the vast masses of workers to carry out the party and state decisions. The leading participants of the Russian political process believed that repressions were a "necessary element" of the country's perestroika. Their reliance on economic levers in the search for funds for industrialization implied the use of different forms of property, commodity-money relations, and entrepreneurial spirit in agriculture and light industry. Those existing under the conditions of the New Economic Policy were used for the sake of accumulating funds in these sectors that could be used for the creation of heavy industry.

This path, proposed by N. I. Bukharin, leader of the "rightist deviation" which emerged in the Party, suggested the continuation of the New Economic Policy. It was accepted by the members of the Politburo: The Chairman of the governments of the USSR and RSFSR,

A. I. Rykov; the head of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, M. P. Tomsy; a candidate member of the Politburo in 1926-1929. Secretary of the Central Committee, First Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee (1924 - 1928), and the USSR People's Commissar of Labor (1928-1930) N. A. Uglanov.

The second way, to which Stalin and his supporters were increasingly inclined, was to concentrate the whole economy in the hands of the state, using extra-economic, command-administrative methods to mobilize the resources available in the country for industrialization. This meant curtailing the New Economic Policy; withdrawing resources from agriculture and light industry; using them to accelerate the creation of heavy industry, which in turn could serve as the basis for the rearmament and accelerated development of all other branches of the national economy.

On September 30, 1928. A day before the beginning of the first Five Year Plan, Bukharin published in Pravda an article entitled "Notes of an Economist", in which he again discussed the necessity and possibility of a crisis-free development of industry and agriculture; he sharply criticized the Trotskyite "super-industrializers" who were not named by name. The article, perceived as an obvious attack on the Stalinist group, provoked a sharp skirmish at the Politburo meeting of October 8, where Stalin demanded that Bukharin stop "the line of braking collectivization," to which the latter, in his fury, called the general secretary "a petty Oriental despot."

On October 1, 1928, with the beginning of the new economic year, the country began to implement a five-year plan for the development of the economy. However,

there were no specific targets for each branch of the economy yet. During October, the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy was still summing up the balance of the plan's control figures. In November, the Plenum of the Central Committee reviewed these figures and adopted a plan for the first year of the Five-Year Plan, overcoming the accusations of the "Rightists" that the envisaged high tax on the peasants meant their "military-feudal exploitation."

Meanwhile, Bukharin did not moderate his activity, hoping to expand the number of supporters. He tried to establish contacts with former leaders of the "Left Opposition." In July 1928 he met with Kamenev, who had come especially from Kaluga, where he was serving an exile. Bukharin lamented during the meeting that "the revolution is ruined," that Stalin - "Genghis Khan," "schemer of the worst kind" who "does not care about anything but maintaining power," and suggested an alliance against him. But Kamenev did not go for it, presumptuously deciding that both sides would remember his political talent more than once in the next feud, and that sooner or later he would return to power. However, he did not miss the opportunity to annoy one of his former persecutors and passed Bukharin's words on to "young Trotskyists," who reproduced them in an underground pamphlet dated January 20, 1929. Bukharin tried to draw K. E. Voroshilov and M. I. Kalinin to his side; he conducted behind-the-scenes negotiations with OGPU Chairman G. G. Yagoda, his deputy M.A. Trilisser in order to remove Stalin from power. In mid-January 1929, together with Rykov and Tomsky, he opposed the expulsion of Trotsky.

But the Stalinist majority voted for it, because he would

not stop and sent letters from Alma-Ata to his supporters, demanding to move into action. February 11, 1929 Trotsky was put on a steamer bound for Constantinople, and never returned to Russia. In 1933 he moved to France, in 1935 - to Norway, and from January 1937 he lived in Mexico. In August 1940 his life was cut short by an ice-axe blow made by NKVD agent R. Merkader.

During the first months of the Five Year Plan Bukharin three times spoke out in the pages of "Pravda" against Stalin's "general line". This was most sharply expressed in a speech devoted to the five-year anniversary of Lenin's death, published there on January 24 under the title "Lenin's Political Testament. The article, expounding Lenin's writings on the plan to build socialism, was perceived as an anti-Stalinist manifesto in defense of the neo-pop philosophy and politics that the secretary-general was now getting rid of. Its title was a reminder of the "testament" clause known to members of the party leadership - the need to remove Stalin from the post of general secretary.

All this led to a decisive clash in the Party leadership at a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee, which completed a new split in the Politburo. Stalin for the first time named a group of "rightists": Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. Accused not just their theoretical errors, but the flawed views of "Bukharin's group"; its opposition to the party line; "right opportunist, surrenderist platform"; the intention "to assemble an anti-party bloc with Trotskyists". This victory over the "rightists" was consolidated at a joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Committee (April 16-23, 1929), convened to

adopt a five-year plan for industry. Bukharin could not count on success at this forum: out of more than 300 participants of the plenum a little over a dozen turned out to be his supporters.

A resolution of the Politburo, which sharply criticized Bukharin, was offered for approval by the plenum, which for the first time was fully informed about the year-long struggle with the "rightists". He, according to Stalin, advocated both in foreign and domestic policy, a line, the implementation of which would mean "betraying the working class and the revolution." Particular emphasis was placed on Bukharin's failure as a theorist. His new claims to this role were declared "the hypertrophied pretentiousness of an undereducated theorist," and it was recalled that Lenin had called him a theorist "not quite Marxist." Rykov and Tomsy were also subjected to devastating criticism. The result was a plenum decision to remove Bukharin from Pravda and the Comintern, to remove Tomsy from his post as chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and a warning that they would be removed from the Politburo if new attempts to promote "capitulist" views were made. Uglanov also lost his place in the Politburo, even earlier, in 1928. He was replaced by Molotov as first secretary of the Moscow Party Committee.

The 16th Party Conference of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), convened immediately after the plenum, rejected the rightist defense of the minimum five-year plan and opted for the optimal variant as obligatory under all conditions. Adopted in May 1929 by the Vth All-Union Congress of Soviets, it represented a program of expanded attack of socialism on the entire front of the economy and the construction of the

foundation of socialist economy.

The victory of Stalin and his supporters over the "right-wing bias" in the party opened the way to a rampant push for industrialization and collectivization. Despite the adopted law on the Five-Year Plan, Stalin already achieved an increase in its indicators in a few weeks. On January 20, 1929 Pravda first published Lenin's 1917 article "How to Organize Competition". Soon after that a peculiar movement began in the country to see who would "promise more" in the early fulfillment of the five-year plan. On August 14, 1929, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy decided to increase the gross output of big industry by 28%, not 21%, in the second year of the Five-Year Plan. The newspaper Economic Life in September 1929 reported: the board of Glavmashstroy decided to restructure the five-year program of agricultural machine building and tractor building. To satisfy the national economy with tractors it is necessary not only to speed up the construction of Stalingrad plant and tractor shop at "Krasny Putilovets" in Leningrad, but also to build four new tractor plants; two of them - in the current five-year period. The Chelyabinsk plant must be designed to produce not 20, but 30 thousand tractors, and their production at the Kharkov plant must be brought up to the maximum limits. There must also be built factories in the south or in the Central Black Earth Region (CCR) of the country, the construction of ball-bearing factory must be accelerated, the factory for cutting tools must be built, the production of agricultural machinery must be significantly increased. Production of combines is established not only at Rostov, but also at the "Kommunar" plant in Zaporozhye, at the Novosibirsk plant.

Allocations for the construction of the Rostov Agricultural Machinery Plant are increased. From the 1929/30 economic year it is planned to begin the construction of the Saratov, Siberian and Central Asian plants, and to include in the five-year plan the construction of two plants in the Urals and the Far East.

On October 27, 1929, the newspapers published an appeal of workers at the Krasnoye Sormovo plant to the workers of the Soviet Union calling for a struggle to fulfill the five-year plan in four years. A few days later this slogan was picked up by the largest enterprises of the country. In November, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party approved the coal miners' initiative to fulfill the five-year plan in four years and the tractor-builders' initiative to surpass America in three years. The First All-Union Congress of shock brigades (December 5-10, 1929) adopted an appeal to the workers of the country with an appeal to fulfill the tasks of the five-year plan in four years ahead of schedule. By the autumn of 1929 the measures taken since the 15th Party Congress (December 1925) to prepare the village for the transition to total collectivization began to bear fruit. If in the summer of 1928 there were 33.3 thousand collective farms comprising 1.7% of peasant households, by the summer of 1929 there were 57 thousand collective farms comprising over one million members, (3.9%) of households. In some regions of the North Caucasus, the Lower and Middle Volga, the Central Federal District, from 30% to 50% of peasant households became collective farms. For three months (July - September) about one million of them joined the collective farms, almost as much as during 12 post-October years. This meant that the main strata of the

village, the middle classes, began to take the path of collective farms.

Relying on this trend, Stalin and his supporters moved to revise the plans for collectivization they had just adopted, and demanded that it be completed in the major grain areas of the country in one year. The theoretical justification for forcing the restructuring of the village was Stalin's article "The Year of the Great Breakthrough" (Pravda. 1929. November 7). It stated that the peasants went to the collective farms "with the whole village-The statements of the Right about the impossibility of mass collectivization "collapsed and dissipated into ashes".

The Plenum of the Central Committee (November 10-17, 1929), which discussed the results and further tasks of collective farm construction, stressed in its resolution that the turning point in the peasantry's attitude to collectivization that had occurred "in the coming sowing campaign must become the starting point of a new movement forward in the rise of the poor and middle-class economy and in the socialist restructuring of the village." This was a call for immediate total collectivization.

In the midst of the plenum, on November 12, the leaders of the Right addressed a cautionary statement to the members of the Central Committee and the Central Committee. Recognizing the successes of the Soviet economy over the past year, when "record figures for industry and the development of collective forms of farming" were obtained, they warned that abandoning the well-trodden path of the NEP and reviving the ideals of "war communism" would lead to a crisis in agriculture,

and changes in agrarian policy would adversely affect the supply of food to large cities.

The response resolution was stern: "Bukharin, as the instigator and leader of the right-wing deviationists, was to be removed from the Politburo". The propaganda of the views of "right-wing" opportunism and reconciliation with it was deemed incompatible with membership in the Party.

The resolution had a sobering effect. On November 26, the leaders of the "Right" decided, it seemed, to finally stop fighting and surrender all their positions. A statement published in Pravda on behalf of Tomsy, Bukharin and Rykov read: "For the past year and a half we and the majority of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) have disagreed on a number of political and tactical questions. We consider it our duty to declare that the Party and its Central Committee have been right in this dispute. Acknowledging our mistakes, we, for our part, will make every effort to wage, together with the whole Party, a resolute struggle against all deviations from the general line of the Party, and above all against right-wing deviation and conciliation, so as to overcome any difficulties and ensure the complete and speedy victory of socialist construction". In the days that followed, one after the other members of the "Bukharin school", the Soviet intelligentsia who held leading posts in the central and local ideological institutions, planning and economic bodies, also announced their departure from the opposition.

Thus, in November 1929 the Central Committee instructed the local party and Soviet bodies to deploy total collectivization not only in the villages and districts

but also in the regions. To assist in the organization of the collective farms it was decided to send at least 25 thousand advanced workers to the countryside. One of them is vividly depicted in the novel *Lifted virgin soil* by M. Sholokhov as Semyon Davydov.

In a speech at the Conference of Agrarian Marxists in December 1929, Stalin formulated the task of eliminating the kulak class as a necessary condition for the development of collective and state farms.

A "great leap" in development, a new "revolution from above" was supposed to do away with all socio-economic problems at once, to radically break and restructure the prevailing economic structure and national-economic proportions. Revolutionary impatience, enthusiasm of the masses, the mood of storm troopers, to some extent inherent in the Russian national character, were cynically exploited by the highest leaders of the country. Administrative levers prevailed in the management of the economy, the material interest of the workers in the best results of labor was devalued.

The end of 1929

The end of 1929 was called the year of the "Great Breakthrough" and marked in its essence the end of the NEP period in the country's history.

December 1929 was marked by the celebration of Stalin's 50th birthday. The secretary general, who had led his supporters to victory against their political opponents, confirmed in their eyes and in the opinion of

all his countrymen as the undisputed leader of the CPSU(b) and the Comintern, a living symbol of the "socialist offensive on the whole front", an infallible guide to the party's general line and the best exponent of Lenin's will.

The cult of personality, vividly manifested at previous stages of Soviet history with regard to Lenin (in the Party), Trotsky (in army circles), Zinoviev (in Leningrad), by the end of the 20's was focused on the figure of Stalin. The jubilee celebrations showed that a purposeful formation of the cult of his personality, inseparable from the achievements and victories, defeats and tragedies of the Soviet people in the following quarter century, began.

It might have been expected that the defeat of the Right would have driven dissent away from the party for a long time. However, this did not happen. With the first difficulties and mass discontent of the peasants during forced collectivization, Bukharin veiledly began to express doubt again about the deliberate continuation of the NEP. And when Stalin in his article "Vertigo of Success" (Pravda. 1930. March 2) disassociated himself from the extremists who allowed "excesses" in the village, Bukharin immediately (March 7) published the pamphlet "Financial Capital in the Mantle of the Pope". It ironically recounted how Christ's vicar on earth had let people into the world, and then tried to shift the responsibility for this to others. The hint was quite transparent and appropriately understood not only by the readers of Pravda, it naturally could not go without consequences.

The XVI Party Congress (June 26-July 13, 1930), which went down in history as the congress of the deployed

offensive of socialism on the entire front, called "to achieve the actual fulfillment of the five-year plan in 4 years." Speaking at the congress, Stalin did not fail to show the superiority of Party policy over "the Trotskyists crumbrous wisdom," who "in terms of tempo, are the most extreme minimalists and the most vile capitulators". He argued that the five-year plan in some industries could be accomplished even in 1.5-2 years. According to Stalin, the annual production of iron at the end of the Five-Year Plan could and should be raised to 17 million tons (in contrast to the planned 10), tractors - to 170 thousand pieces (instead of 53 thousand), cars - to 200 thousand pieces (against the planned 100 thousand). All of this allowed one to view Stalin's policy with good reason as a transformation of Trotsky's famous ideas about "super-industrialization". "Right-wing evaders" at the congress were again accused of proposals to reduce the rate of industrialization.

Stalin said in this connection: "People who chatter about the necessity of lowering the rate of development of our industry are enemies of socialism, and agents of our enemies." The essence of the "right wing," trying to exploit the difficulties of the collective farm movement to discredit the party line, was defined as kulakish. To this were added accusations of "right-wing" terrorist intentions to "forcibly to change the composition of the Central Committee". On the eve of the Congress, the Politburo discussed "meetings" at the apartment of the old party member Kozelev, where such conversations were held. Mikoyan suggested that he be shot, but Stalin thought it sufficient to limit to his exclusion from the Party.

In October 1930 Stalin rebuked Bukharin himself for

preaching terrorism. The latter, shocked, wrote to him on October 14: "I consider your accusations a monstrous, insane slander, wild and ultimately unintelligent." With this, he continued in despair, "you will not frighten or intimidate me," but the provocation "on which you build your policy ... will not do any good, even if you destroy the chalk physically as successfully as you destroy me politically".

As a result of an ideological struggle aggravated by fears of the emergence of a single opposition "Right-Trotskyist" front, Stalin and his supporters prevailed over the "right-wingers" accused of complicity with the bourgeoisie and the planting of capitalism in the countryside. The victory was consolidated by the ousting of the opposition from the leading Party and state structures. Burin lost his post as a member of the Politburo in November 1929. Tomsy . in July, and Rykov in December 1930. The post of Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars, held by Rykov, was handed over to Molotov.

In November 1930, S. I. Syrtsov, who had replaced Rykov as Chairman of the RSFSR Government in 1929, was removed from the Politburo.

In August 1930, due to difficulties with supplies. Syrtsov sent a letter to the party organization with the title *"Something must be done?"* ...It suggested that the pace of collectivization be slowed down, that collective and state farms be allowed free access to the market, and that planning regulations be relaxed.

The letter was regarded as "right-leftist confusion"

(Kaganovich), "slander" and "an attempt to create a new opposition group" (Stalin). In December 1930. Syrtsov and the first secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the VKP(b), who solidarized with him, V. V. Lominadze, were condemned by a commission of the Central Committee and the Central Committee as organizers of a bloc, "whose platform coincides with the views of the 'right-wing'." (Later, in June 1937, D. E. Sulimov, who was nominated for the post of Chairman of the RSFSR SNK, also lost his place among the members of the Central Committee of the Party and was repressed.)

The places of the opposition members "purged" from the Politburo were taken by those who adhered to Stalin's line of implementing the revolution from above. On July 13, 1930, L. M. Kaganovich, S. M. Kirov and S. V. Kosior (first secretary of the Central Committee of the CPB of Ukraine since July 1928), and on December 12 - G. K. Ordzhonikidze. With the exclusion of Rykov from the Politburo, only Stalin remained in the Politburo from among its members under Lenin. Thus, the collective leadership that led the Party and the state in the early years after Lenin's death, by the end of 1930, was razed to the ground and essentially replaced by Stalin's regime of personal power.

The establishment of this regime and its evolution thereafter no longer led to the emergence on the political horizon of new bright anszds and any significant opposition groups. It can be said that the subsequent history of Stalin's regime was accompanied by rearguard battles of local significance and the mopping up of the political scene from the rather numerous adherents and epigones of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin.

In terms of the number of victims, the battles, due to Stalin's personality traits (mainly the ease with which he resorted to violence to suppress those who disagreed with his political line, not stopping at the destruction of real and imaginary opponents of the regime), exceeded the victims of the 20s many times over. In ideological terms, the anti-Stalinists more often than not could not forgive his "betrayal" of the idea of world revolution and other lost alternatives to historical development that might have been more successful than the Stalinist alternative. For example, in 1932 a number of party members tried to create an organization and deploy anti-Stalinist propaganda. The protest was inspired by M. N. Ryutin, Secretary of the Krasnopresnensky District Party Committee in Moscow in 1924-1928 and a candidate member of the Central Committee in 1927-1930. He was expelled from the Party in September 1930 with the following wording: "for treacherous and subversive behavior toward the party and for an attempt at underground propaganda of right-wing opportunist views". Trying to defend himself, Ryutin wrote to the CKK that he had not in fact "allowed a deviation from the line in the question of the pace and evaluation of the situation in the village," but "Stalin in vain slandered me and threw me out of Party work. I consider it unfair of him." Such an original way of defense was answered with an equally original response:

Ryutin was arrested and subjected to new interrogations. When he was released in January 1931, he began to reflect on the reasons for the arrest. He began to reflect on the causes of the degradation of Soviet society and soon, together with the old Bolsheviks V. N. Kajurov and M. S. Ivanov, came to the conclusion that he could not

do without the overthrow of Stalin's tyranny.

By March 1932, M. N. Ryutin had prepared two documents. An appeal "To all members of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)" said, in particular: "The avant-garde pace of industrialization, entailing an enormous reduction in the real wages of workers and employees, unbearable open and disguised taxes, inflation, the growth of the yen and the fall in the value of the gold coin; the adventurist collectivization through incredible violence, terror led the whole country to the deepest crisis, the monstrous impoverishment of the masses and hunger in the countryside as well as in the cities. No boldest and most ingenious provocateur could think of anything better to destroy the proletarian dictatorship, to discredit Leninism, than the leadership of Stalin and his clique."

In another document, "Stalin and the Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship," the General Secretary's policy was scourged as treasonous toward international socialism, beginning with the Brest Peace: "Lenin approached the question of the Brest Peace as a Bolshevik internationalist, but Stalin as a National Bolshevik. For Lenin, the Brest Peace was a means of delaying the emergence of a general socialist revolution, for 'there is a mass movement in the West, but the revolution has not yet begun there.' From Stalin's point of view, however, 'there is no revolutionary movement in the West, no facts, but only potency, and we cannot reckon with potency'".

"Lenin passionately believed in and saw the revolutionary movement in the West, Stalin did not believe in it." Ryutin also spoke of "hundreds and

thousands of one hundred percent Stalinists," who, in his view, represented "the complete type of opportunists," but "managed to adapt" to the regime. Among them, S. M. Kirov, a "former cadet"; G. F. Grinko (Commissar of Finance of the USSR in 1930-1937) and N. N. Popov (member of the editorial board of Pravda, then secretary of the CP (b) Ukraine), "former Mensheviks"; V. I. Mezhlauk (first deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee), "former cadet, then Menshevik. A. P. Serebrovsky (Deputy People's Commissar for Heavy Industry) - "former loyal servant of the capitalists. The documents were not widely circulated, for the opinionization, which was called the "Union of Marxist-Leninists" on August 21, was crushed in the very bud.

On September 14, members of the N. K. Kuzmin and N. A. Storozhenko delivered a statement to the Central Committee stating that they had received an appeal "To all members of the VKP(b)" from Kaiurov for review. The text was attached. The next day the members of the "right-wing-leftist" union were arrested. By this time Zinoviev, Kamenev, Uglanov and a number of members of the soon-to-be-defeated "Bukharin school" (D. P. Maretsky, P. G. Petrovsky, A. N. Slepko, Y. E. Stan and others) had become acquainted with the documents. The founders of the "Union of Marxist-Leninists" and all those who had anything to do with the activities or documents of this organization were prosecuted with various penalties. There were 30 people in all. In October 1932 Zinoviev and Kamenev went into exile, only because they knew about the documents and did not report them to the Central Committee, as required by party ethics.

In October 1932 there were also arrested 38 members of the "group of Slepko and others" ("Bukharin's school").

As specific charges of its members were put forward two facts: holding a conference in August 1932 in the apartment of Astrov (in a petition for rehabilitation in 1988, he claimed that it was simply a meeting of former classmates from the Institute of Red Professors), and the preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the Party and government. In April 1933, thirty-four people from the "school" were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment on charges of "counter-revolutionary right-wing organization which aimed to actively fight the Soviet power and restore the capitalist order in the USSR" and conducting "active counter-revolutionary activity and counter-revolutionary agitation." Some were also accused of being supporters of terror against the leadership.

By the end of 1932 the list of "counterrevolutionary conspirators" included (according to the statement of M. A. Saveliev, the head of the Komakademiya and an old friend of Bukharin in the Moscow underground and in exile), the well-known participants in the Civil War, V. N. Tolmachev and N. B. Eismont, who until 1927 were members of the joint Trotskyist-Zinoviev opposition. The former was head of the Glavdortrans S'NK RSFSR in 1932 and a member of the RSFSR Economic Council, the latter was the RSFSR Commissar of Supplies.

"Criminal" turned out to be a conversation at a party on November 7, 1932 in Eismont's apartment in which Tolmachev stated the need to "remove Stalin" and Eismont, who agreed, suggested to his close acquaintance, N. V. Nikolsky "to define himself and express his opinion on his participation in the fight." As Saveliev reported from Nikolsky, the latter, assessing his conversation with Eismont, suggested the existence of

the "right" anti-party group which included Eismont, Tolmachev and A. P. Smirnov (Chairman of the All-Union Council of Municipal Services of the CEC, member of the Presidium of the USSR, member of the Central Committee, in 1928-1930, Secretary of the Party Central Committee).

On November 24, 1932, the decision of the Presidium of the Central Committee followed; for participating in an anti-party group, attempting to involve other persons in this group, spreading slanderous accusations of protest against the leading personnel of the Central Committee of the Party and false testimony to the Central Committee - to expel Eismont from the ranks of the VKP(b); further management of his case should be transferred to the OGPU.

On November 25, a similar decision was made in the Tolmachev case. Smirnov's behavior was the subject of proceedings at a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee and in the commissions of the Central Committee.

The accused categorically denied any intention to "remove Stalin". Nevertheless, the January (1933) joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the VKP(b) with its resolution accused the group Smirnov, Eismont and Tolmachev in the gravest sins and demanded that CC members Tomskey, Rykov and candidate member of the CC Schmidt, who allegedly encouraged the anti-party activities of the group, radically changed their behavior. The result of all this was the imprisonment of Tolmachev and Eismont in a special camp for three years. Smirnov was expelled from

the Central Committee, but remained in the Party and was warned that if his work did not earn him the trust of the Party in the future, he would be expelled from its ranks.

Under the impression of the events of the turn of 1932-1933, Stalin's speech at the unified plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the VKP(b) (7-12 January 1933) was quite sharp. He reiterated that as socialism progressed, the class struggle would intensify and on this ground the broken groups of the old counter-revolutionary parties of the SRs, Mensheviks, bourgeois nationalists of the center and the outskirts may revive and stir up, "fragments of counter-revolutionary elements" from the Trotskyists and right-wing deviationists may revive and stir up.

However, there was no "aggravation" with regard to the main leaders of the opposition in the coming year. On the contrary, Zinoviev, expelled from the Party in October 1932 in the case of the "Union of Marxist-Leninists" and sent into exile in Kustanai, in December 1933 decision of the Central Committee was restored to the Party again, elected a member of the Board of the Central Union and later included in the editorial board of Bolshevik magazine. Excluded from the party in 1932, together with Zinoviev, Kamenev was sentenced to three years of exile (he served his sentence in Minusinsk), in December 1933, was also forgiven and returned to the party ranks, was appointed director of the publishing house "Academia", later became director of the Institute of World Literature, USSR Academy of Sciences.

Expelled from the Politburo, Bukharin was soon elected an academician of the Academy of Sciences of the

USSR, remained a member of the Central Committee (after the 17th Congress - candidate and member) and a member of the CEC of the USSR, head of the Scientific and Technical Department and member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, worked in the Commissariat of Heavy Industry. On February 27, 1934 he was appointed responsible editor of the Soviet government official newspaper Izvestia. Tomsy, demoted in party status from a member of the Politburo to a candidate member of the Party Central Committee, was in charge of the United State Publishing House from 1932 to 1936.

The 17th Party Congress was held from January 26 to February 10, 1934. For a long time it has appeared in history as a congress of winners. It noted the victory on the front of socialist construction as a result of the successful implementation of the first five-year plan and approved the resolution "On the second five-year plan for the development of national economy of the USSR (1933-1937), the objectives of which were the final liquidation of the capitalist elements and the completion of the technical reconstruction of the national economy. The congress proclaimed the complete defeat of all factional and opposition groups, and Stalin's report stated: "The anti-Leninist group of right-wing deviationists has been smashed and dispersed". Its organizers have long since renounced their views and are now trying to make amends for their sins. The neo-Nazi clone groups are broken up and dispersed. Their organizers have either finally merged with the interventionist emigration, or they have confessed.

If at the XV Congress one had still to prove the correctness of the Party line and to struggle against the

well-known anti-Leninist groups, and at the XVI Congress one had to crush the last supporters of those groups, at this Congress 17th there is nothing to prove and perhaps no one to crush. Everybody can see that the party line has won. The policy of industrialization has won. "The policy of liquidation and total collectivization has won. Obviously, all these successes and, above all, the victory of the Five-Year Plan demoralized and crushed into ashes all and any anti-Leninist groupings".

By the end of the congress, however, the complacency had evaporated. Despite the oaths of loyalty to the leader and rebukes to the opposition, self-condemnation and flattering speeches of former "left" and "right" dodgers (Kamenev called for "all forces, all energy to counteract the slightest hesitation" of Stalin's authority, Bukharin called him field marshal of proletarian forces), there were signs that a new "opposition" was maturing during the congress itself. Some delegates, sensing the threat looming over them, gathered in hotel rooms and private apartments to discuss candidates for the post of general secretary.

Participants in the events (including A. V. Snegov, secretary of the Irkutsk city party committee in 1934; the old Bolshevik L. S. Shaumyan, son of the legendary Stepan Shaumyan; Napoleon Andreasyan, who was head of one of the counting subcommittees at the congress; O. G. Shatunovskaya, Communist Party commissar in 1934, who was later repressed for belonging to a Trotskyist organization and who became one of the most active exponents of Stalin's crimes (1955-1962) after her rehabilitation.

.In 1955-1962, she was a member of the CPC of the

CPSU Central Committee) told that G. K. Ordzhonikidze, J. E. Rudzutaka, I. M. Vareikis and, most often, S. M. Kirov were "tried on" for the role of Secretary General at the 17th Party Congress. It is known that the K deputies, headed by the Secretary of the North Caucasus Regional Committee, B. P. Sheboldaev invited him to a meeting and offered to nominate him for the post of general secretary. But he did not just refuse, but informed Stalin of this proposal. And this had tragic consequences.

On February 10, 1934 the Plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), elected at the 15th Party Congress, formed the Politburo, the Orgbureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Politburo consisted of: Andreev (USSR Commissar of Railways), Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Kirov, Kosior, Kuibyshev (deputy chairman of SNK, chairman of the Soviet Control Commission), Molotov, Ordzhonikidze and Stalin. The Secretariat of the Central Committee was formed with Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Kirov, and Stalin. From that time until April 1966, there was no position of Secretary General in the Central Committee. Prior to the appearance of the post of First Secretary in the Central Committee (September 1953), all Central Committee Secretaries were formally equal. It can be said that from 1934 Stalin retained "informal" leadership in the Party, actually performing the functions of the General Secretary.

The year 1934 went down in history not so much as the year of the 17th Party Congress, but as the year of Kirov's murder and the beginning of large-scale repressions against members of the former opposition. Kirov was one of Stalin's most consistent supporters.

From January 1926 until his murder he was first secretary of the Leningrad Obkom and City Party Committee, relentlessly cleansing that city of Zinovievites. In October 1926, at the plenum of the Central Committee, Kirov proposed that Trotsky and Kamenev be removed from the Politburo and was himself elected a candidate for Politburo member. In 1930 he became a full member of the Politburo and in February 1934 became in addition, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party.

It seemed that nothing foretold his elimination. On the eve of the 17th Party Congress on January 17, 1934, Kirov made a cult-like speech at the combined fifth regional and third city Leningrad conferences: "Stalin is the great organizer of the working class's victories". From late July to August he was on vacation in Sochi, together with Stalin and Zhdanov. From September 3 to September 30, he was on a business trip in Kazakhstan. November 25-28, took part in the plenum of the Central Committee in Moscow, and November 29 returned to Leningrad and began to prepare a report, which was supposed to speak on December 1 at 18 hours at the Party activists in the Uritsky Palace (now the Tauride Palace).

But an hour and a half before the speech, he was killed by a revolver shot in the corridor of the Smolny. The murder was committed by L.V. Nikolaev, a former Communist Party worker, detained at the scene of the crime, who had already been detained near Kirov's apartment with a pistol shortly before (on October 15). The explanation of that visit, however, was convincing: the party member, who had been unlawfully dismissed from his job, was applying for a position. The pistol did

not arouse suspicion either. It legally belonged to Nikolaev from the time of the Civil War.

The reasons for the murder of S.M. Kirov became clear to the Party leadership from the very beginning of the investigation. One of the leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for example, wrote about it later, A. Sudoplatov. But the investigators could not declare that one of the Politburo members died entangled in intimate relations with married women, in particular with the attractive girl Milda Draule, the murderer's wife. It is no coincidence that her interrogation began 15 minutes after the shooting.

Probably Stalin immediately had the idea of using the murder, committed because of banal jealousy, for political purposes as a pretext for organizing reprisals against ideological opponents and unwanted cadres of the party and state. At the moment the news of the murder was received in Stalin's Kremlin office, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, and Zhdanov were there. According to Mikoyan, Stalin immediately, before any investigation, said that the Zinovievites, having been defeated in an open struggle, had turned to terror against the Party.

Already in the first hours after the assassination, Stalin himself, together with his closest associates, prepared a resolution called the "Law of December 1." In the evening of the same day it was enacted by a decree of the Presidium of the CEC of the USSR, signed by one of its leaders - A. S. Enukidze. It is only fair to point out that the same way, for political purposes, those who denounced Stalin's personality cult wanted to kill Kirov, unsuccessfully trying to prove that Stalin was only

waiting for, or perhaps preparing for, the murder as a pretext for a drastic change of political course in the country.

To all appearances, Stalin neither expected nor prepared, but simply used the murder for his own purposes. The investigators were at once instructed: "Look for murderers among the Zinovievites. On December 6, the scheme of the investigation was determined, according to which there were ostensibly two centers. The first - in Leningrad, under the leadership of the well-known Zinovievite I. I. Kotolínov, one of the leaders of the Leningrad Komsomol until 1925. The second - in Moscow, headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev. already ") December 14 members of the first center, accused of direct organization of the murder were shot. The verdict stated that all of them were "active participants in Zinoviev's anti-Soviet group in Leningrad.

In the course of the investigation, on December 16, 1934, Zinoviev and Kamenev were arrested; soon afterwards the existence of the leading "Moscow Center" consisting of 19 persons was announced. On January 18, 1935, the Central Committee sent out a closed letter to the local party organizations "The Lessons Associated with the Villainous Murder of Comrade Kirov". The letter said that a conspiracy allegedly involving Trotskyites and Zinovyevs was in existence, and called to seek out and expel from the party those who sympathized with Trotsky, Zinovyev and Kamenev. All this was the precursor of a broad wave of terror designed to put an end to the very possibility of the emergence of any new opposition.

§ 2 Industrialization

The basis of the first Five-Year Plan was an extensive construction program. New construction absorbed unemployment (1,365,000 people as of October 1, 1928) and agrarian overpopulation. In 1931 the labor exchange was closed and the absence and non-admission of unemployment was solemnly proclaimed. From 1927 to 1930, 323 new enterprises were put into operation in the USSR. In 1931 alone 518 first-borns of domestic industry were put into operation (one or two a day). The newest industrial complexes of that time were created by dozens of productions - automobile and tractor plants, heavy engineering plants, power stations, metallurgical and chemical complexes. For example, in the USSR iron output in 1928 was 3.3 million tons, in 1932 the plan was to raise the production to 10 million, "corrections" Stalin to 15-17 million, in fact produced 6.1 million tons. There were similar numbers (thousands of tractors)' of 1.8; 170 and 50.8; of automobiles - 0.8; 100; 200 and 23.9.

Artificially inflated growth rates of the industry led to a serious imbalance between the industries. The dispersion of resources for the construction of facilities not envisaged by the plan could only be compensated by enthusiasm.

The new buildings were created in the most difficult conditions: there was a shortage of machinery, building materials, engineers and technicians. The builders, inspired by dreams of transforming new buildings into a "garden city" in four years, lived in hastily built barracks and dugouts, poorly fed and had no proper clothes. Almost every industrial town had a slum area called "Shanghai".

Nevertheless, new waters were built in an unprecedentedly short time. On June 17, 1930 the Stalingrad Tractor Plant was put into operation which was built in months: the shops grew two or three times faster than it was planned. In January 1932 a report on putting into operation the Nizhny Novgorod automobile plant was published which was built and assembled in 17 months.

During the five year period the number of workers in the country more than doubled (in 1929 in industry, construction and transport was 4.6 million workers, in 1932 - 10), but many of them disastrously lacked qualifications: yesterday's builders and farmers with difficulty mastered the unfamiliar factory equipment. The new enterprises of the Soviet Union were not only in need of new equipment, but also in need of modernization.

Specialists from other countries helped to launch new enterprises. Nor was the NEP forgotten. When in 1930 there was a clear threat of failure of unrealistic targets, the Soviet leaders remembered the material incentives. They used individual-targeted pay, bonuses for saved raw materials, materials, and tools. Later the movement of self-supporting brigades was resumed, the labor of shock workers was encouraged; support was provided to the movement for the transfer of the best workers' experience to the youth and the lagging behind, named after its initiator - the miner N. A. Izotov from Donetsk.

The industrialization of the USSR was "helped" by the world economic crisis that coincided with the Soviet 5-year anniversary. It began on the "black Thursday"

October 24, 1929 with the stock market crash in New York and quickly engulfed the entire capitalist world. The crisis lasted until 1933. When the decline in production somewhat halted, it moved into the depression phase. During the crisis, the Soviet Union had difficulty controlling the sprouts of strategic goods and was in a practical position to buy equipment on a massive scale and to hire specialists and skilled workers.

In the course of industrialization the reorganization of industrial management was carried out. It began with the September 5, 1930 decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) "On measures to streamline production management and establish one-man rule". The All-Union Communist Party of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture was improving, but it was becoming more and more unwieldy and ineffective as production expanded.

That is why in January 1932 it was reorganized into People's Commissariats: of Heavy Industry (Commissar I. K. Ordzhonikidze, after his death - V. I. Mezhlauk), Lumber (S. S. Lobov) and Light Industry (I. E. Lyubimov). Among the major organizers of production were also M. L. Rukhimovich, A. P. Serebrovsky, Il. V. Kosior, and A. I. Mikoyan. Widely known in the country were such managers of large construction and production facilities as A. V. Vinter and Il. G. Alexandrov (Dneproges), I. P. Bardin (Kuznetsk Metallurgical-I. Combine), AP Bannikov (Uralsmash), A.M. Bodrov (the 1st State Bearing Plant in Moscow), A. P. Zavenyagin (the Magnitogorsk and Norilsk metallurgical plants), I. F. Te-iosyan (the "Spetsstal" plant association).

The successes achieved in economy made it possible to

report fulfillment of the five-year plan in 4 years and 3 months as early as in January 1933. During this period of time 1500 large-scale enterprises were put into operation. This means that every day a new enterprise was put into operation. The share of production of means of production in the gross projection of industry rose to 53% in 1932 against 39.5% - in 1928. During the five-year period the tractor building, automobile industry, machine tool building, aircraft industry, modern agricultural machine building, power, and metallurgy.

By the end of the Five-Year Plan, the USSR ranked second in the world and first in Europe in terms of total industrial output. As for light industry and agricultural production, the final indicators of their growth for the five-year period were lower than planned. Production of cotton fabric was 59%, wool – 34% of the level of 1928. Taking into account the experience of the first five-year plan, the tactics of the implementation of forced industrialization at the new stage was changed. Artificially inflated rates were no longer observed, although some unrealistic targets were included in the plan.

In general, the plans for the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937) adopted at the 17th Party Congress were more balanced in comparison with the original plans which had been outlined at the 17th Party Conference in February 1932. The speakers at the Congress proposed to give up the excessive centralized planning and to leave more initiative to the local authorities. The final version of the plan was approved at the meeting of the CEC and SNK of the USSR in November 1934. The Five-Year Plan was more realistic in its objectives, and its implementation managed to significantly improve the

dynamics of the country's economic development. Like the previous five-year plan, it was declared completed ahead of schedule - for 4 years and 3 months.

The main efforts in this period were subordinated to the task of completing the technical reconstruction of the national economy, the completion of construction projects and the development of new enterprises. During 1933 - 1937 in various regions of the USSR 4,500 new plants, factories, mines, power plants were erected (in contrast to the first Five Year Plan, every day not one, but an average of three new large enterprises were put into operation). As compared to 1932. The main production assets of the country grew by 2.2 times. The pride of the Soviet people for a long time became the automotive giants in Moscow and Nizhny Novgorod, Turksib (built in 1930), Rostselmash (1930), Stalingrad (1930), Kharkov (1931) and Chelyabinsk (1933) tractor factories; Dneproges (1932), Kuznetsk (1932) and Magnitogorsk (1934) metallurgical plants, the Moscow Machine-Tool Plant (1932), the Ural Heavy Engineering Plant (1933), Berezniki (1932) and Solikamsk (1934) chemical plants, the world's first plants of synthetic rubber (1932) and Voronezh, city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur (1932), the Novokramatorsk machine-building plant in Donbass (1934), the Chimkent lead plant (1934), the White Sea-Baltic (1933) and Moscow canal (1937), the first stage of the Moscow subway (1935), and many other enterprises and construction sites.

The former national outskirts, where the reconstruction of the national economy was carried out at a faster pace than in the RSFSR, were transformed into major centers of industrial development. Employment in the large

motor plant in Ufa, textile and knitting plants in Tashkent, Bukhara and Baku. Kashkhstan became a major area of non-ferrous metallurgy, coal mining, and chemical industry. In Bashkiria and Tatarstan, between the Volga and the Urals, a major area of oil production - "Second Baku" emerged. Karelia and Komi became major suppliers of timber, Yakutia - of gold.

By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, the technical reconstruction of the USSR was basically completed. Incredible efforts of the entire population ensured a steady growth of industrial production, and an average of 17% per year. During the five-year period, it grew as a whole by 120% (Group "A" – 139%, Group "B" – 99%). The machine park of mechanical engineering in 1937 consisted of 75% of new and perfect machines of domestic and foreign production. The heavy engineering plants which were put into operation began to produce complete sets of complex equipment for enterprises of ferrous metallurgy, which had previously been imported from abroad. Import of steam locomotives and wagons, factors and cutting machines, steam boilers, hammers, presses, lifting and transport equipment stopped. In a number of areas, the USSR manufacturing moved to the forefront of the world (production of synthetic rubber, electric turbines, jet technology). It overtook or came very close to Germany, Great Britain, and France in the production of fossil products in some branches.

However, it was still significantly, up to 5 times, behind these countries in production per capita. In terms of total industrial production, from the end of the first five-year plan, the USSR, as emphasized in official reports, held first place in Europe and second place in the world. (Some modern scholars believe that Soviet industry did

not rise from fifth place, but managed only to significantly narrow the gap with the world leaders.)

The need for industrialization was not least dictated by the urgency of reorganizing the country's Armed Forces. By the beginning of the first five-year plan, they were not much different from the times of the Civil War and were inferior to the armies of the leading European countries.

For example, the army had only 'U tanks, 300 tractor-tractors, 1200 lorries and 1394 planes of outdated design. The flight tests of the first Russian serial I-5 fighter designed by N. N. Polikarpov began only in April 1930.

In 1935 The Red Army was armed with 7,633 tanks of various purposes: light T-26, BT, medium T-28 and heavy T-35; over 5,000 cars; 6,672 planes, including fighters I-15, I-16, bombers SB, TB-3, scout R-5. For the first time the army began to receive anti-aircraft guns and machine-guns, the newest for those times means of communication, including the field radio-stations and cipher-alarms.

The images of the Soviet Army were Modernized or redesigned images of the small arms (rifles of the 1891-1930 model, machine guns and pistols) were modernized or redesigned. Ships of the Navy were restored and modernized. The city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur became a new center of military shipbuilding in the Far East.

The growing threat of World War demanded further strengthening of the defense power of the USSR. In December 1936 was formed all-union People's

Commissariat of Defense Industry (People's Commissars: M.L. Rukhimovich, 1936-1937; M.M. Kaganovich, 1937-1939). In the second five-year plan, as in the first, the Soviet military-industrial complex developed at a faster pace than industry as a whole. During 1933-1937 the total increase of production of the MIC grew by 286% compared to the total industrial growth of 120%. The Red Army increased from 900,000 men in March 1933 to 1.5 million by the end of 1937.

The expansion of construction and industrial production during the Second Five-Year Plan did not require as large an increase in the number of workers. Between 1932 and 1937 their ranks grew from 10 to 11.7 million people. The backbone of the working class in the USSR were industrial workers. In the first five-year plan their number increased by 93%, in the second ~ - by 32%. They accounted for 34-38% of all workers and 27-30% of the total number of workers and employees in the country. The state did much to raise the cultural and technical level of the working class. During the second five-year plan practically all the workers went through schools and advanced training courses. Labor productivity, which, according to official data, had grown by 40% during the first five-year plan, increased by 82% during the second five-year plan.

High rates of industrial development were also achieved at the expense of the low starting level, and command-and-control methods of leadership. The objectives of forced industrialization met the mass use of cheap labor and enthusiasm of the masses, inspired by the utopian idea of building a classless, affluent society. Various forms of socialist competition for meeting and exceeding production targets - shockwork during the first five-year

plan, the Stakhanov movement for increasing labor productivity and better use of technology - played an important role in the second. The movement was named after the miner of the Donbass coal mine Stakhanov, who on August 30, 1935 was a shift with two loaders, 102 tons of coal instead of the 70 standards. His famous followers were blacksmith X. Busygin, milling I. Gudov, locomotive engineer PF Krivonos, shoemaker NS Smetanin, collective farmer M.S. Demchenko, weavers E. V. and M. I. Vnogradov, and many thousands of lesser-known labor heroes. In November 1935, the All-Union Meeting of Stakhanovites was held. Calling the movement "the highest stage of socialist competition", Stalin did not fail to note that it emerged "against the will" and even "in the struggle" against the administration and the conservative technical intelligentsia.

The blame for the disruption of plans, numerous accidents, breakdowns, and fires, the growth of which was objectively facilitated by the accelerated industrialization and collectivization, was often shifted to all kinds of "pests" and "enemies". Thus, in February 1930 the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution "On the elimination of sabotage at military industry enterprises". In August a group of bacteriologists, headed by Karatygin, was condemned for the mass horse mortality in the villages; in September, 48 heads of the food industry were shot for allegedly organizing food difficulties in the country. On September 2, 1930. Politburo decided to publish in the newspapers that N.D. Kondratyev, V.G. Groman, II. A. Sadyrin, A. V. Chayanov, L. N. Yurovsky, N. N. Sukhanov (Himmer), I. P. Makarov, L. K. Ramzin, V. A. Bazarov and others "as participants and leaders of

counter-revolutionary organizations that set out to overthrow Soviet power and restore the power of the landlords and capitalists."

In November-December 1930 the trial of the Industrial Party took place. According to the indictment, the Industrial Party was formed in the late 20's, included more than 2 thousand members of the old technical intelligentsia, and created by economic sabotage the ground for the coup to be carried out in 1930 or 1931. This was to be supported by the Anglo-French interventionists. The accused (Professor of the Moscow Higher Technical School and Director of the Heat Engineering Institute L.K. Ramoin, responsible officials of the State Planning Committee and the Supreme Economic Commission, I.A. Ikonnikov, I.A. Larichev, N.F. Charnovsky and others), "admitted" that in case of coming to power they intended to form a government, which would include P. I. Palchinsky (Comrade Minister of Trade and Industry in the Provisional Government, Chairman of the All-Union Association of Engineers under the Soviet power - as Prime Minister), E. V. Tarle (famous historian, academician - Minister of Foreign Affairs) and others.

Later, the liquidation of the "sabotage centers" was announced, which, in addition to the Prom Party, included the Union Bureau of the Menshevik Central Committee and the First Labour Peasant Party. In 1933, 18 specialists of the "Metropolitan Vickers firm" (six of them British citizens) were convicted for allegedly organizing a sabotage network in the Soviet Union. Those convicted in these and other, often fictitious, cases joined the army of prisoners and exiles. By early 1933, the total number of inmates in the camps was

approximately 300,000, in 1937 - already 996,400. As early as 1928, in a letter to Stalin, the Deputy People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, N. M. Janson (later Commissar of Justice of the RSFSR; USSR Water Transport) proposed that prisoners be used to work in the development of remote areas, logging, railroad, mining etc. In June 1929, the Politburo approved the proposals of the commission headed by Janson and decided to establish a system of corrective labor camps under the OGPU. On July 2, 1929, the USSR SNK issued a decree "On the use of the labor of criminal convicts... ". On April 25, 1930 the Administration of Camps was established within the OGPU (General Directorate of Camps), which on October 1, 1930, was transformed into the Chief Directorate of Camps (GULAG). Thus an institution that became the symbol of the Soviet repressive policy appeared. The labor of prisoners was included in the state plans.

The camp sector of the socialist economy emerged. It was headed by leading members of OGPU (transformed into NKVD on July 10, 1934) G. G. Yagoda, M. D. Berman, I. I. Pliner, J. D. Rapoport, S. G. Firin, N. A. Frenkel and others. According to data as of January 1, 1938. On January 1, 1938, there were 1,851,576 inmates in camps and penal colonies (where persons sentenced to imprisonment for less than three years were held). In addition, the labor of so-called "special settlers" was used, whose number amounted to 880,007 people.

According to the 1937 plan, the NKVD was to assimilate about 6% of the total capital investment. In the 1930s, prisoners worked to build cities (Magadan, Angarsk,

Norilsk and Taishet), canals (the White Sea-Baltic and Moscow-Volga), the oil fields of Ukhta and Pechora, the coal mines of Vorkuta, the gold mines of Kolyma and Magadan, the Karaganda coal mines and the Balkhash copper plant, the Norilsk Nickel-Cobalt plant, the timber and industrial complexes and many thousands of kilometers of railroads. In 1936 the NKVD created the Main Directorate of Highways, which was entrusted with all road construction.

§ 3. Collectivization

The collectivization of the peasantry, which constituted 80% of the total population of the country, was intended not only to intensify labor and raise the standard of living in the countryside. It facilitated the redistribution of funds and labor from the countryside to industry.

It was assumed that it would be much easier to obtain bread from a relatively small number of collective farms (collective farms) and state farms (state agricultural enterprises) working according to the plan than from 25 million dispersed private producers. Mass collectivization also promised to free the labor force needed for construction and industry from the countryside.

Collectivization; Historical picture of events occurring in the village

To manage the process of collectivization and agricultural production, according to the directive of the November (1929) Plenum of the Central Committee, the USSR People's Commissariat for Agriculture was

established. In the thirties it was headed by Ya. A. Yakovlev (1929-1934), M. A. Chernov (1934-1937), R. I. Eiche (1937-1938), I. A. Benediktov (1938-1943). The People's Commissariat included the USSR Collective, founded in 1928 specifically to manage collective farms. The Soviet Chairman G. G. Kaminsky's admonition to the representatives of the total collectivization districts assembled in Moscow in January 1930 gave an idea about the methods of collectivization management: "If you overdo it and get arrested, remember that you were arrested for your revolutionary cause.

The forced collectivization started on January 5, 1930 by the decree of the Central Committee of the all-Union, CPSU(b) "On the Collectivization Rate and the State Assistance to the Collective Farm Construction". It identified the grain districts (the Lower Volga, the Middle Volga and the North Caucasus) where collectivization was to be completed in the first turn - in the autumn of 1930 or the spring of 1931. For the other districts, the terms were postponed for one year, and for the districts of the second stage (Ukraine, the Central Black Earth Region, the Urals, Siberia and Kazakhstan). For other districts the deadline was pushed back to 1933.

The decree recognized the agricultural artel "as a transitional form of farming to the commune" as the basis of collective farm construction. This wording oriented the "collectivizers" toward the strengthening of communalization of the means of production and personal property of the peasants. (The level of communization reached 30% in the TOZs, workplaces, 50% in the artels, and 100% in the communes.)

Immediately after the publication of the decree, a

campaign was launched in the press to encourage the acceleration of collectivization and the competition in it. The role of vanguard in the struggle for the collective farms was played by poor and middle-class groups in the villages and by "twenty-five thousandths" workers-communists sent from the cities.

The five-year plan of collectivization was already fulfilled in January 1930. When more than 20% of all peasant farms were in collective farms. In early February Pravda guided its readers, "The collectivization target of 75% of poor- and middle-income farms during 1930/31 is not the maximum. The threat of being accused of how the NEP was broken. Transcripts of the Plenums of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party(b), 1928-1929. In 5 vols. / Editor-in-Chief V. P. Danilov et al. P. Danilov et al. M, 2000-2002; Soviet children in the eyes of the Cheka - OGPU-NK VD. 1918-1939: Documents and materials: In 4 volumes / Ed. by A. Berelovich, I. Danilov. M. 1998-2003; The tragedy of the Soviet village. Collectivization and Kulakization. 1927-1939: Documents and materials: In 5 vols. Ed. by: V. Danilov et al. M., 1991-2002.

The lack of a strong commitment on the part of local workers to "rightist deviation" led to various forms of pressure on peasants who did not want to join the collective farms (deprivation of voting rights, exclusion from the Soviets, boards and other elected public organizations). It was mostly the well-to-do peasants who resisted.

The situation was sharply worsened by the Politburo's resolution of January 30, 1930 "On Measures to liquidate kulaks' farms in areas of total collectivization. It repealed the law on renting and hired labor, and instructed to

confiscate the kulaks' means of production, livestock, outbuildings, processing enterprises, and food, forage, and seed stock.

The kulaks were divided into three categories. The first, "counterrevolutionary activists," were to be imprisoned in concentration camps, and the organizers of terrorist attacks and insurgency were to be shot. The second, "elements of the kulak activists, especially of the richest kulaks and semi-popularists," were to be deported to remote areas of the region and beyond its borders. The third group consisted of the kulaks who settled on new plots outside the collective farms in the area. It was stated that the total number of the liquidated farms should remain within 3 - 5% of the total number (the number of kulaks was clearly exaggerated, the focus on it suggested "kulakization" of the middlemen who did not agree to join the collective farms; in reality the number of those liquidated in some districts reached 10-15%). The property and deposits confiscated from the kulaks were to be transferred to the indivisible funds of the collective farms as entrance fees of the poor and the peasants. In this way the authorities recruited the poor of the village into the ranks of supporters of collectivization and dekulakization. The dekulakization became a powerful catalyst of collectivization and by March 1930 it allowed to raise the level of collectivization in the country to 56.6 percent and in the RSFSR to 57.6 percent.

The total number of liquidated "kulak farms" only in 1929-1931 amounted to 381,000 (1.8 million people), and during the collectivization years it reached 3.1 million households. In January 1932, on the collectivization G. G. Yagoda, chairman of the OGPU, reported to Stalin that 1.4 million peasants were settled

in special settlements in the Urals, Siberia, the European North and Kazakhstan. Most of them worked in logging, mining and "non-statutory" collective farms. About 10% of the total number of the dispossessed were sentenced to prison camps.

The unwillingness to work at the "statutory" collective farms sharply increased the flow of peasants who moved to the cities. In 1931 alone their number exceeded 4 million. Among them were also some former kulaks who had sold their property beforehand and managed to escape repression. The uncontrolled migration was supposed to be regulated by the new law "On the Rights of the Child" which was introduced in 1931.

The system of passports and propiska (previously it was condemned as a manifestation of policing in the capital countries) was introduced in December 1932. Collective farmers could obtain passports only with the consent of the kolkhoz board.

Collectivization was accompanied by the destruction of the economic science (the greatest of agricultural scientists N.D. Kondratyev and A.V. Chayanov were repressed), mass closing of churches, mockery over the religious feelings of the rural population (by the beginning of 1931 about 80% of all rural churches of the country were closed, a considerable part of the clergy fell into the category of "dispossessed"). On November 4, 1929, a special decision was made, which even concerned the ringing of bells. A resolution of the Commission on the Implementation of the Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State (Anti-Religious Commission) under the Central Committee of the VKP(b), which was headed by E. M. Yaroslavsky, read:

"1. To forbid completely the so-called ringing or ringing of all bells. 2. To permit, by resolution of local authorities, the ringing of small bells of a set weight and at set hours at the request of religious organizations. When the ringing of bells is reduced, the bells must be removed and transferred to the appropriate government agencies for use for economic purposes."

All this could not but cause retaliation, including with weapons in hand. According to the OGPU, in January-April 1930 there were 6,117 riots with 1,755,000 participants. Another consequence of the haste and administrative arbitrariness was the mass slaughter of cattle. The authorities were forced to make concessions. On March 2, 1930 in "Pravda", simultaneously with the Model Charter of the Agricultural Artel there appeared Stalin's article "Vertigo of Success" which condemned the "excesses". After that, on March 14, the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) issued the decree "On the struggle against distortions of the party line in the collective farm movement" which demanded to stop the practice of coercion, not to allow the transfer of agricultural farms to the commune charter, and to correct their mistakes.

By August 1930, 21.4% of peasant farms remained in collective farms, i.e., at the level of the five-year plan targets. Chasing the pace was detrimental. However, in autumn of that year the kolkhoz offensive resumed. By June 1931 the collective farms united 53% of all peasant farms. Collectivization was completed in the most important agricultural areas of the country. In Transcaucasia by the beginning of June 1931 the collectivization rate was 42%, in Belorussia – 49%, in Tajikistan – 42%. A significant number of individual

farmers remained in the North, North-West and central non-blackearth regions. By the end of five-year plan there were created over 200 thousand collective farms which united about 15 million peasant farms or 62% of their total number. Along with collective farms were formed 4.5 thousand state farms. The idea was that they should become the school of big socialist farming. Their property was state property. The peasants who worked in them were state workers. Unlike the collective farmers, the workers received a fixed wage for their work.

Already by the beginning of 1931 the experience of labor organization in collective farms made it possible to establish that the most expedient form of collective farm labor accounting was the workday, with the application of piecework. The VI Congress of Soviets of the USSR in March, 1931 approved it as a common standard for all collective farms as the measure of labor quantity and quality, and the basic principle of collective farm income distribution. The organization of labor was promoted by the creation of production brigades within the constant staff of collective farmers. The Party Central Committee by its resolution of February 4, 1932 proposed to create them in all collective farms.

The economic results of the first collective farm year were encouraging: collective farms gave the country about one third of gross and marketable output, the income of collective farmers was higher than that of individual farmers. However, on the whole, collectivization and dekulakization undermined the productive forces of the village. The number of livestock in the country over the five-year period was reduced by almost half. The supply of grain to the state by the end of

1931 declined. Already in that year, famine began in some regions. In the spring of 1932 the norms of rationing of townspeople with bread had to be reduced. In August 1932, a law was adopted which severely punished even petty theft of collective farm property. The arrests in connection with the acts of "sabotage of grain procurement" began.

At the same time, the government made some concessions to the peasants, a kind of neo-Nep - reduction of the state plan of grain and meat procurements, trade at free prices in case of fulfillment of supplies to the state. However, these belated measures brought no relief.

The famine of 1932-1933

A number of grain areas in Ukraine and Russia, took the lives, according to data not yet established by historians, more than 4 million people. In Ukraine, according to the OGPU, during 4.5 months (December 1, 1932 - April 15, 1933) only starvation and cannibalism killed 2,420,100 people. According to the calculations of the contemporary historian E.A. Osokina more than 3 million people became victims of famine in Ukraine and Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the main losses were suffered by the villagers - 2 million people.

The passport system introduced in December 1932 was designed to prevent the mass influx of starving peasants into cities.) Neither a sharp reduction in exports nor attempts to find foreign currency by selling museum holdings could diminish the scale of the national tragedy due to the limited state grain reserves in the country. The

situation was aggravated by the fact that, in the name of political goals, the Stalinist leadership tried to conceal the fact of the famine and refused international aid to the starving.

The economic results of collectivization in the years of the Five-Year Plan can be judged from the following figures. The volume of agricultural production in 1932 was 73% of the level of 1928 and of livestock production 47%. At the same time the marketability of agricultural production increased from 15% on the eve of collectivization to 36-40% in the second and third five-year periods in 1930. In 1931 – 70%; I) 1932 – 67%; in 1933 – 68%. The state's procurements of bread (grain) rose from 10.8 million tons in 1928 and 16.1 million tons in 1929 to 23.3 million tons in 1933. The difference in figures meant that there was less and less bread for domestic consumption in the village. Much of the harvested grain was used for exports and the purchase of industrial equipment abroad. During the first five-year plan 12 million tons of grain was exported; in 1930 - 4.8; in 1931 - 5.1; in the unprofitable 1932 - 1.8 million tons. (By comparison, tsarist Russia exported 9-10 million tons of grain per year before the war.)

The beginning of the second five-year plan in the village was associated with overcoming the difficulties created by the mistakes of the previous stage of collectivization. In order to strengthen the kolkhoz system and pacify the village in January 1933, the Party decided to create extraordinary management bodies - political departments of MTS (Machine Tractor Stations) and state farms, endowed with tremendous rights. They exercised political control over the placement and employment of collective and state farm workers,

ensuring timely fulfillment of obligations to the state by the collective farms. Under the slogan "Make the collective farms Bolshevik and the collective farmers prosperous!" in February 1933 the work of the First All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Workers was organized.

The call of the congress to organize the All-Union competition for high crop yield which was directly connected with the possibility to increase the prosperity of collective farmers, strengthened both the material interest and production initiative. Over 250 thousand collective farmers, including about 10 thousand chairmen of collective farms, nominated to the leading positions by the political departments of MTS for two years of their work (transformed to the regular party bodies in November, 1934), were engaged in adjustment of the collective farms.

In 1933-1935, the authorities were able to achieve the fulfillment of the bread (grain) supply both in the whole country and in each republic, krai and oblast. After the famine of 1932-1933, grain exports were reduced, and from 1934 they did not exceed 1 million tons per year. At that time, they began to resort to additional state purchases of agricultural products at procurement prices, which were 25-30% higher than the planned. Due to this additional volume of grain procurements increased from 4.1 million tons in 1933 up to 13.6 - in 1934. Until the end of the second five-year plan, these purchases amounted to 15-16% of all grain supply of the collective farms. The state received part of the bread (grain) from the collective farms in the form of in-kind payment for the work of MTS. From 1933 to 1935.

These receipts increased in the structure of grain harvests from 15.5 to 25.4 percent. The November (1934) Plenum of the Central Committee decided to reduce (or even completely stop) the export of bread and direct it to the domestic market.

However, the turning point in the countryside and the improvement of the food supply of the urban population was mainly determined by the expansion of the supply of machinery to agriculture. Before the revolution almost half of the land in the country was cultivated by the plough. By 1928 the plough was replaced by the iron plough (10% of the arable land was tilled by the plough), there were 25 thousand ploughs in the country.

With tractors only 1% of the arable land was cultivated. By the end of the first five-year plan 22% of the arable land was cultivated with tractors, by the end of the second - up to 60%. The supply of the village with machinery was carried out through machine-tractor columns (the first was formed in September 1928 in the Azov district of the Don from 18 tractors to serve two collective farms and one land society) and mainly through MTS (Machine Tractor Station).

By the summer of 1930 158 state and 479 cooperative MTS's were organized. In the areas where they operated, the level of collectivization was 20-30% higher than where they did not exist. Initially MTS's were conceived as inter-collective joint-stock enterprises, but the cost of them for the collective farms proved to be unaffordable, and at the end of the first five-year plan they all became state-owned enterprises. During the first five-year plan 154 thousand tractors, including 94 thousands of domestic tractors were supplied to

agriculture (in 1923-1924 only 13 tractors were made in USSR). At the end of 1934, agriculture had 281 thousand tractors, 31 thousand combines, 34 thousand trucks, and many other complex agricultural machines. In the second five-year plan agriculture got 405 thousand tractors, and all of them were made at domestic factories. The number of MTS in those years, 1937 had doubled and reached 5.8 thousand. If in 1932 they served only a third of collective farms of the country, in 1937 - 78%. The use of the latest agricultural machinery improved the processing of land, increased yields.

The successes in collective farm construction were fixed in the new collective farm charter, which was adopted in February 1935, at the Second All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Workers. It included a provision that the collective farms were to hold land for perpetual and free use: it was not to be sold or leased. The Statute permitted a collective farmer to keep private subsidiary plots of 0.25 to 0.5 hectares, and in some districts - up to 1 hectare of land, 2-3 cows, an unlimited number of poultry.

By the end of the second five-year plan private farms produced a significant mass of gross output of the collective farm sector: 52.1% of potatoes and vegetables, 56.6% - fruit crops, 71.4% - milk. 70.9% - meat. The bulk went to cash consumption, but as an example a quarter of livestock products and up to half of potatoes and vegetables were sold on the market. Market prices by 1938 as compared with 1933, decreased by 64%.

By the end of the second five-year plan collectivization could be considered completed. Individual peasant

farms remained only 7%. Most of them were the farms of herders, deer breeders, hunters and fishermen on the outskirts of the country. Collective farms, of which there were 242,500 across the country, became the main unit of rural life. In 1937, a good harvest was gathered (98 million tons), and livestock breeding reached the prewar level.

Collectivization in national regions was carried out with some consideration of local economic and household peculiarities. Its completion here was postponed to a later date. The most widespread form of associations in Transcaucasia, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Buryatia were partnerships for joint land cultivation. Collective farmers were allowed to keep not only productive but also working cattle. In Kazakhstan and Kirghizia cattlemen could have up to 20 cows, 100-150 sheep, 10 horses, 8 camels. Collectivization in Central Asia was greatly facilitated by state construction of irrigation systems.

As the tasks of total collectivization were solved, the size of the "kulak exile" was reduced. In 1933, almost 400,000 kulaks and their families were exiled. In 1934 - 255,000, in 1935 - 246,000, in 1936 - 165,000, in 1937 - 128,000. In May 1934 the laborers were restored in civil rights, from January 1935 - in electoral rights. However, they still had no right to return to their former places of residence and were not drafted into the army. These restrictions were removed from them at the end of 1938. In that year, all non-statutory artels were transferred to the charter of the usual agricultural; many special resettlers returned to their former places of residence, and 220 thousand families by the end of the 1930s continued to live and work on the land they had

mastered and the factories they built.

Collectivization, which radically changed the face of the Russian countryside, marked the beginning of the so-called "de-collectivization" - the destruction of the customary way of life in the village, traditions and experience of the rural world. It transformed the peasant from a small-scale proprietor into a worker dependent on the state, alienated from the means of production and deprived of the right to dispose of the results of his labor. The work ethic and morals based on industriousness, thrift, community, family and religious traditions were gone from village life. These traits were even more difficult to retain for the millions of peasants forced to leave their homelands for settlements, gigantic construction sites, and industrial cities.

The gross domestic product of the USSR, to the creation of which rural workers also made a significant contribution, increased annually by 14-15% during the two five-year periods.

The increase in GDP did not automatically influence the improvement of people's welfare, but it made it possible in November 1934 to adopt the decision "On the Abolition of the Card System (rationing) for Bread and Some Other Products", introduced in early 1929. In 1935, the free sale of bread (January), meat products, sugar, fats and potatoes was resumed (October). Cards for manufactured goods were abolished in January 1936. Despite this, the standard of living of workers remained on average lower than before the revolution. From 1925 (when the level was closest to the pre-war level) until 1937, the nominal wages of workers increased by 5.5 times, and the cost of food - at least 8.8 times. At the

same time, the general growth of the national economy made it possible to expand housing construction and somewhat improve the living conditions of the workers. Significant reconstruction was undergone by Moscow, the capitals of the republics, and expanded new cities.

The rapid modernization of the country was a real feat of the workers, peasants and all the Soviet people. In terms of civilizational approach, at that time the transition from the pre-industrial and early industrial to the developed industrial type of production was carried out. However, as the years passed, the descendants of heroes and historians became convinced that both industrialization and the transformation of the countryside could have had more significant results without the unthinkable sacrifices (storming, famine, artificial aggravation of the class struggle, repressions) and the authoritarian-depressive regime, which subordinated life not to legal, but to arbitrary, command-order power.

§ 4. The First Five-Year Plan as a Stage of the Cultural Revolution

Party leadership of cultural reforms during the first five-year plans was exercised by the Agitation and Propaganda Directorate (Agitprop) of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In January 1930 it was divided into two independent departments - Department of Culture and Propaganda (with the sectors of scientific work and education, including the arts; Marxism-Leninism propaganda; the press, including fiction literature; A. I. Stetsky, head of the department) and the department of agitation and mass publications consisting of the sectors

of general agitation, mass campaigns of industrial character, mass campaigns of agricultural character, mass work among women workers and peasant women. The cultural and ideological apparatus on the same basis of the Communist Party of the Soviet Republics, the kray, (territory), regional, city and district party organs were the same principles.

In January 1932, the Cultural and Ideological divisions were dismantled. The number of their sectors was increased to 12. There were independent sectors of party education and political literacy; teaching of Leninism in high schools and secondary schools; mass propaganda of Leninism and party politics; public education; research institutions; industrial and technical propaganda; cultural services to factories and collective farms; newspaper; magazine; scientific literature; and art. Further development of cultural construction demanded a new restructuring of the Cult-Prop of the Central Committee and making its apparatus functionally and branch-oriented.

In May 1935 five departments were created on the basis of the Cultprop: Party propaganda and agitation (chief - Stetsky); press and publishing house (B. V. Tal); schools; cultural and educational work (A. S. Scherbakov, A. V. Kuznetsov, A. Yu. S. Scherbakov, from 1938 - A. A. Zhdanov); science, scientific and technical inventions and discoveries (B. M. Wolin). Direct management of all cultural affairs by the party bodies provided in many cases an effective solution to the issues of cultural construction. At the same time, because of their omnipotence, led to the infringement of the constitutional rights of state bodies.

Practical implementation of the Party's instructions in the field of cultural construction was carried out by the Commissariats of Education of the Union republics. In Russia, this work was led by the People's Commissariat headed by A. V. Lunacharski (until 1929) and A. S. Bubnov (1929-1937). It was then headed by A. P. Tyurkin and V. P. Potemkin.

In the beginning of the 30's the unification of the organizational structure of the Narkompros which was conditioned by the unity of the cultural policy and the uniform system of national education for all the republics was basically completed. In September 1933 in accordance with the resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR five departments were created in the Narkompros: the primary and secondary schools; the teacher training department; the university and research institutions; the library department; the theatrical and entertainment enterprises. The structure of Narkompros remained Glavrepertkom, and OGIZ. People's Commissariats of other Soviet republics were reorganized on the same basis.

With the beginning of the first Five-Year Plan, the broadened offensive in all directions of socialist construction forced to organize a new powerful attack on the front of the fight against illiteracy. (By the 1927/28 school year the illiterate population in the cities was 21.5%; in the villages, 56.7%.) Launched in 1928 on the initiative of the Komsomol, the All-Union Cultural Campaign to fight illiteracy turned into a mass movement. In 1930 more than a million students of Soviet party schools, teachers, cultural and educational workers were mobilized for this struggle. In 1931, the

number of learning adults reached 10 million.

The quality of education in the mass literacy movement could not be high: the cost of educating one illiterate decreased from 13 to 2.5 rubles. The system of general education schools in Russia by the end of the 20s included several types of schools. There were elementary, secondary, seven-year and nine-year schools, factory schools and schools for peasant youth. All forms of education covered about 8% of the population. In May 1929 the 5th Congress of the USSR Soviets decided to begin with the implementation of the universal compulsory education for children up to 15 years old (universal education). On July 29, 1930 the Central Committee of the Party adopted a resolution "On the universal compulsory primary education". With the adoption of a similar resolution of the CEC and CPC of the USSR in August of the same year, compulsory primary education acquired the force of law. Since September 1930, universal free and compulsory primary (four-class) education of children was introduced in the country. In the cities and worker's settlements universal education was provided in the amount of a seven-year school. Local Soviet bodies were given the right to introduce compulsory education in other districts as well. It was proposed to greatly increase the number of day and evening schools for youth in the countryside. State appropriations for school education in 1930 increased tenfold compared to 1925/26. In August 1930 a program for the introduction of compulsory elementary education was drawn up and approved. Financial support for it predetermined the construction of new schools, free supply of clothing, footwear, food, textbooks and writing materials for elementary school students. Accordingly, new tasks were to be solved by

the paper industry, printing, etc.

The 16th Party Congress in June 1930 noted that universal compulsory primary education and the elimination of illiteracy should become the Party's combat task for the near future. "The main thing now," stressed Stalin at the Congress, "is to move to universal compulsory primary education. I say 'the main thing,' because such a transition would mean a decisive step in the cultural revolution."

The shortage of teachers in the transition to universal education was solved by giving everyone who had a seven-year education, the right to work in elementary school - it was enough to finish short-term (six months to three weeks) courses for training and retraining of teachers. There were accelerated graduations from pedagogical institutes and colleges. Enrollment in pedagogical institutes increased by more than 2 times, in pedagogical colleges - by 3 times. In 1930-1932, the Komsomol held three all-Union mobilizations for pedagogical work of literate Komsomol members. All this made it possible to cover by the end of the first five-year plan with training in the primary School 98% of children aged 8 to 11 years (in 1927/28 - 51.4%). At the same time, work was carried out to teach the illiterate and low-literate. In 1933, People's Commissar of Education Bubnov announced that the plan of teaching of illiterates and semi-literates in the first five-year plan (18.5 million) was over-fulfilled in the Soviet Union more than 2.5 times. In 1932 six times more money was spent on education than in 1927/28, and almost twice as much as required by the five-year plan.

The industrialization of the country necessitated an

acceleration of the training of skilled personnel for industry. The training of workers was carried out in stationary educational institutions, with and without discontinuing production. Mass training was carried out by factory apprentice schools (FZU). This system included schools with a two-year training period which produced workers of mass professions of 3-4 categories; schools with the training period of 2 to 3 years trained universal workers of 5-6 categories, and from 3 to 4 years - machine setters, controllers and highly skilled workers. The period of training was shortened as the general educational background of the entrants increased. In the autumn of 1933 the FZU schools were reorganized into vocational educational institutions for training of the mass workers of the persons which had graduated from the seven-year school. The period of training in them was decreased from two years to six months, and for the most complex professions - to one year.

With the transition to industrialization the system of secondary and higher education was also restructured. Since 1931, the acceleration of the rate of creation of a new technical intelligentsia of working-class people was carried out under the well-known slogans: "It's time for the Bolsheviks to become specialists themselves", "Technique solves everything in the period of reconstruction". To implement these tasks it was proposed to increase the number of new cadres of technical specialists by 4 times in 2-3 years, in connection with which the period of study in technical universities was reduced from 5 to 3 years. Senior classes of secondary schools were transformed into technical schools, some technical schools -* into high schools, a number of polytechnic institutes and multi-

branch high schools were dismantled, their faculties and departments became independent educational institutions.

As a result, by the end of the first five-year plan the output of specialists from technical colleges was increased almost fourfold, from technical schools - 6.5 fold. During 1929-1932 the universities trained 170 thousand specialists, during 1933-1937 – 370,000 specialists. - In total about 2 million specialists left universities and technical schools in 1928-1937. But it was very difficult to maintain a high level of professional training when the period of education was reduced.

The All-Union Industrial Academy in Moscow was created in the late 20's to train highly qualified cadres of economic managers (the first graduation was in 1930). Similar educational institutions worked in other industrial cities. The problems of improving quality and bringing training of technical specialists into production with the beginning of the first five-year plan were solved by the transfer of the relevant higher educational institutions from the direction of the People's Commissariat for Education to the sectoral People's Commissariat for Education. This has contributed to the strengthening of the material and technical base of universities. Their laboratories were equipped with new types of equipment. Construction of academic buildings and dormitories were conducted at the expense of the industries.

In the mid 30's, after a number of leftist experiments in the 20's, it was possible to create an effective system of education. In the early 1930s, the previously practiced brigade method of crediting which sharply reduced the personal responsibility of students for results of their

studies was abolished. In June 1936, the USSR CPC passed a decree "On the work of higher educational institutions and on the management of higher education" which legalized lectures, seminars, and practical training.

The new Soviet intelligentsia was formed from three sources - specialists from the pre-revolutionary school, nominees from the workers' and peasants' environment, and through training in secondary special and higher educational institutions. In 1933 the All-Union Committee on Higher Technical Education under the USSR Central Executive Committee was created for the general management of higher education institutions, which in 1936 was transformed into the All-Union Committee on Higher Education under the USSR Council of People's Commissars. From May 1936 to November 1937, the Committee was headed by I. I. Mezhlauk, later - by S. V. Kaftanov.

During the Second Five Year Plan the material basis for implementation of the program of total literacy was created in the USSR: up to 20 thousand new schools were established, approximately as many as were created in the tsarist Russia for 200 years. School education acquired greater consistency. According to the resolution of SNK of the USSR of May 15, 1934 "On the structure of primary and secondary schools" there were established three types of secondary schools: primary (1-4th grades), junior secondary (1-7th grades) and secondary (1-10th grades).

During the second five-year plan the number of primary and secondary school pupils grew in the USSR from 21.3 to 29.4 million. State spending on cultural

construction (school, personnel, science, press, etc.) was 5 times more than during the first five-year plan. In 1934-1938 the production of school textbooks was doubled.

With the development of universal education the very concept of literacy was changing. Alphabetic literacy was no longer satisfying, because it did not meet the needs of economic and cultural construction. A person who did not have the knowledge of four grades, was considered illiterate. In January 1936 the government and the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) adopted a decree "On work on teaching illiterates and semi-literates", which set the task to achieve real success in the complete elimination of illiteracy and ignorance of workers under the age of 50 within two years. In accordance with this, the training of adults in general education schools was expanded. At the same time two types of evening schools with a three-year period of study - incomplete secondary school for adults (based on primary school) and a full secondary school for adults (based on a seven-year school).

The development of science in the country was largely aimed at helping the national economic production. The 5th Congress of Soviets of the USSR (May 1929) proposed to immediately begin the fullest possible deployment of research institutes for the development of agricultural experimentation. The All-Union Agricultural Academy named after V. I. Lenin Academy of Agriculture (VASKhNIL) with 12 institutes, established in 1929. This academy was subordinate to People's Commissariat of the USSR and included in a unified system of research institutes covering all branches of agricultural production. The activities of industrial research institutes were also

closely related to the reconstruction of the national economy. In 1928-1931 their number increased from 30 to 205 (almost 7 times). By the end of the second five-year plan there were 867 scientific-research institutes and 283 branches employing nearly 38 thousand researchers. During the 1930s, the links between science and the practice of economic construction were also strengthened through the deployment of a network of factory laboratories. They were to maintain close ties with research institutes and provide scientific and technical services to industry.

On January 13, 1934 the USSR Council of People's Commissars adopted the decree "On Academic Degrees and Titles". Instead of the single title of scientific specialist that existed since 1918, there were established the scientific degrees of Candidate and Doctor of Sciences (the first was awarded on the basis of the defense of candidate's thesis, the second - doctoral thesis) and the scientific ranks of assistant, junior researcher, associate professor, professor, full member of the scientific institution. Titles were assigned depending on the pedagogical and research work performed. By January 1, 1936 in the USSR were over 2500 professors and over 3800 associate professors, about 1800 doctors and 3 thousands of candidates of sciences.

The USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by great scientists and organizers - presidents A. P. Karpinsky (1917-1936) and V. L. Komarov (1936-1945), in 1930 it was placed under the authority of the Scientific Committee of the CEC of the USSR. According to the new Charter, it became the main center of the country for the development of theoretical problems of science.

On December 14, 1933 was issued the resolution of the USSR Central Executive Committee which had transferred the Academy under the authority of the USSR Council of People's Commissars. In April 1934 it moved from Leningrad to Moscow.

In all, by spring of 1929 there were 1227 scientific institutions in the USSR (of them 7 academies and associations, 789 institutes, 34 centers of archives). Most of them were concentrated in Leningrad, Moscow and Kharkov. In the RSFSR there were 276 institutes with their branches, in Ukraine - 88, in Belorussia - 19, Georgia - 22, Uzbekistan - 12, Azerbaijan - 9, Armenia - 6, Turkmenistan - 4, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan - one institute each. They employed about 25 thousand scientists (in 1917 - about 12 thousand). By 1929 nearly a third of them were graduates of Soviet universities.

During the first five-year plans the scientific institutions of the USSR Academy of Sciences, created after 1917, significantly expanded their activities: the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (TsAGI); the State Optical Institute; the Institutes of Physical and Chemical Analysis and Biological Physics; the Petrograd Physico-Technical Institute; the Institute of Physiology; the Soil Institute named after V. V. V. Kuznetsov. B. V. Dokuchaev, etc. In the early 1930's the Geological Institute (1930); the Power Engineering Institute (1930); and the Institute of Physical Chemistry (1931) were formed and quickly became widely known. In 1932, there were 28 institutes in the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the total number of academic institutions reached sixty six.

The transfer of the USSR Academy of Sciences to

Moscow caused the relocation of many academic research institutions. The Presidium of the Academy, physical and mathematical, chemical, geological and partially biological institutions moved there.

Mathematical Institute named after V. A. Steklov (1934); Physical Institute named after V. A. Steklov (1934). П.Н. Lebedev Institute in Moscow (1934, headed by S. I. Vavilov); the Institute of Organic Chemistry (1934; A. E. Favorsky and N. D. Zelinsky), General and Inorganic Chemistry (1934; N. S. Kurnakov); Physical Problems (1934; P. L. Kapitsa). In the 1930s the research work was started in Azerbaijani, Armenian, Georgian, Far East, Kazakh and Ural branches; Kola, Northern and Tadjik bases of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Since the mid 1930s there was unfolding a network of research institutes in universities. The system of universities started to operate 26 research institutes, dozens of laboratories, stations, observatories and other institutions. At Kazan University the A. M. Butlerov Institute of Chemistry was established, at Gorky University - the Research Institute of Physics and Technology; at Tomsk University - the State Research Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics; at Tbilisi University the research institutes of mathematics, geography, language and literature began to operate. A great contribution to the improvement of military technical knowledge and military equipment were made by the new specialized military academies: mechanization and motorization of the Red Army, artillery, military engineering, military chemical, military electrotechnical, military transport, etc.

In April 1936 the Red Army Combat Training Department, headed by Deputy People's Commissar M.

N. Tukhachevsky, was established in the People's Commissariat of Defense. His execution in connection with the case of "anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization in the Red Army" had a deterrent effect on the technical re-equipment of the army.

In the 1930s, all major research centers and research institutes were headed by famous scientists, creators of scientific schools and new research directions: A.P. Karpinsky, I. P. Pavlov, A. N. Bakh, V. P. Volgin, I. M. Gubkin, A. F. Ioffe, V. L. Komarov, G. M. Krzhizhanovsky, N. S. Kurnakov, N. Y. Marr, M. N. Pokrovsky, A. N. Tupolev, E. O. Paton, I. P. Bardin, N. I. Vavilov, S. I. Vavilov, N. P. Gorbunov, P. L. Kapitsa, N. N. Semenov, A. A. Bogomolets, T. N. Kara-Niyazov, and others. From 1925 to 1934 particularly outstanding scientific achievements were rewarded with the Lenin Prize. Since 1934, for the same purposes, the USSR Academy of Sciences has established and begun to award prizes in the name of outstanding national scientists and figures of the Soviet state. The following awards were established: the Mendeleev, Pavlov, Kirov, Obruchev, Williams, Kovalevsky, Arkhangelsky, Timiryazev awards.

The 1930s were marked by important achievements in natural science. Soviet mathematics was strengthening its position in the world. I. M. Vinogradov, D. F. Egorov, S. N. Bernstein, N. N. Luzin, A. N. Kolmogorov, L. C. N. Luzin, A. N. Kolmogorov, L. S. Pontryagin, and N. N. Bogoliubov made major contributions to the development of the newest branches of mathematics and its applications.

In the late 20s and 30s Soviet scientists made a number

of outstanding discoveries. For example, the phenomenon of Raman scattering of light on crystals (1928; L. I. Mandelstam and G. S. Landsberg); the quantum theory of this phenomenon was developed by I. E. Tamm, and the method of detecting cosmic rays was developed by D. V. Skobeltsyn (1929); a special luminescence of pure liquids caused by gamma-rays was named the "Vavilov-Cherenkov Effect" (1934); a complete theory of the effect was presented by I. E. Tamm and I. M. Frank (1937). In 1958, Cherenkov, Frank, and Tamm were awarded the Nobel Prize for the discovery and explanation of the phenomenon. In 1934, a monograph by N. N. Semenov's "Chemical Kinetics and Chain Reactions" was published. Further work on the manifestation of details of chain reactions and generalization of the results of discoveries made by the scientist and his pupils were awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1956.

In the early 30's in the USSR, research on the physics of the atomic nucleus was developed. The first successes in this field are associated with theoretical works: the proton-neutron model of the nucleus (D. D. Ivanenko), exchange forces (I. E. Tamm and D. D. Ivanenko). L. D. Landau in 1932. In 1932, after the discovery of the neutron, he predicted the existence of the neutron state of matter. The advanced position of the USSR in nuclear research was demonstrated at the 1st (September 1933) and 2nd (September 1937) All-Union Conferences on Atomic Nucleus Physics, which were attended by foreign scientists. I.V. Kurchatov discovered the phenomenon of nuclear reactions branching in 1934. The first in the USSR and Europe cyclotron - a facility for atomic nucleus splitting - was established at the Radium Institute in 1937 (L. V. Mysovsky, V. N. Rukavishnikov, I.

V. Kurchatov, and others).

Scientists in the field of solid state physics, semiconductors, and dielectrics (A. F. Ioffe, I. E. Tamm, and I. K. Kikoin) have achieved great success. P.L. Kapitsa created the world's first helium liquefier in 1934, and his subsequent developments in this field were a great contribution to the development of the Soviet and world technology of gas liquefaction.

In the first half of the 1930s, the first radars were created in the USSR (P. K. Oshchepkov and others). One of the pioneers of electronic technology based on the use of electron and ion beams, electric and electromagnetic fields was A. L. Chizhevsky. He is the owner of the world's first invention of electric dyeing method. He also became the founder of heliobiology - the science of the relationship between solar phenomena and the life of terrestrial organisms, which at the time was unjustly criticized.

The brilliant school of Soviet mechanical scientists was formed in TsAGI under the leadership of S. A. Chaplygin. In the 1930s the Institute became the unique scientific center of theoretical and experimental research in the field of hydroaerodynamics applied to the problems of aviation, hydro-machine building, shipbuilding and other industries. For the deployment of research work in these areas from TsAGI were separated from the departments: aviation materials and propeller-engine. On their basis the All-Union Institute of Aviation Materials and the Central Institute of Aviation Engine Building were established. Along with the major design bureaus

A. N. N. Tupolev and N. N. Polikarpov, small design bureaus - K. A. Kalinin, D. M. Grigorovich, A. I. Putilov,

and A. S. Yakovlev - worked successfully, B. B. (Lavrov), Beriev and others. The Soviet aircraft became a world leader in terms of range, flight altitude, payload capacity and other parameters. The planes of domestic design made it possible to make flights which made the Soviet Union famous (V.P. Chkalov, M. M. Gromov, V. Kokkinaki, M. V. Vodopyanov, V. S. Grizodubova and others). In particular, in June and July 1937 and later in 1939 there were non-stop flights from Moscow to USA across the North Pole on Tupolev designed aircraft.

In the 30's, the classic works of N. I. Vavilov on the centers of origin of cultivated plants and on their geography appeared. Unfortunately, biology and genetics were detrimentally affected by the activities of a group of biologists under the leadership of the creator of the pseudoscientific "Michurin doctrine" T. D. Lysenko and the philosopher I. I. Presentation, who played a major detrimental role in the struggle for the Bolshevization (or totalitarianization) of agricultural science and practice. Nevertheless, agricultural practice in the 30s was enriched by the achievements of scientific schools on the grass-field farming system (head of the school V. R. Villamet), plant nutrition and chemicalization of agriculture (D. N. Pryanishnikov) and drought control (N. M. Tulaykov). Under the direction of the latter, a new soil map of the country was prepared.

Less significant were the achievements of the 30s in the humanitarian and artistic spheres. Literature, art, and cinema were undergoing a process of organizational and ideological unification.

The ideology of the "socialist offensive" was

characterized by the curtailment of the diversity of spiritual life processes inherent in the twenties and the affirmation of monopolism, leaderism and cult consciousness. In April 1932, the Central Committee of the Party adopted a decree on the restructuring of literary and artistic organizations in order to overcome their fragmentation, circular isolation and "detachment from the political tasks of the present". The "creative" method of "socialist realism" was forcibly imposed in literature and the arts, which demanded that reality be depicted in a "socialist perspective" and turned literary and artistic figures into apologists for socialism. Many works created in the tradition of socialist realism, imbued with the spirit of vulgar politicization, class enmity and hatred. However, the variety of techniques of artistic creativity within a single method, creative talent allowed to create large-scale artistic works, which forever entered the golden fund of literature, music, film, painting, which had a tremendous impact on society and forming in it new ideals, interests, needs, standards and stereotypes of behavior.

Soviet literature and art in the 1930s were enriched by new works by A. Gorky, M. Sholokhov, A. Tolstoy, A. Fadeev, P. Pavlenko, F. Gladkov, F. Panferov, L. Leonov, M. Bulgakov, A. Platonov, S. Marshak, K. Chukovsky, M. Zoshchenko, I. Ilf and E. Petrov, B. Pilniak, E. Zamyatin, I. Babel, N. Klyuev, O. Mandelstam; performances by K. Stanislavsky and V. Nemirovich-Danchenko, V. Meyerhold and A. Tairov; films by P. Eck (director of the first sound film). The films of S. Gerasimov, and S. Vasilyev, G. Alexandrov, S. Eisenstein, G. Kozintsev, L. Trauberg, E. Dzigan; music by S. Prokofiev, Shostakovich, Khachaturian, Khrennikov, Kabalevsky, and Dunayevsky; paintings by

Grekov, B. M., and J. Gergiev. Ioganson, M. Nesterov, P. Korin, I. Grabar, A. Deineka, A. Plastov, Yu. Pimenov, K. Petrov-Vodkin, P. Konchalovsky, A. Rylov, M. Sarian, P. Filonov, K. Malevich; sculptures by V. Mukhina, N. Tomsky, M. Manizer, N. Andreev, I. Shadr; architectural constructions by V. L. and A. Vesnin, K. Melnikov, A. Shchusev, I. Zholtovsky, B. Iofan, A. Langman, and L. Rudnev.

A notable trace in the history of the cultures of national and Soviet people as a whole was left by the masters of culture of the republics of the USSR. These include, for example, such writers and poets as M. Bazhan, M. Rylsky, P. Tychina, V. Sosyura, A. Korneichuk (Ukraine), Y. Kupala, Y. Kolas, P. Brovka (Belarus), T. Tabidze, P. Yashvili (Georgia), S. Zoryan, E. Charents (Armenia), S. Rustam, and S. Vurgun (Azerbaijan), M. Tursun-zade, S. Aini (Tajikistan), B. Kerbabaev (Turkmenistan), Zulfia, Aibek (Uzbekistan), M. Auezov (Kazakhstan), K. Kuliev (Kabardino-Balkaria), Suleyman Stalsky, G. Tsadasa (Dagestan), Sh. Jalil (Tatarstan), and many others.

The foundations of the new ideology and culture were adopted not only by the united organizations of the creative intelligentsia (the Unions of Writers, Artists, Composers and Architects) created in the thirties, but also by the censorship agencies (Glavsilit, Glaviskusstvo, Glavrepertkom) that exercised ideological control over the activities of creative organizations, exhibitions, contests, films and theater repertoires. The same purpose was served by the purges of libraries and the transfer for "special preservation" of scientific works, artistic and journalistic works that did not conform to the new system of values. Both deliberately ignoring these regulations and artists' deviation from the party line, led

to all kinds of trouble - exclusion from the Union, deprivation of the publication of works (and hence, of material goods), and direct repression.

The 1930s were associated with a series of campaigns to criticize and rethink the state of philosophy, political economy, and to root out hostile views and theories. Most significant was the rethinking of the role of historical science and education as the most effective means of controlling the memory of the people and the formation of patriotic feelings. The historical nihilism and Russophobia that had been inculcated in the 1920s by M. N. Pokrovskii's school of history were condemned.

On March 29, 1934, the Politburo "recognized it necessary to restore, on September 1, 1934, the historical faculties at Moscow and Leningrad universities, and then at Tomsk, Kazan, Rostov, and Saratov universities. With the opening of history departments in the universities began a campaign to revise the attitude to the history of the country, the continuity in the development of history of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was restored. Were "rehabilitated" and began to celebrate the events and associated names, contributing to strengthening the power of the state and its progress: the princes and kings, military leaders, men of science and culture, previously mentioned only as exploiters and their servants.

The Soviet period of history, inextricably linked to the triumph of Marxism-Leninism, state patriotism, and the prominent role of Stalin, was placed in the context of civilization and progress.

The August 1937 approval by a special government commission of A. V. Shestakov's textbook on the history

of the USSR for elementary school (A. A. Zhdanov, the Central Committee's secretary for ideology, played a major role in its creation) served to confirm these ideas in the mass consciousness. A. A. Zhdanov) and "A Short Course of the History of the VKP(b)", written for the most part by E. M. Yaroslavsky and P. N. Pospelov. It was first published in Pravda in September 1938. The author of the titles of all the chapters of the book, the text of the central section of Chapter IV "On Dialectical and Historical Materialism," numerous inserts, and the editing of the text was Stalin. The "Political Dictionary" (1940) stated that the entire "Brief Course" was prepared "on the initiative and with the closest personal participation of Comrade Stalin", and in the book "Stalin I. A Brief Biography" (1947) stated that in 1938 a "Brief Course of the History of the VKP(b)" was published, "written by Comrade Stalin and approved by a commission of the Central Committee".

The teaching of social disciplines offered ample opportunity for exposure to the country's history and an understanding of the significance of the revolutionary experience of the past decades. However, the teaching of the disciplines was merged with the propaganda of the cult of personality, the justification of repression, and spy mania. For example, Shestakov's textbook reported that "the enemies of the people had a program - to restore the yoke of the capitalists and landlords in the USSR. Spies sneak into factories and plants, big cities and villages. It is necessary to keep a close watch on all suspicious people in order to catch fascist agents."

§ 5. The Constitution of "Victorious Socialism" and the Struggle against the "Enemies of the People"

By the mid-1930s significant economic, social, and political changes had taken place in the country. The multi-economic structure and the remnants of the exploiting classes were eliminated; the peasantry was socially transformed, a new intelligentsia and a new ruling class were formed. On February 1, 1935, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) came up with the initiative of making "some changes" to the existing Constitution. But in the process of work it turned out that it was impossible to do without specifying and amending the text of the country's Basic Law. As a result, a new integral draft appeared by May 1936.

Legally, the former USSR Constitution consisted of two parts: The Declaration and the Treaty on Establishment of the USSR. The Constitutional Commission, created at the VIIth All-Union Congress of Soviets on February 6, 1935. It practically abandoned the contractual nature of the first Union Constitution, and embarked on the path of preparing a principally new document - the All-Union Constitution, which covered all the aspects of the state life. The proposals of 12 sub-commissions and individual members of the Constitutional Commission were put together in April 1936 by a working group of three leading personnel of the Central Committee: A. A. Stetsky, B. M. Tal, and A. Ya. M. Tal and A. Yakovlev. As a result, "a draft outline of the Constitution" was drawn up, on the basis of which its "initial draft" was elaborated. It was repeatedly discussed and edited. Stalin crossed out of it a number of proposals (Bukharin and others) aimed at democratizing the political system

and expanding the rights of citizens.

The members of the Constitutional Commission proposed significant changes in the national-state structure of the Union of the SSR. In addition to abolishing the ZSFSR and transferring Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia into the union republics, it was proposed to grant the same status to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tatarstan, Bashkiria and the Buryat-Mongol republics, and to transfer all the autonomous oblasts into the category of autonomous republics. It is typical that the commission did not request the opinions of the republics and oblasts whose fate was being decided. And not all the proposals were included in the final draft. The text of the draft Constitution which was basically approved by the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Presidium of the CEC of the USSR in the beginning of June, 1936 was published on June 12 for the national public discussion. It lasted almost half a year. The Presidium of the CEC registered about 170 thousand proposals for amendments and additions to the text which were submitted to the Constitutional Commission. Of course, the overwhelming majority of them were not reflected in the Constitution.

In November, after public discussion of the draft, it was submitted to the extraordinary VIII Congress of Soviets (November 25 - December 5, 1936) for the additional editing. On December 5 the Congress approved the draft Constitution.

The new Fundamental Law proclaimed the victory of socialism in the country. Socialist property, which existed in two forms, state and cooperative collective farms, was declared the economic basis of the state. Along with the

socialist system of economy, the law admitted a small-scale individual economy based on personal labor.

The most significant difference between the new Constitution of the USSR was that it, (unlike the previous one), no longer contained the "Declaration on the Formation of the USSR" - the most ideologized part of the Basic Law. It stressed the exclusiveness of the country's political system and explained its isolation by its unconcealed aspiration for the world revolution and the unification of the workers of all countries into the mythical "World Socialist Soviet Republic".

Article 2 of the new Constitution declared: "The political basis of the USSR is formed by the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, raised and strengthened as a result of overthrowing the power of landlords and capitalists and conquests of the dictatorship of the proletariat". At the same time, instead of all-Union, republican and oblast congresses of Soviets, a system including district, city and republican Soviets was consolidated. At the apex of the state power pyramid was the USSR Supreme Soviet, established to replace the former CEC as the highest body of authority in the USSR, elected by direct, secret ballot and consisting of two chambers with equal rights.

One of the chambers, the Council of the Union, was elected by districts, with the norm of one deputy per 300,000 inhabitants. The other, the Council of Nationalities, was elected by union and autonomous republics, autonomous regions and national districts, based on the norm: 25 deputies from each union republic, 11 deputies from each autonomous republic, 5 deputies from each autonomous oblast and one deputy from each national district. (In practice, the elections

were held on a non-alternative basis: only one candidate of the "bloc of communists and non-partisans", approved by the corresponding party instances, was put on the ballots.)

For the first time, the Constitution legally defined the place and role of the Communist Party in the political system. The All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was proclaimed the "foremost workers' unit" representing "the leading nucleus of all workers' organizations, both public and state". Article 126, containing this notation, was actually understood as a constitutional consolidation of the leading position, the party's monopoly on political power. The Party committees of institutions, enterprises, MTS and collective farms, as it followed from the Statute of the VKP(b), adopted at its first congress after the new Constitution came into force, were given the right to control the activities of the administration.

Real power in the country was in fact concentrated in the hands of a narrow group of persons who belonged to the Politburo of the Central Committee. And the entire management system of state and public organizations was completely controlled by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The Central Committee apparatus included the Personnel Department, which had 45 departments in all branches of state, economic and socio-political life. It not only shaped the leadership, appointing top executives (euphemisms for appointments were recommendations to elect or confirm the name of the person in office), but also exercised day-to-day control over the nomenklatura workers.

Article 126 of the Constitution actually defined the

structure of society's political system, listing all of its elements. Besides the CPSU(b), it named "trade unions, cooperative associations, youth organizations, sports and defense organizations, and cultural, technical and scientific societies". Attention is drawn to the absence in this exhaustive list of socio-political organizations. It meant that only the named elements of the system were considered legitimate. Other organizations, parties, or movements that could emerge had to be considered informal, and illegal.

In the new Constitution, compared to the previous one, the centralization of economic and political life was increasing. The number of joint people's commissariats at the Center, especially those designed to direct the economy, increased. The Basic Law contained the list of union, union-republican and republican commissariats. The former included the People's Commissariats: Defense, Foreign Affairs; Foreign Trade, Railways; Communication; Water Transport; Heavy Industry, Defense Industry. The second were commissars of food, light, timber industry, agriculture, grain and livestock collective farms, finance, internal trade, internal affairs, justice, health.

A number of branches of state administration were under the jurisdiction of the Union republics only: education, local industry; public utilities, and social security.

The Constitution declared a wide range of civil and personal rights, including the right to work, rest, education, old-age financial security, and in case of illness and disability. The equality of all citizens irrespective of their nationality and race in all spheres of economic, state, cultural and social-political life as well

as the equality of men and women were proclaimed by the fixed laws. However, the principle of equality of citizens in many respects remained only on paper.

For example, it did not apply to representatives of nations and national minorities, peoples who had established their own national statehood but did not have one. The principle was not fully implemented in the question of legal equality of the urban and rural populations. The majority of rural inhabitants, unlike townspeople, did not have passports and were actually attached to collective farms; they were not covered by the pension legislation and other social guarantees.

For the first time, the Constitution spoke about inviolability of person, home and protection of secrecy of correspondence (Articles 127, 128). This was to be ensured by the fact that arrests, searches, and seizures of correspondence could be made only with a prosecutor's warrant or by court decision. However, these guarantees were universally violated during mass repressions.

The new Constitution reflected a hardening of the state's position toward the Church at the end of the 1920s in connection with collectivization and the transition to mass repressions of those who were classified as class-hostile. This category included clergymen and believers. A directive sent to the places in early 1929 and signed by L. M. Kaganovich emphasized that religious organizations were the only legally existing counterrevolutionary force with influence on the masses.

The Constitutions of the RSFSR of 1918 and 1925, where in order to ensure their own freedom of

conscience, the separation of Church from State and school from Church was proclaimed, stating that freedom of religious and antireligious propaganda is recognized for all citizens. However, in 1929, at the suggestion of a commission headed by E. M. Yaroslavsky, the following amendment was made: "Freedom of worship and freedom of antireligious propaganda is recognized for all citizens".

The new Constitution of the USSR also spoke about freedom of conscience in this same wording. Article 124 enshrined the obvious inequality between believers and non-believers. The former no longer had the right to conduct religious propaganda; they were guaranteed only the freedom to practice their religion. The latter, on the other hand, were legally entitled to conduct antireligious propaganda.

The constitution of 1936 proclaimed the abolition of democratic restrictions inherent in the transitional period. General direct (instead of multi-step), equal (instead of proportional) and secret (instead of open) elections to the Soviets of all levels were established. The exclusion from political life of any categories of the population, except those convicted by the court and the insane, was abolished. Disenfranchisement expanded dramatically during the "great break". During the 1928-1929 election campaign in the USSR, 3.7 million people, or 4.9% of the adult population (4.1% of the rural population and 8.5% of the urban population) were put on the deprivation lists. In 1930, the category of the deprived was supplemented by former prisoners. Now it included "former": landowners, merchants, kulaks, nobles, police officers, tsarist officials, owners of private businesses, members of the opposition political parties, white officers, as well

as ministers of religion, monks. In 1932 the "dispossessed" together with their families numbered 7 million people with no rights - no suffrage, housing, health care and even no ration cards.

On the basis of the new Constitution of the USSR were developed and adopted constitutions of the Union republics, in particular - the RSFSR (January 21, 1937). It consolidated the new systems of power, administration and elections; the changed administrative-territorial division caused by the sharply increased centralization of the management during the transition to the forced industrialization and collectivization of agriculture.

In 1929, the three-tier system of administrative-territorial division of the country: province, region (kray), district, was recognized as inefficient because the central party-state apparatus remained too distant from the management of local party organizations and Soviets. The 16th Party Conference (April 1929) considered the districts an unnecessary link in the territorial system, and in July 1930, the CEC and SNK of the USSR adopted a corresponding resolution. The transition to a two-link system increased the role of the district apparatus and contributed to the transformation of districts into strongholds of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The excessive cumbersomeness of the oblasts and krays, which numbered dozens and hundreds of districts, was overcome by downsizing. As a result, the total number of districts in all republics of the USSR increased from 2,443 in 1934 to 3,463 in 1938. The number of regions and districts increased 2.5 times during the 1930s. The liquidation did not affect the national districts.

On the contrary, their number increased due to the

creation in 1929 of the Nenets National District in the Arkhangelsk Region. In 1930, several new national districts appeared at once: Vitimo-Olekminsky (Chita Region), Koryaksky (Kamchatka Region); Ostyako-Vogulsky (since 1940, Khanty-Mansiysky - in Tyumen Region), Taimyrsky (Krasnoyarsk Region); Chukotsky (Magadan Region); Evenky (Krasnoyarsk Region), Yamal-Nenetsky (Tyumen Region). In 1934 appeared Argayash national district in the Chita region. In 1937, Aginsky Buryat, Ust-Ordynsky Buryat and Karelian (Kalinin region) national districts were formed. In the early 30's the number of national districts and village councils increased significantly. On the territory of the Soviet Ukraine there were 28 national districts (including 9 Russian, 8 German, 3 Bulgarian, 1 Polish) and 1,076 national village councils by June of 1935. There were 250 (as of January 1933) and 240 (as of July 1934) national districts on the territory of the USSR; as well as 5,300 (as of 1933-1934) national village councils. Every tenth district and eighth to ninth village council in the country was categorized as national.

In the RSFSR by the beginning of 1931 there were 14 territories and regions, 14 autonomous republics and 2,085 districts. By the time the new Constitution of the USSR was adopted, its composition had significantly changed. The Kara-Kalpak (1932), Mordovian (1934) and Udmurtian (1934) autonomous regions were transformed into autonomous republics. In 1934 there were formed Chechen-Ingush and Jewish Autonomous Regions. December 5, 1936 Komi, Mari, North Ossetian, Kabardino-Balkar and Chechen-Ingush autonomous republics. At the same time, the Kazakh and Kyrgyz ASSR seceded from Russia and joined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The new Constitution of the USSR and the constitutions of the Union republics drafted on its basis made no mention of the lower levels of the Soviet federation (the national districts and village councils), which, as it soon turned out, meant a transition to a policy aimed at their elimination and curtailing work with national minorities. In 1937, the RSFSR consisted of 5 krays, 19 oblasts, 17 autonomous republics, 6 autonomous oblasts, and 10 autonomous okrugs (districts). On the eve of World War II, on March 31st 1940, the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was reorganized into the Karelian-Finnish SSR, also separated from the RSFSR. The creation of the autonomous formations ensured the fullest exposure of the economic, political and cultural development of each nationality, and provided the most favorable conditions for the training of national personnel.

The system of power and administration in the union republics was built by analogy with the central one. The Constitutions of the Union Republics had to comply with the Fundamental Law of the USSR. In the case of divergence of the union and republic versions, the union law was in effect.

The elections to the new authorities, in accordance with the new constitutions, were held in 1937 and 1938 in a festive atmosphere. However, the "triumph of democracy" coexisted with mass repressions. They were called "Yezhovshchina" - on behalf of Nikolai Yezhov, appointed in September 1936 People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, who replaced G. G. Yagoda, accused of conspiracy. G. G. Yagoda had been head of the People's Commissariat since July 1934.

The ideological campaign, connected with the adoption of the new USSR Constitution and the first elections on its basis, became a kind of screen which hid the fight with dissent in the party and the country as a whole, which by that time had become extremely tense. Its origins should be sought in the desire of Stalin and his entourage to prevent the emergence of new opposition groups (and their association with the old ones) in the context of the implementation of audacious, sometimes adventurist plans to restructure the country. The confrontation at the beginning of collectivization with the bulk of the peasantry also forced him to resort to a previously tried and tested weapon - the "red terror" against the "class enemies". The need to be fully armed in the face of the threat of Hitler's Germany justified the decisive measures.

The resounding murder of S. M. Kirov was used to start implementing the idea of the necessity of physically eliminating all real and probable opponents to Stalin who could become the organizers and potential, as they called it later, of a "fifth column" acting in the event of war on the side of the enemy army and undermining the rear. The official thesis was that the "enemies of the people" infiltrated everywhere: in all party, soviet and economic bodies, and in the Red Army leadership. The situation in the country became more and more in line with the situation drawn in 1938 by B. Romashov in the play "Home": "We live in our big Soviet house, working, having fun, having fun. And some personalities wander around our house and try to blow it up." The campaign to expose and purge the country of "enemies" in 1935-1938 was accompanied by numerous lawsuits.

The first of the most high-profile were the trials of the "Leningrad counter-revolutionary Zinoviev group of G. I. Safarov, Il. A. Zalutsky and others" (January 1935) and "the Moscow counterrevolutionary organization, the group of 'workers' opposition" (March-April 1935). (March-April 1935, the main accused A.G. Shlyapnikov, S.P. Medvedev).

At the very beginning of 1935, the so-called "Kremlin case" arose, which resulted in the removal from the post of Secretary of the CEC of the USSR A. S. Enukidze, who, moreover, was the godfather of Stalin's wife, N. S. Alliluyeva. As noted in the resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee of April 3, 1935 "On the CEC apparatus and Comrade Enukidze" of April 3, 1935. The real motives of his transfer "to a smaller job" could not be officially announced in the press "since their publication could discredit the highest organ of the Soviet Authority". Modern historians consider this case, unlike many others, not a fiction, but to a large extent a reflection of real events and facts (see: Zhukov Y. N. The Other Stalin. M., 2003).

Due to the peculiar personal qualities of the hardened bachelor Enukidze, the CEC apparatus (Secretariat of the CEC, Commandant's Office of the Kremlin, Government Library, Armory Chamber) "admitted employees and female staff not on business grounds, but on familiarity, personal ties and often on the willingness of a received employee to cohabit with one or other of the senior employees of the CEC Secretariat. As a result, as stated in the quoted document, the apparatus turned out to be "extremely contaminated with elements alien and hostile to the Soviet state". In particular, the employees of the government library were

N. A. Rosenfeld, née Princess Bebutova, the former wife of L. B. Kamenev's brother; former noblewomen N. I. Burago, 3. I. Davydova, E. K. Mukhanova, E. Yu. This entire company was accused of spreading "slander about Comrade Stalin".

The women actively discussed the version that Stalin's wife died unnaturally - that Alliluyeva's suicide, and possibly her murder, was due to her disagreement with the political course pursued in the country, as a result of which the village was impoverished and the population in the city lacked food. Contrary to the official interpretation of Kirov's death, it was claimed that the murder was not political in nature, but the result of personal revenge, etc.

Nina Rosenfeld's exasperation at the collapse of her high-ranking relative's political career turned into a deep dislike of Stalin. From her lips repeatedly sounded the words of willingness to personally kill him. The investigation readily transformed the exaltation into terrorist intentions. In the cited resolution of the Politburo it was noted that, according to the testimony of N. B. Rosenfeld and his former wife, their terrorist intentions were inspired by L. B. Kamenev, "who repeatedly told them that the removal from power and the destruction of Stalin was the only way to change party policy and to get the Kamenev-Zinoviev group to power". Nina and Nikolai Rosenfeld allegedly took these statements "as a directive to commit a terrorist act". In the document it is further noted that "Enukidze knew nothing of the readiness of the impending assassination". He was used by his "class enemy", however, he is "politically responsible for all this". The result of the "case" was that only 9 people out of 107 employees of the secretariat stayed in the Kremlin. The rest, for the most part, were

repressed.

Y.N. Zhukov believes that the "Kremlin affair" reflects the disappointment of Stalin's policies among a considerable part of the revolutionaries of Lenin's draft who had not previously been associated with any opposition, in particular his apparent "treason" against the idea of world revolution, which was expressed in the USSR's accession to the bourgeois League of Nations. The "Kremlin affair" reinforced to Stalin the need for the physical elimination of various kinds of oppositionists and a large part of the old revolutionaries. On May 25, 1935, a decree of the UK Party liquidated the "Society of Old Bolsheviks," which had 3,300 members. Reportedly, the Society collected signatures on a petition to the Politburo with a request, bearing in mind Lenin's words, "Let there be no blood among you," not to impose death sentences on such old Bolsheviks as Zinoviev and Kamenev.

On June 25, 1935 the Central Executive Committee of the USSR adopted a decree "On the liquidation of the Society of former political convicts and exiled settlers", which had 2,700 members. Among the repressed were one of the leaders of the Society of old Bolsheviks, a former friend and comrade-in-arms of Stalin, Sh. F. Dzhaparidze; the editor of the magazine *Katorga i Izvestia* (Hard labor and exile), I. A. Teodorovich.

On August 19-24, 1936 Soviet and world community was shocked by public trial of the largest figures of VKP(b) and Soviet state in the case of so-called "anti-Soviet united Trotskyite-Zinoviev center".

Criminal charges were brought against G. E. Zinoviev, L.

B. Kamenev, G. E. Yevdokimov (Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party in 1926-1927), I. P. Bakaev (member of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) in 1925-1927), S. V. Mrachkovsky (commander of the Ural and then West Siberian military districts in 1920- 1925), V. A. Ter-Vaganyan (Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the RSDLP(b) in 1917, responsible editor of Under the Banner of Marxism II 1922-1923), I. N. Smirnov (Commissar of Posts and Telegraphs in 1923-1927), I. I. Reingold (Deputy Commissar of Agriculture until December 1934), R. W. Pikel (formerly head of the secretariat of the chairman of the ICKI), E. A. Dreitser (division commissar during the Civil War, on the eve of his arrest - deputy director of the Magnesite plant in the Chelyabinsk region), S. Goltsman (employee of the Foreign Trade Committee), as well as members of the German Communist Party I -D. I. I. Kruglansky, V. P. Olberg, K. B. Berman, M. I. Lurie, and P. L. Lurie, who arrived in the USSR in the early Years, allegedly on orders from Trotsky for the purpose of committing terrorist acts. The defendants were charged with preparing and carrying out a terrorist act against Kirov, preparing an attempt on Stalin and those in his inner circle, and many other crimes against the Soviet government. All of the 16 defendants were sentenced to death.

On January 23-30, 1937 the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court in open court considered the criminal case of the "parallel anti-Soviet Trotskyist center. They arrested, tried and sentenced to death by firing squad.

Pyatakov (first deputy People's Commissar for Heavy

Industry from 1932), L. P. Serebryakov (Secretary of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) in 1920-1921, before the arrest - deputy chief of the Central Office of highways and motor transport NKPS), N. I. Muralov (one of the leaders of the Moscow armed uprising in October 1917, before the arrest - head of the agricultural department of workers' supply Kuzbasstroy), and a number of less well-known party and economic leaders - Ya. N. Drobnis, J. A. Livshits, M. S. Boguslavsky, I. A. Knyazev, S. A. Rataichik, B. O. Norkin, A. A. Shestov, I. D. Turok, G. E. Pushkin and I. I. Grachet. The other participants in the trial were G. Y. Sokolnikov (candidate for the Politburo in 1924-1925, First Deputy People's Commissar of the Timber Industry since 1935), K. B. Radek (head of the International Information Bureau of the Central Committee since 1932) and V. V. V. Arnold (head of the garage and supply department at the Prokopyevsk and Angersky mines in Kuzbass) - sentenced to ten years and M. S. Stroilov (chief engineer of the Kuzbassugol trust in Novosibirsk) to eight years' imprisonment. Subsequently all of them also died.

Complete surprise for many Soviet people were reports in Soviet newspapers on June 12, 1937 on the exposure of "anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization in the Red Army" and the execution of eight convicted representatives of its senior commanders. They were: the first deputy People's Commissar of Defence, Marshal M. N. Tukhachevsky; commander of the Kiev Special Military Region, I. E. Yakir, and commander of the Byelorussian Special Military Region, I. P. Uborevich, commander of the 2nd rank, the chief of the Frunze Military Academy, A. I., and commander of the 7th-5th class of the Soviet Army. Frunze A. I. Kork; Commodores R. P. Eideman, B. M. Feldman, V. M.

Primakov, and V. K. Putna. The chief of the Red Army's Political Administration, army commissar, 1st rank, Y. B. Gamarnik, shot himself on the eve of his arrest.

Most likely, the cause of repressions in the army was the struggle for power within the defense leadership - between "cavalrymen" (Voroshilov, Budenniy and others) and "motorists" (Tukhachevsky, Uborevich and others). In May 1936, Tukhachevsky and his supporters had already raised before the Politburo the question of Voroshilov's dismissal from the post of Commissar. So the "anti-Roshilov conspiracy" in the army was no secret to anyone. To remove him would have been a clear derogation of Stalin's power, and the transfer of the army - the main support of power - into the hands of the politically dubious Commissar and his supporters was completely unacceptable.

Nine days after the trial of the "Trotskyist military organization" on charges of "military conspiracy," among the 980 commanders who were repressed there were 1 Marshal, 3 commanders, 29 brigadiers, 37 komdives, commissars, 21 komkor, other commissars, 16 regimental commissars, 17 brigade commanders and 7 division commanders. The prosecution of the military under, popular at that time Article 58, first of all affected the persons who in 1923-1925 studied at the Military Academy of the Red Army and voted at a party meeting for a resolution proposed by supporters of LD Trotsky, the then chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the People's Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs.

Thus, as a result of judicial and extrajudicial repressions, by the end of 1937 a significant portion of the old

Bolshevik guards and many representatives of the party and state apparatus and the armed forces who were suspected of being disloyal to the regime in power and therefore "unfit" to solve the problems facing the country were physically liquidated. In this respect, the destiny of 1,961 delegates of the 15th Party Congress, who represented a significant part of the administrative top of the society, is typical.

1,108 of them (56.5%) were arrested and most of them died. Of the 139 UK Party members and candidates elected at the congress, 97 (69.8%) were subsequently repressed, and five (3.6%) committed suicide. The scale of repression allows us to speak of a de facto coup d'état in the party. The peak of terror was from August 1937 to November 1938.

The Big Terror was begun by the Operational order No. 00447 of the Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR "On operation on reprisal of former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements" of July 31, 1937. The order was to arrest 268,950 people by December of this year, place a significant part of them in camps for 8 to 10 years, and 75,950 people were to be shot. The order was intended to destroy and isolate in the Gulag a considerable mass of people who had suffered under the regime in the recent past, but who had been granted the right to vote along with everyone else in the forthcoming elections under the Constitution of 1936. Along with the former kulaks, the order named repressed former churchmen and sectarians, former active participants in anti-Soviet armed crimes, cadres of anti-Soviet political parties - SRs, Georgian Mensheviks, Dashnaks Musavatists, Ittihadists, former active participants in bandit uprisings, whites, punishers, repatriates, etc. All

these millions of people offended by the policies of the authorities were not at all an imaginary potential "fifth column" that inspired fear in the representatives of the ruling regime.

In the ruling circles, both in the Center and locally, there was no doubt that the votes of this part of the electorate and their allies would be used against representatives of the party and state power during alternative, competitive, secret ballot elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It is no coincidence that the "quotas" for repression recorded in the July NKVD order at the initial outline of the republican, regional and territorial departments of the NKVD, at the insistence of the local authorities, the most concerned about the outcome of the vote, were (quotas) increased 3-5 times. All in all, in accordance with this order, almost 770,000 people were repressed.

In September 1937, a new tendency in the repressive policy was revealed. A press campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" was launched. Many of those repressed in the national regions died on charges of this sin and the related separatism, espionage, and treason. The repressions were directly related to perceptions of hostility toward the Union of SSR by surrounding states.

Ideas of national and state patriotism and military-state confrontation, which began to define Soviet nationality policy more and more from the mid-1930s, overshadowed the traditional class struggle schemes and largely determined the harshness of repressions against all those who were directly or indirectly related to the states of "hostile environment". The attitude towards Germans and Japanese citizens of potential enemy

countries was expressed with provocative frankness in the newspaper "Journal de Moscou" published in Moscow for distribution abroad on April 12, 1938: "It would by no means be an exaggeration to say that every Japanese living abroad is a spy, just as every German living abroad is a Gestapo agent."

On July 20, 1937 the Politburo of the Central Committee decided to "immediately order the NKVD bodies to arrest all Germans working in defense plants". On July 30, the order concerning the Soviet citizens of German nationality was signed. In August the same decisions were made concerning Poles, then also Koreans, Latvians, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Chinese, Iranians, Romanians. Under the knife of repressions were 30,938 Soviet citizens who worked earlier on the Chinese Eastern line and came back to the USSR after selling the road in 1935. In the order of NKVD of September 20, 1937 it was said that they "are in the overwhelming majority as the agents of Japanese intelligence. On October 23 an order was issued in which emphasis was laid on the fact that agents of foreign intelligence cross the border in the guise of those seeking political asylum, and it was proposed: "All the defectors, regardless of the motives and circumstances of the crossing to our territory, should be immediately arrested. The professional revolutionaries crossing over to the Soviet territory were also put on trial."

According to the data of the commission which worked before the XX Congress of the Party, by September 10, 1938 - 227,986 persons were tried, of whom 172,830 (75.8%) were sentenced to death and 46,912 (20.6%) to various punishments.

State security considerations also dictated that the frontier zone be "cleansed" of the population, et al. ethnically related to the peoples of the neighboring countries. In April 1936, the U.S.S.R. government took the decision to relocate 45 thousand Poles and Germans from the Ukraine to Kazakhstan. In 1937, 172 thousand Koreans were deported from the Far East to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. With the inclusion of the Western Ukraine and Belarus, the republics of the Baltic States and the Moldavian SSR the deportation policy was further developed. During the years 1939-1941 134,500 former citizens of the Polish state were arrested and about 200 thousand were deported only in the new western regions of Ukraine and Belorussia.

The growing suspicion of everybody who had direct or indirect connections with the Soviet Union was the reason for the liquidation of many cultural, educational and territorial institutions of the national minorities. On December 1, 1937 the Central Committee Orgbureau considered the question "On the liquidation of national districts and village councils". The justification for the decision pointed out that "in a number of regions and krais various national districts and village councils (German, Finnish, Korean, Bulgarian, etc.) were artificially created whose existence was not justified by the national composition of their population". Moreover, a special inspection revealed that many of these districts were "created by the enemies of the people with sabotage purposes." The resolution ordered the local Party committees "to submit to the Central Committee of the VKP(b) by January 1, 1938, proposals for the liquidation of these districts by reorganizing them into ordinary districts and village councils." As a result, the number of national districts and village councils in the

country decreased significantly.

At the same time, the fate of the national schools in the districts was also decided. The decision of the Central Committee's Orgbureau. "On the national schools" on December 1st 1937 it was recognized harmful for "the existence of the special national schools (Finnish, Estonian, Latvian, German, English, Greek etc.)" and it was suggested to reorganize them "in the Soviet schools of the common folk". The People's Commissariat of the RSFSR was instructed to submit proposals to the Central Committee on the liquidation of national pedagogical colleges, houses of education and other cultural and educational institutions. The Decree of the Central Committee Orgbureau of January 24th 1938 enjoined the People's Commissars of Education of the allied republics to "personally approve the terms and order of reorganization of every national school" and to report on the execution of this order not later than July 15th 1938.

The means to rid the CPSU(b) of members involved in connections with the opposition and "enemies of the people" were "party purges" which began in the 1920s. A general purge of the Party was carried out in 1929-1930 by resolution of the 16th Party Conference (1929). As a result, 7.8% of Communists were expelled from the Party. Another purge was carried out by the united plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Party (January 1933). By the mid 30's the country had 1.5 million

Many of them were easily infiltrated by all kinds of malignant and dissident sentiments.

The repressions and purges of the 1930s grew essentially out of the old ideological disputes that arose

between the Stalinists and the opposition after Lenin's death. They were between supporters of Trotsky, who believed that the victory of the revolution in Russia was impossible without the victory of the world revolution, and Stalin, who also believed in a world revolution, but who set out to build socialism first in one country and make it the decisive factor in the victory of the world revolution. The very logic of the idea of "socialism in one country" led to the realization already in 1934 that it was impossible without relying on the most numerous Russian people in the USSR, its patriotism and national traditions. Logic demanded that a new layer of people be promoted to power. Changes in the echelons of power were the inevitable reaction of a vast Slavic country to the internationalist, cosmopolitan experiments of the 20-30s, which ignored the national factor. At the same time, the purges of 1936-1938 can be seen as one of the last stages of the Civil War or as a result of "the aggravation of the class struggle," according to the "popular" expression of the time.

According to official data in the process of this "aggravation" for criminal and political crimes in 1929-1934 - 39,899 people were sentenced to execution, the majority (77.4%) were in 1930 and 1931 - the first years of mass collectivization; in 1935 in NKVD cases - 1,229 people, in 1936 - 1,118. In the next two years of the Big Terror the number of repressed reached its peak. In 1937 - 353,074 people sentenced to execution, in 1938 - 328,618. This meant that in 1935-1936 there were on average 3-4 death sentences per day, and in 1937 and 1938 - 970 and 900 per day.

It is known that among those repressed in 1937-1938 there were 200,000 Orthodox bishops, monks, clergy and laity who suffered for the faith, 100,000 of whom

were executed. (Corresponding figures for 1929-1936: 50,000 repressed, 5,000 executed.)

The victims of mass terror were not only the leaders of the party, Soviet, economic and military structures, but also many ordinary party members, scientific and cultural workers, engineers, workers and collective farmers. Molotov, justifying the repressions, later asserted: "If we take into account that after the revolution we chopped right and left, we won the victory, but the remnants of the enemies of different directions existed, and in the face of impending danger of fascist aggression, they could unite. We owe it to the year 37 that we did not have a fifth column during the war. Even Bukharin, judging by his December (1937) letter to Stalin, "the large and bold political idea of a general purge" capturing "the guilty, the suspicious, and the potentially suspicious" seemed justified "in connection with the pre-war period and the transition to democracy."

§ 6. national policy

The years of the first five years were a time of radical changes in the national policy of the Soviet state. If the national policy of the 1920s could be seen as a concession to "nationalists," then in the early 1930s the attitude toward Russian national feelings and interests began to change. This turn found itself in the decision to put an end to experiments with Russian national writing. In January 8, 1930 the Politburo of the Central Committee instructed to stop developing the issue of Romanization of the Russian alphabet. Previously, this was seen as a condition for joining the "advanced"

European culture. 12 years of Soviet history turned this project into an apparent anachronism. Formally the USSR was already called the country of socialist (it means advanced) culture, and the Latinized West was called bourgeois (it means backward) culture.

At the same time, the victory of the world revolution was becoming more and more problematic, and was being pushed further and further beyond the horizon of the foreseeable future, while the objective interests of the USSR demanded that all its citizens know a unified inter-ethnic language. By the circumstances of historical development, Russian had long been such a language, and the authorities showed their readiness to recognize this role of the language along with the Cyrillic basis of its writing. Romanization began to be perceived as an artificial barrier blocking the non-Russian population's access to means of inter-ethnic communication. It was decided to remove the barrier and spread the means of inter-ethnic communication as widely as possible.

In October 1933 the commission headed by M. I. Kalinin recognized the further work on unification of the national script on the basis of Latin alphabet as actually useless, and proposed to replace the Latin alphabet for the small peoples of USSR with the Russian one. In 1934 it was decided that the schools that had just begun to be established for the Ket and the Itelmen should teach entirely in Russian, and that the rest of the Northern peoples' schools should teach it from the second form and switch to it from the third form. Practically the switch to Cyrillic alphabet for the peoples of the North (and later for the other peoples as well) began after the resolution of the Presidium of the CEC of June 1, 1935.

Quite revealing was also the decision of the Secretariat of the CKP(b) in late 1930 which sharply condemned the newspaper articles of Demyan Bedny published in Pravda and Izvestiya in which the pre-revolutionary Russia was indiscriminately denigrated as "slavishly lazy, savage and following the cultural America and Europe" and the Russian patriots with their allegedly inevitably base feelings. The subject of the journalists attacks were K. Minin and D. Pozharsky, "two historical embezzlers". Monuments to such patriots suggested "blowing up with dynamite" and, along with other "historical junk", sweeping them from city squares. The "national traits" of Russians - "laziness", "sitting on the stove", "slave, hereditary flabby nature" - were vilified. Pseudo-revolutionary zeal of proletarian poets entered into a clear contradiction with historical experience. It became incomprehensible how people of this breed accomplished the socialist revolution and rebuilt the country. These journalists were condemned as slandering the people, debunking the USSR, the Russian proletariat, and as expressing Trotskyist ideas about Russia.

In February 1931 the cornerstone was laid for a new ideological course in dealing with the national question. Speaking at the All-Union Conference of Socialist Industry Workers, Stalin stated: "In the past we did not and could not have a fatherland. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and we, the people, have the power, we have a fatherland and we will fight for its independence. A new understanding of the "socialist fatherland" was required in order to narrow its vague proletarian-world outlines to the actual boundaries of the USSR.

The new conception of the fatherland made it possible to "rehabilitate" patriotism in its normal form for the masses at large, and to begin cultivating it as the highest valor of the Soviet people. As Kalinin put it, "The whole population should be imbued with Soviet patriotism, so that every citizen of the Soviet Republic, even a most ordinary man in the street, on meeting a citizen of a capitalist country, should always feel his inner superiority: "I am a citizen of the Soviet Republic".

On October 31, 1931. In a letter addressed to the editors of Proletarian Revolution, Stalin made a clear claim for "Russian primacy" in the global revolutionary movement. It was claimed that the Russian proletariat is the vanguard of the international proletariat, that the consistent and to the end revolutionary internationalism of the Bolsheviks is a model of proletarian internationalism for the workers of all countries. According to this, it is not the Western Marxists who should give lessons to their Russian comrades, but vice versa. The article stressed that the "Russian Bolsheviks" have every reason to evaluate the degree of Marxist revolutionariness of the foreign social democrats. Disagreement with this kind of Russocentrism meant, by Stalin's definition, "Trotskyist smuggling."

Hitler's ascent to power in Germany in January 1933 under the slogans of national revival, revanchism, and expansion of the "living space" for the German nation finally consolidated the turn toward recognition of the significance of national history and patriotism in the consolidation of Soviet society. Hitler's book *Mein Kampf*, published for the Soviet leadership, left no doubt about the direction of German expansion. In it, in particular, it said: "When the Urals with its boundless

natural resources, Siberia with its rich forests and Ukraine with its boundless fields of crops will go to Germany, every German will have enough for life.

The development of the German events accelerated the evolution of the Stalinist regime in a National Bolshevik direction that increasingly deviated from the course of the world revolution. On December 19, 1933, the Politburo of the Central Committee declared the readiness of the USSR to join the League of Nations and to conclude within its framework a regional agreement "on mutual protection against aggression by Germany". (This was referring to the Eastern Pact of at least the USSR, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.) Shortly after the USSR's admission to the League of Nations (Sept. 18, 1934), Stalin began to assert that the intentions to bring about a world revolution "we never had". The death sentences in 1936 and 1938 of recent Comintern leaders Zinoviev and Bukharin, among other things, were meant to give the impression of the reality of the Soviet leadership's intentions to abandon its direct course toward world revolution.

The analysis by members of the Politburo of the Central Committee with the participation of G. Dimitrov (In February 1933 was accused of setting fire to the Reichstag and was imprisoned in a Nazi prison. He was released a year later and immediately after his arrival in Moscow on February 27, he was introduced first to the political secretariat and then to the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee). The Politburo concluded that the main reason for the Communists' failure lay in the wrong approach to European workers; in propaganda based on national nihilism; and in ignoring the peculiarities of national psychology. At

Stalin's suggestion, Dimitrov was elected general secretary of the Comintern Executive Committee and began to restructure its work in the light of the errors identified.

The correction of mistakes in the Soviet Union itself began with the removal of the curse of "Great Russian nationalism". The resolution of the 10th congress of the RCP(b) "On the Party's next tasks in the national question" (March 1921) decided this question unambiguously: of the two possible dodges in the national question, "the first represents a special danger and special harm". The presumption was eliminated at the 17th Party Congress which ordered all party organizations to be guided by "the provisions and tasks put forward in Stalin's report" of January 26, 1934. The report stated that "the main danger is that deviation which they stopped fighting and thus allowed it to grow into a national danger. As later events have shown, the repressions were most often paired with accusations of local nationalism.

Of crucial importance was a reconsideration of the role of the discipline of history in school and university education. The role of history in school and university education was re-evaluated.

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It was considered necessary to use it as a powerful tool for the purposeful formation of public historical consciousness and the education of patriotic feelings. In March 1933, a commission under the People's Commissariat for Education of the RSFSR worked to write a new textbook on the history of Russia and the USSR. The first experiments were unsuccessful. The textbooks were written in the spirit of the worst traditions

of the national-nihilist school of M.N. Pokrovsky. A year later (March 8, 1934), a meeting of historians already spoke openly of the need to break with "sociological analysis" and return to the teaching of so-called "pragmatic history".

On March 20, 1934, the question of the history textbook was discussed at an expanded meeting of the Politburo. The middle school textbooks that had been prepared were rejected. "What is it? - Stalin asked. - "The era of feudalism," "the era of industrial capitalism," "the era of formations"-all eras and no facts, no events, no people, no concrete information, no names, no titles, no content itself. It's no good anywhere. We need textbooks with facts, events and names. History should be history. We need textbooks about the ancient world, the Middle Ages, the new times, the history of the USSR, the history of the colonial and oppressed peoples.

The meeting formulated an important thesis about the role of the Russian people in national history. Commissar Bubnov decided to clarify which textbook was needed: the "History of the USSR" or "History of the Peoples of Russia"? Stalin replied: "History of the USSR. The Russian people in the past gathered the other nations. He began the same gathering now. In the same connection, he stated that Pokrovsky's scheme was not Marxist and that all the trouble came from the time of Pokrovsky's influence.

The discussion resulted in the formation and approval of author's groups for writing new history textbooks. In 1934-1937 a contest for the best textbook on the history of the USSR was held. Its conduct reflected the clash of national-Russian and national-nihilist positions.

Bukharin, a member of the competition committee, believed that the textbook should contain a description of centuries of Russian backwardness and "prison of the peoples". It was suggested that the stages of Russia's formation - the adoption of Christianity, the gathering of the Russian lands, and the reunification of Little Russia with Russia - be viewed from a nihilistic standpoint. The project, prepared by the group of I. I. Mints, divided the events into revolutionary and counter-revolutionary. The reunification of Little Russia with Russia was declared the enslavement of "the Ukrainian people", Bogdan Khmel'nitsky was presented as a reactionary and traitor. Minin and Pozharsky were presented as counter-revolutionaries. In this regard, according to A. S. Scherbakov, "at the end of 1935, the question of Minin and Pozharsky, the defense of Moscow... was already raised by order of the Central Committee. The questions raised surprised many people. There was a lot of nihilism about their Russian history (misunderstanding of the inheritance)".

Without waiting for the results of the contest, the SNK of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) adopted on May 15, 1934 a decree "On Teaching Civil History in Schools of the USSR". Three weeks later, the notions of Motherland and patriotism were elevated to the rank of the highest social values. Honor and glory, power and prosperity of the Soviet Union were proclaimed the supreme law of life of patriots. Soviet patriotism, "love and devotion to one's motherland," was defined as the highest valor of a Soviet man. The decree of the USSR Central Executive Committee "On Adding the Statute on Offenses Against the State (Counterrevolutionary and Specifically Dangerous

Crimes Against the Order of Government of the USSR) to the Statute on Committing Treason", published at the same time, placed such treason in the category of crimes punishable by firing squad and deprivation of freedom for the members of the guilty family.

In August 1934, Stalin, Zhdanov and Kirov decided to promote the rapid writing of new history textbooks. They prepared "Remarks" on the outlines of the textbooks "History of the USSR" and "No History". The remarks were immediately approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee and brought to the attention of historians involved in the creation of textbooks. Thus, the course of making the USSR the home of Soviet patriots was determined. The Russian people were recognized as a force called upon to gather other nations in a new way. According to Stalin's futurology, Russians were to become a kind of cement for the "zonal" community of Soviet peoples.

The new quality of this community was noted in connection with the conclusion of the transition to socialism and the adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR. According to Stalin, it was the result of the destruction of the exploiting classes, "who were the main organizers of the international fight," the presence in power of a class - the bearer of the ideas of internationalism; the actual implementation of mutual assistance of peoples in all areas of economic and social life; finally, the result of the blossoming of national culture of the peoples of the USSR. "The appearance of the peoples of the USSR changed fundamentally, the feeling of mutual mistrust disappeared in them, the feeling of mutual friendship developed in them and thus real brotherly cooperation of the peoples in the system of

a single union state was established."

It was further emphasized that, unlike the bourgeois constitutions, which are fundamentally "nationalist, i.e., constitutions of the dominant nations," the new Constitution of the USSR, on the contrary, is profoundly internationalist. It assumes that all nations and races are equal and, regardless of their past and present status, are endowed with "equal rights in all spheres of the economic, social, state, and cultural life of society." The 1936 Constitution of the USSR and the constitutions of the Union republics adopted on its basis did not mention national minorities, the national districts and village councils that existed at the time, the policy of "korenization," (nativeization), to which great importance had been attached in the twenties. Stalin declared that the Soviet Union included "about 60 nations, national groups, and nationalities," despite the fact that the census, conducted on December 17, 1926, recorded three times the number of nationalities living in the country. All this could not but testify to a radical change in the policy toward national minorities and small nations. The process of development of national minorities, their languages and culture, which had been encouraged earlier, was being pointed in a new direction.

At the beginning of 1936, the press noted the great successes on the linguistic front of building socialist culture, expressed, in particular, in the transition to the Romanized alphabet of 68 nationalities, or 25 million Soviet citizens. In order to develop this success, the Presidium of the Council of Nationalities of the CEC of the USSR proposed to convene the All-Union Conference on the Language and Writing of the

Nationalities of the USSR and to consider a wide range of problems connected with the development of systematic assistance to the nationalities in the development of literary language and scientific development of orthography, terminology and dictionaries, with the training of language specialists in the Center and locally. However, Stalin and Molotov unexpectedly opposed the convening of the meeting. Moreover, in May 1936 the Department of Science, Scientific and Technical Inventions and Discoveries of the Central Committee of the Party proposed to condemn Latinization as a "leftist bent of the Narkompros (national committees) and T. Lunacharsky" because "enemies" used it for separating the workers of national republics and regions from the common family of the USSR peoples: "Under the cover of talk about the "international nature" of Latin base, they defended their orientation to the bourgeois culture of Western Europe".

In February 1937 the Secretary of the Council of Nationalities of the CEC of the USSR declared that it was necessary to solve the problem of the rapprochement of "alphabets and even related dialects and languages of certain nationalities" and in this connection he clarified the meaning of the estimate of the number of nations which was made during the adoption of the new Constitution: "Stalin pointed out that the Soviet Union consists of about 60 nations, national groups and nationalities. We, on the other hand, had 71 alphabets in the VCCNA only on the Latin basis. Apparently, there is something far-fetched and harmful about the Latin alphabet, which does not bring the small nationalities closer to the major nations, but disunites and alienates them." As a result, there was a Politburo resolution of July 2, 1937. It eliminated the All-Union

Central Committee of the New Alphabet (founded in 1925 for the implementation of the language policy) as an institution which had fulfilled its task.

The new Constitution no longer drew the prospect of the USSR becoming a world republic in the future. It was based on a vision of the fatherland, narrowed down to the actual borders of the state. Relation to its past was dramatically changing. This turn was clearly marked in the year the Constitution was adopted. In early 1936, Bukharin, picturing in Izvestia the brilliance of Bolshevik achievements in rebuilding the country, habitually tried to strengthen them with comparisons to the shameful backwardness of pre-revolutionary Russia, the darkness and squalor of its people: "It took the Bolsheviks to turn an amorphous, unaware mass in a country where Oblomovism (subjugation) was the most universal character trait, where the Oblomov (gloomy) nation dominated, into a shock brigade of the world proletariat! This Rasian stretch of mind! These nearly two hundred enslaved peoples, torn to pieces by the Tsarist policy! This Asiaticism (orientalism)! This "laziness"! Where did it all go?"

Exercises of this kind, begun at one time with Lenin's light hand, it was decided to put at an end. Bukharin was corrected as if determined to be led through the ranks in front of the whole country. The verdict that sealed the fate of this political figure was placed on the pages of the central Party newspaper. An editorial in Pravda, edited by L.3. Mekhlis, stated; "Only amateurs of verbal quibbles with little understanding of Leninism can claim that in our country before the revolution 'Oblomovshchina was the most universal character trait,' and that the Russian people were 'a nation of Oblomovs."

The people who gave the world such geniuses as Lomonosov, Lobachevsky, Popov, Pushkin, Chernyshevsky, Mendeleev, such giants of humanity as Lenin and Stalin, - the people who prepared and accomplished the October Revolution under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party - only a person who is not aware of what he says can call such a people the 'Oblomov Nation'. Bukharin's article was identified with fascist scribblings "to prove that Russians are not even human," and with hatred that is "primarily directed at the Russian people" precisely because the detractors understood superbly the real role of this people in the struggle to transform Russia into a "great proletarian power."

"Pravda" called for overcoming "'leftist internationalism,' the misunderstanding that communists should by no means shy away from a positive appraisal of their country's past." The matter was portrayed in such a way as if "the party has always fought against any manifestation of the anti-Leninist ideology of the 'Ivanovs who do not remember their kinship', who try to paint the entire historical past of our country in a solid black color. However, the hiccup was immediately shifted to the upcoming phase of this struggle. "We shall smash all the rotten, anti-Leninist concepts that slanderously distort our past." The concept, which was to be created and approved, was to reflect "a rich, full of profound content historical path and which has inscribed so many glorious pages in the history of mankind." It is good to know the "remarkable," as was stressed, the "wonderful history of the country" was emphasized as necessary to "love one's great motherland with all consciousness".

The confrontation between Izvestia and Pravda in the interpretation of the history of the Russian people was particularly important because it was woven into the context of the larger task of historical science and historical education in the country. On January 27, 1936, the newspapers published the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and SNK USSR on the creation of a special commission led by Zhdanov "to review, improve and, if necessary, revise the already written history textbooks". Also published were the "Remarks" of Stalin, Zhdanov and Kirov of August 8, 1934 on the outline of the Soviet history textbook. The Pravda front page, explaining the meaning of these documents, called on historians to fight "against the anti-Leninist traditions of the Pokrovsky school both in method and in the concrete picture of Russian history" and to eliminate the "half-Menshevik, half-centrist ideas and Trotskyist smuggling" inherent in this school. The SNK and Central Committee pointed out that "the task of overcoming these harmful views" was "of the utmost importance for the cause of our state, our party, and for the education of the rising generation." "The time has come," wrote one member of the competition committee, "for us to give our youth history textbooks that prepare them for the great battles ahead in the international arena. History in the hands of the Bolsheviks must be a concrete science, an objective truth and thus a great weapon in the struggle for socialism."

A sign of decisive change on the historical front was the liquidation of the Communist Academy, formerly headed by Pokrovsky. The historians of the pre-revolutionary school, S. V. Bakhrushin, Yu. Gauthier, B. D. Grekov, V. I. Picheta, E. V. Tarle, A. I. Yakovlev, and others.

Disciples of the "Pokrovsky school" (N. N. Vanag, A. G. Prigozhii, S. G. Tomsinskii, G. S. Friedland, etc.), who were unable to orient themselves correctly in the new conditions, were repressed. The foundation of the "national" school of Soviet historians is associated with the name of a student of V. O. Klyuchevsky, Academician B. D. Grekov, who headed the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1937-1953.

The difference between the new historical concept and the previous one lay in the interpretation of the place and role of the Russian people in national and world history. Already the first article-back to Bukharin asserted: "The workers of all the nations of the Soviet Union know in practice what great help the great Russian people have given them. They go hand in hand with him along the same path, toward the same goal." This theme was developed in subsequent articles: "All nations - participants in the great socialist construction project - can be proud of the results of their labor; all of them - from the smallest to the largest - are full-fledged Soviet patriots. And first among the equals is the Russian people, the Russian workers. It was asserted that on the brilliant examples of the struggle for the liberation of mankind, on the rich history of the great people "many generations of fighters for world communism will be educated.

On the eve of the adoption of the new Constitution of the USSR, the importance of the new historical concept was clearly demonstrated in the case of A. Y. Tairov's production of the play Bogatyrs by D. Poor at the Chamber Theater in Moscow. The heroes of the epic poem are caricatured in the play. In the spirit of the anti-religious campaigns of the 20s, the play depicted the

baptism of Russia as an accidental event "through drunkenness". It seemed that a greater success awaited the performance that used the music of the great Russian composer Alexander P. Borodin, than the play *The Baptism of Rus*, which was staged in Leningrad at the end of 1931 and ran until the spring of the following year. In it, according to a journal article of the time, the epic heroes appeared as the gendarme guards, the Nightingale the Robber embodied the merchant class, Byzantium had a link with the fascist Tzar, Prince Vladimir was depicted as a representative of the autocracy, and by the end of the performance he took on the image of the penultimate Tsar, the jerk. Critics then only lightly scolded the play for its generalization of all orthodox Russia in the image of the stiff-necked Mikula Selyaninovich, appearing drunk and uttering confused and incomprehensible words.

The reaction to "*Bogatyr*s" turned out to be quite different. At the premiere of the play was Chairman of the Sovnarkom Molotov. After watching one act, he defiantly got up and left. Directed by his indignant assessment: "Outrage! *Bogatyr*s were wonderful people! The play by D. Poor did not fit the changed attitude to history. It was immediately condemned by a special Politburo decree of November 14, 1936, and removed from the repertoire as alien to Soviet art. The head of the Committee for the Arts under the CPC, P. M. Kerzhentsev was asked to write an article for *Pravda* in the spirit of the decision, and the next day it was published. The play was subjected to a veritable rout in it. The official reaction to the production, reinforced by numerous gatherings of the creative intelligentsia, vividly demonstrated the seriousness of the authorities' intentions to discard unsuitable traditions and portray the

"remarkable" history of the Russian people.

In 1937, the concept of the historical role of the Russian people acquired a new component. "Great" and "first among equals" was henceforth proposed to be called also "big brother" of other Soviet peoples. It was connected, most likely, with a new interpretation of the old task of eliminating the actual inequality of nations. In the twenties, this was done with an explicitly Russophobic directness. For example, a book on the Soviet Constitution asserted, "One of the most precious rights of the backward nations in the Soviet Union is their right to active aid, and to this right corresponds the duty of the "Sovereign Nation" to help, which is only the repayment of a debt. The sovereign Russian nation for the convenience of collecting from her debt was simply excluded from the number of subjects of the federation, and the resources of the RSFSR and the Russian people uncontrollably disposed of supranational union center.

The new titling of the Russian people allowed essentially disavowing statements about the final resolution of the national question, which led to undesirable practical consequences. For example, D. E. Sulimov, Chairman of the Sovnarkom of the RSFSR declared: "The autonomous republics and regions (RSFSR) in their cultural and economic development had reached a level where one can safely say that they had in an exceptionally short time passed a huge way of economic and cultural revival and caught up with the main Russian districts and regions. This meant that further help to the "backward" peoples and regions from the Russian people was not required. In the interests of the "backward peoples" tempted by the "bait of Russophobia" (G. P. Fedotov), the policy of eliminating

the "remnants" of national inequality and the "colossal work which should involve the masses of both the formerly oppressed nationalities and those peoples who are in a more advanced position" continued. In 1938, the conflict was resolved in favor of continued aid. "Despite the tremendous successes of the national republics in eliminating their former backwardness, we cannot yet speak of the complete elimination of all elements of actual economic and cultural inequality. In consequence of this," the journal Soviet State asserted, "the special tasks of the Leninist-Stalinist national policy connected with the question of eliminating this inequality, on the basis of the new, incomparably higher level achieved by the advanced parts of our Union also remain in force."

All this meant that the Constitution of 1936 was not the final step in solving the national question. The vicious practice of the past, when it was solved mainly at the expense of the Russian people, was not overcome. The leadership continued to use the "bait of Russophobia" in order to appear as a protector of small nations from "Great Russian chauvinists." The title of "big brother" was supposed to psychologically compensate for the performance of the burdensome duty.

By this technique, the previously prescribed repayment of historical debts was compared to the relationship in a family where older brothers touchingly take care of younger ones. The new titling, which spread from 1937. As a rule, it was equipped with reservations that the position of "elder brother" was "used by the Russian people primarily to help raise, straighten out, and develop those nations most oppressed by the tsarist government, which were most lagging behind economically and culturally".

The concept of national history, which reflected the new vision of the historical role of the Russian people, was developed during the preparation of the new school textbook on history and was constantly criticized by the contest participants for not wanting to renounce Pokrovsky's scheme. The authors of nearly all 46 contest manuscripts, said A. S. Bubnov at a meeting of the contest jury on January 25, 1937, pursued an anti-historical line in their analysis of the process of gathering of Russia, formation and strengthening of the Moscow principality. They reproached, in particular, the failure to understand that the entry of Ukraine "into the monotheistic Moscow Kingdom in the prevailing historical conditions was the least evil for the Ukrainian people. The accession of Georgia to Russia should have been viewed in the same way. Historians called for a revision of the old viewpoint, "which depicted the colonial policy of Russia as a solid black spot in the history of the Russian state.

Written by historians of Moscow State Pedagogical Institute, headed by A. V. Shestakov "A brief course in the history of the USSR" for 3rd-4th grades, considered the Soviet period in the continuity with the general development of Russian statehood. The manuscript of the textbook met the requirements of the government committee and was acknowledged the best. It was finalized by a special group of scientists under the guidance of A. A. Zhdanov, which included experienced historians of the old school K. V. Bazilevich, S. V. Bakhrushin, B. D. Grekov, N. M. Druzhinin, B. I. Picheta. The text approved on July 22nd represented "a peculiar fusion of two main ideas - the idea of the exaltation of the old statehood and the idea of the inevitability and

beneficence of the victory of socialism in Russia". At the beginning of October 1937 the edition came out. The state-patriotic concept of national history embodied in it and the idea of continuity of the best ancestors' traditions were repeated by new generations of compatriots in other textbooks.

The course of Russian history, also reprinted at that time, was recommended to higher schools. O. O. Klyuchevskiy, materials from Platonov's Russian history textbook, and other works of old-school historians were recommended for higher education. It was decided to republish the "History of 19th century" of French historians E. Lavissee and A. Rambaud, with a part devoted to the history of Russia. Especially noteworthy in this edition is the preface by E. V. Tarlet, also printed in Bolshevik magazine. The role of Russia and the Russian people in world history was presented here in a spirit diametrically opposed to the "Pokrovsky school".

Russia, Tarle wrote, was not only a gendarme of Europe; from the beginning to the end of the 19th century, it exercised "a colossal influence on the fate of mankind. This lawsuit was a time when the Russian people powerfully occupied one of the most central and leading places in world culture. Russia gave the world not only "four titans" - Pushkin, Gogol, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, one of the first places were taken by Russians in painting (Surikov, Repin, Vereshchagin, Serov), and in music (Glinka, Mussorgsky, Rimsky-Korsakov, Dargomyzhsky, Rachmaninov and Tchaikovsky), and in exact science (Lobachevsky, Mendeleev, Lebedev, V. Kovalevsky). This century "was the time when the world importance of the Russian people became especially clear, when for the first time the Russian people made it clear what

great possibilities and intellectual and moral powers lay within it, and what new paths it could take for itself and lead mankind in the future."

The new historical concept asserted in 1936-1937

It was not only a scientific event. In preparation for war it became the basis of mass propaganda, heroic-patriotic education, and the spiritual mobilization of the population in defense of the homeland. The traditions of the Civil War and proletarian solidarity were little suited for the Patriotic War. The broad celebration of the centenary of the memory of Alexander Pushkin in early 1937 also served new purposes of historical and patriotic education. The Russian emperor was unexpectedly presented to the audience as a positive hero, the greatest statesman, who cared solely about the good of his fatherland. On September 7, 1937, the Borodino History Museum was opened on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of the war with Napoleon and was accompanied by numerous patriotic articles in the newspapers, which praised Field Marshal Kutuzov and other commanders, in violation of revolutionary and proletarian traditions, who had until recently been painted as reactionary enemies of the workers.

§ 7. foreign policy

From the late 20's the world situation and the foreign policy of the USSR were significantly affected by the global economic crisis, which acquired its most pronounced nature in 1929-1933. It resulted in a significant reduction in industrial production in the

developed capitalist countries: in the USA it decreased by 46%, in Germany by 40%, in France by 31%, in England by 16%. The crisis was a consequence of strengthening the processes of concentration and cyclic production under the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution, which began at the end of XIX century. The struggle of the monopolies for profits further exacerbated the contradictions between the states involved in this war. Relations between them were already strained by the unequal Versailles system of treaties resulting from Germany's defeat.

The outbreak of the world economic crisis was at first regarded in the USSR, and especially in the Comintern, as a harbinger of a new phase of the long-awaited world proletarian revolution. However, capitalism once again showed its vitality: the crisis was overcome. It was largely due to the intensification of state intervention in economic and social life and the siphoning of resources from colonial and dependent countries. Because of the specific features of different countries, the crisis was overcome in three variants: liberal-reformist (in the USA and Great Britain), social-reformist (Scandinavian countries, France at first) and totalitarian (Germany, Italy and Japan).

The Soviet Union, which began to modernize its economy in a hostile environment, was actually forced to fight for survival. In the clearest form this strategy is expressed by I. V. Stalin in February 1931 at the First All-Union Conference of Socialist Industry Workers: "We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We must run this distance in ten years. Either we will do it, or we will be swept away. Foreign policy during the period of forced modernization of the country was intended to

provide security for the reconstruction of the national economy and the creation of a reliable Armed Forces capable of protecting the country from external threats.

According to the country's Constitution, the highest authority in the field of foreign relations belonged to the USSR Supreme Soviet. The general management of relations was entrusted to the government. In reality, it was the Politburo and its head that were directly in charge of foreign policy. Day-to-day foreign policy activities were carried out by the People's Commissariat (Ministry) of Foreign Affairs, headed by G. V. Chicherin (1923-1930), M.M. Litvinov (1930-1939), V.M. Molotov (1939-1949). The foreign trade in 1926-1930 was headed by the People's Commissariat for Foreign and Domestic Trade (People's Commissar A. I. Mikoyan), later by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade (A. P. Rosengolts in 1930- 1937; E. D. Chvyalev in 1938; A. I. Mikoyan 1938-1949).

At the beginning of the first Five Year Plan, the Soviet Union had to conduct its foreign policy under conditions of increasing interventionist sentiments in the imperialist countries. The Soviet Union, which sought the peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-political systems, joined the Briand-Kellogg Pact (signed in Paris in August 1928 by the French foreign minister and the US secretary of state), signed by nine powers, which renounced war as a foreign policy means and was the first to put it into action. In October 1929, it was possible to restore diplomatic relations between the USSR and Great Britain, which had been severed in 1927. In the same year 1929 the Soviet country for the first time since the end of the Civil War suffered a serious military provocation. On July 10 groups of Manchurian troops

and White Guards sacked the Soviet consulate in Harbin, seized the Chinese Eastern Railway (CEL), which since 1924 was under joint Soviet-Chinese control, arrested the Soviet administration of the road (more than 200 people). At the same time Manchurian troops began shooting at Soviet frontier outposts and settlements. Attempts of the Soviet government to resolve the conflict by peaceful means were thwarted. On August 16 the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet People's Commissariat adopted a resolution on breaking off diplomatic relations with China. The Soviet government established the Special Far Eastern Army under the command of V. K. Blucher (18.5 thousand soldiers and commanders), which in October - November 1929 drove the interventionists from the Soviet regions of Primorye and Transbaikalia. On the 22nd of December 1929 Soviet-Chinese agreement was signed. But full restoration of diplomatic relations between two countries happened only in 1932. In 1931 in the Far East a new danger for USSR arose. Japan, having conquered Manchuria, began to turn it into a military springboard for attack. Intensive preparations of the Kwantung Army for the future war began. Japan refused to sign the non-aggression pact proposed by the USSR. In 1935 the Soviet Union was forced to sell CEL to Manchou-Guo authorities. It was also confronted with the need to overcome the economic blockade by the Western powers.

In 1930 Washington and London accused the Soviet Union of exporting goods to the world market at dumping prices and imposed an export ban. In May 1930, the French government put forward a plan to create a block of European states called "pan-Europe" against the Soviet Union. The U.S. government pursued a hostile

policy against the Soviet Union. It persistently refused to recognize it, and in 1931 it banned the import of some Soviet goods into its country.

The Soviet government responded to these measures by transferring foreign trade deals to countries that refrained from such actions. During the crisis, many capitalist firms, despite the embargo, sold machine tools and equipment to the Soviet Union. The U.S. managed to buy up to 50% of the total exports of tractors from this country, in Germany - about 25% of agricultural machinery, in England - more than 10% of textile equipment, in Poland - almost all of its castings. Thus, the Soviet orders even helped the economy of these countries out of the crisis. Therefore, the business community in the West was also interested in normalizing relations and expanding economic ties with the USSR. As a result, France lifted prohibitive measures against Soviet exports, Germany and Italy extended credits to the Soviet Union.

In 1932 the international positions of the Soviet Union significantly strengthened. After long negotiations, non-aggression treaties were signed with Latvia, Estonia, Finland, France and Poland. In the same year the Soviet delegation spoke at the International conference in Geneva with the proposal about general and complete disarmament.

In 1933. In the conditions of increasing military threat in Europe (after the Nazis coming to power in Germany) and Asia (because of Japanese aggression against China), the USSR became a party to the Convention on the Definition of the Aggressor and took the initiative of creating a system of collective security in Europe and

Asia. It signed acts of aggressor definition with Poland, Romania, Latvia, Estonia, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, as well as with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. In September a non-aggression treaty was concluded between the USSR and Italy. The position of our country was also strengthened with the recognition of the existence of the Soviet Union by the U.S. government. The President F. Roosevelt, who won the elections of 1932, sent to the Chairman of the CEC of the USSR M. I. Kalinin in October 1933 with a proposal to begin negotiations to normalize relations between the two countries. In a reply letter of October 19, Kalinin informed the American president that the Soviet side accepted the proposal. Diplomatic relations between the USSR and the United States were established on November 16, 1933.

By the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union had established diplomatic relations with most countries of the world. On September 18, 1934, it was admitted to the League of Nations, which testified to the growing prestige of the USSR in the international arena. The rhetoric about the world revolution at home was also sharply reduced. The VIIth Congress of the Comintern, which took place in Moscow in July-August 1935, declared a policy of establishing a world revolutionary organization. It proclaimed a course for the creation of a united anti-fascist people's front. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union changed the direction of its foreign policy. Believing that the system of non-aggression treaties was not enough, it directed its efforts to create a system of collective security against aggression, especially from Germany. One initiative was the Soviet diplomacy's proposal for an "Eastern Pact," which would include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, and Germany in addition to the USSR. It provided for military aid to any country, which was a party to the pact, which suffered aggression, no matter who was the aggressor, and was aimed at preventing Germany, in the first place, from unleashing war. At the same time it was also proposed to conclude a Pacific Pact with the participation of the USSR, the USA, England, Holland and Japan. The proposals were not accepted and in September 1934 they were formally rejected.

Germany rejected its participation in the Pact. It was supported by Poland. However, the Soviet Union managed to conclude mutual assistance pacts in the event of aggression with France and Czechoslovakia in May 1935. At the same time both countries concluded a mutual assistance pact with each other.

In 1935 the international situation worsened considerably. The fascist Germany unilaterally broke the Versailles peace treaty of 1919, in March the country announced the compulsory military service and founded the military aviation. In June 1935 Great Britain and Germany entered into a naval agreement that allowed Germany, contrary to the Treaty of Versailles, to have a navy of up to one-third of the surface ships and nearly half of the submarine fleet of the British fleet. On October 3, 1935, Italy attacked Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and occupied it early the following May. On May 9, 1936, the creation of the Italian Empire was proclaimed in Rome. Of the major powers, only the USSR, which had no diplomatic relations with Abyssinia, came out strongly in its defense. However, the Western powers blocked Soviet proposals to boycott the aggressor.

The year 1936 brought a new aggravation of the international situation. On March 7, Hitler's Germany renounced the Locarno Accords of 1925, under which it undertook to honor the provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty concerning the demilitarization of the Rhineland, it deployed troops on its territory, and marched to the borders of France. France did not exercise its right under the Versailles Treaty to compel Germany to withdraw its troops. In September 1936, the Nazi Party held a congress in Nuremberg, which announced a four-year plan to prepare Germany for a major war of "living space" for the Germans. On January 30, 1937, Hitler declared in the Reichstag that "Germany removes its signature from the Treaty of Versailles. After this declaration, a new war in Europe was becoming inevitable.

On October 25, 1936, the aggressors, encouraged by impunity, formalized an alliance between Germany and Italy under the name "Axis Berlin - Rome" in the Berlin Treaty. It recognized the seizure of Ethiopia by Italy, established a common line of conduct with regard to the events in Spain, and agreed on the delimitation of the spheres of "economic penetration" in the Balkans and the Danube River basin. With the formation of the Axis, the formation of the bloc of fascist aggressors preparing for World War II began.

The continuation of this policy was the signing of the "Anti-Comintern Pact" by Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936. The signatories pledged to inform each other about the activities of revolutionary proletarian organizations and fight against them. Other states were advised to "take defensive measures" in the spirit of the agreement or join the pact. The pact was

aimed against the Soviet Union, where the Comintern's headquarters were located. Fascist Italy joined it in 1937.

The hatred by many ordinary people around the world toward the Comintern explains why the fascist states of the 1930s were often seen as a "bastion against Bolshevism. In an effort to conform to such perceptions, Fascist Germany, along with Italy, had been involved in 8 interventions against republican Spain since 1936. In February 1936, the Popular Front government, created on the initiative of the Communist Party, came to power in that country as a result of elections. In July of the same year, a military-fascist rebellion broke out in the country, led by General Francisco Franco, who relied on the "Spanish Falange" (right-wing political party in Spain, founded in 1933) and most of the army (up to 100 thousand people). The rebels were openly supported by the Fascist powers. The League of Nations rejected the Republican government's demand for collective action against the aggressors. Military equipment, weapons, as well as officers and military instructors were sent from Germany and Italy to help the rebels. When all these proved insufficient, regular troops came: over 50,000 from Germany (the Condor legion) and about 200,000 from Italy. The legal basis for the appearance of these interventionist troops was the recognition by Germany and Italy of the Franco regime on November 18, 1937. During the war the term "fifth column" was born in Spain, which meant the enemy's secret agents and their accomplices used to weaken the rear of the armed forces of the republic.

In the unfolding civil war, the Spanish Republicans were assisted by communists and socialists of many

countries. The Soviet Union, responding to a request from the legitimate Spanish government, supplied the Republicans with arms and military equipment (planes, tanks, armored cars, torpedo boats, artillery pieces, machine guns, rifles, cartridges, shells and air bombs). About 3,000 Soviet volunteers (military advisers, pilots, tankers, sailors and other specialists) fought against the Falangists in the ranks of international brigades, including more than 50,000 men from 64 countries. The main military advisers in the Spanish Republic were Ya. K. Berzin, G. M. Stern, K. M. Kachanov.

England, France and other Western powers pursued a policy of "non-interference" in the national-revolutionary war. From September 1936, the International Committee on Non-Intervention in Spain, consisting of representatives of 27 European countries, worked in London. But, as it soon emerged, in fact it became a cover for the German-Italian intervention in Spain. Soviet representative in the Committee, I. M. Maisky fought to end the aid to the rebels from Germany, Italy, Portugal, with the complicity of England, France and the actual connivance of the United States. In October 1936, The Soviet Union declared that since the non-intervention agreement had "ceased to exist in fact," it considered it necessary to "return to the Spanish government the rights and ability to procure arms outside Spain. Thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union in September 1937 it was possible to conclude an agreement on measures to combat the pirate activities of submarines of the Fascist powers. However, the policy of pandering to aggression paralyzed the work of the Committee on Non-Intervention, which largely predetermined the fall of Republican Spain.

Strengthening its position in the Far East, the USSR in March 1936 concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic. It was a warning to the Japanese militarists. However, continuing its further expansion in the Far East, on July 7, 1937, Japan attacked China, occupied its northern regions, captured Shanghai, Beijing and other important centers. In these conditions the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression treaty with China on August 21, 1937. The Soviet Union granted China a large loan on easy terms and provided airplanes, weapons and fuel.

Thus, by the end of 1937, the USSR's efforts to organize a system of collective security were not achieving their goals. Nor was it possible to exploit the possibility of creating a broad popular front to jointly fight against fascism and the war.

Chapter IV, THE SOVIET UNION ON THE EVE OF MILITARY TRIALS. 1938 - JUNE 22, 1941

§ 1. foreign policy in the conditions of growing military danger. Expansion of the USSR

Celebrating the coming of a new year, 1938 few Soviet people could have imagined that in 1,237 days they would have to enter the death throes of the Great Patriotic War of the long 1,418 days and nights. Meanwhile, events unfolding in the international arena revealed more and more clearly the drawing of the world

powers into the orbit of military escalation.

Hitler, who met with no opposition from Britain, the USA or France, occupied Austria in March 1938 and proclaimed its annexation to Germany. On April 16, British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain signed an agreement with the head of the Fascist government of Italy, B. Mussolini. It contained the obligation for Italy to withdraw its "volunteers" from Spain, but only "after the end of the civil war. In so doing, the British government tacitly agreed to the participation of Italian troops in the struggle on Franco's side.

In the spring of 1938, the Spanish people's national war of liberation entered its final phase. The advantage that had remained with the republic until August 1936. began to pass to the rebels. The policy of collaborating with aggression virtually paralyzed the work of the Committee of Non-Intervention, and after July 5, 1938, it effectively ceased to function. In March 1938. Reinforced by the Germans and Italians, it broke through the Aragonese front and on April 15, 1938 it reached the Mediterranean Sea, cutting the territory of the Republic in two. On March 28, 1939, Madrid, the capital of Republican Spain, fell. A fascist dictatorship was established in the country. Franco became the head of the Spanish state. Franco immediately joined the "Anti-Comintern-Chktk".

At the end of September 1938 Great Britain and Germany adopted a declaration containing a commitment "never to go to war with each other". On December 6 the same declaration of non-aggression was signed by France with Germany. French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet believed that from this point on, German policy was "oriented against Bolshevism -

Germany shows its will to expand to the East.

On September 29, 1938, at negotiations in Munich, Germany obtained the consent of Great Britain and France to the seizure from Czechoslovakia of the Sudetenland, inhabited mainly by Germans, and in March 1939, with the "consent" of the then Czechoslovak president Emil Gahi, occupied the entire territory of that country. On March 16, by Hitler's decree, Czechoslovakia was divided into the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, which was incorporated into the Third Reich, and Slovakia, which effectively became a full vassal of Germany. After that on March 22 the German troops occupied the Lithuanian port of Memel (Klaipeda), imposing on Lithuania the "treaty" of cession of this port to Germany. On March 23rd in Bucharest, the Romanian-German treaty on the development of economic relations was signed, by which the Romanian government undertook to take measures to increase the production and processing of oil for supplying it to Germany. In the same month Hitler made territorial claims against Poland, demanding that Danzig be incorporated into Germany. Poland rejected these claims. Hitler terminated the non-aggression pact with Poland. In April 1939 Germany's ally, Italy, occupied Albania.

In February 1939, Hungary and the puppet state of Manchukuo, established by Japan in the northeastern provinces of China, joined the "Anti-Comintern Pact" (in which Germany, Japan and Italy were united). One month later the pact was signed by Spain. On September 27, 1940, it was transformed into an open military alliance (Berlin Pact). In November 1941 the pact was extended for five years. At that time Bulgaria,

Finland, Romania, Denmark, puppet governments of Slovakia, Croatia and Nanjing (the capital of China, which was under Japanese occupation in 1937-1945) joined it. This act completed the formation of an aggressive bloc of fascist states and their satellites that had been forming since the mid-1930s.

Simultaneously with the aggravation of the political situation in Europe, the situation in the Far East was becoming tense. In 1938, the militaristic Japan occupied the northern parts of China, and continued the war to take over the whole of China. In July 1938 Japanese troops invaded Soviet territory near Lake Hasan, in May 1939 they attacked Mongolia near the Khalkhin-Gol River. Having expelled the aggressors from Soviet soil, the Soviet Union, bound to the MNR by a mutual aid pact, came to its aid. England tried to heat up the Soviet-Japanese conflict by pledging not to interfere with Japan's actions in China, which was recorded in July 1939 in the Anglo-Japanese agreement that went down in history as the "Far Eastern Munich". In August 1939 the Soviet-Mongolian troops, organized into the 1st Army Group under the command of G. K. Zhukov (57,000 men) defeated the Japanese invaders. On September, 15th in Moscow the agreement between the USSR, MNR and Japan was signed.

The USSR provided moral and political support and substantial material support to the people of China in their struggle for national independence. By the middle of February, 1939 3,665 Soviet military experts worked in China and participated in struggle against Japanese invaders. In total from autumn of 1937 to early 1942. When Soviet advisors and specialists mainly left China, more than 5 thousand Soviet people worked and fought on the home front and on the front of anti-Japanese

struggle. Those who distinguished themselves in combat were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. 14 of them were awarded in 1939. In the 1937-1942 years, the USSR supplied China 1,285 planes, 1,600 guns, 82 tanks, 1,850 tractors, a large number of machine guns, rifles, ammunition, communications equipment, and medical equipment.

By the end of the 1930s, the USSR had diplomatic relations with most countries. Since 1934 it was represented in the League of Nations, an international intergovernmental organization which was to ensure "the development of cooperation between nations and the guarantee of their peace and security". In 1935 our country concluded treaties of mutual assistance in case of aggression with France and Czechoslovakia.

Lead up to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

However, the September (1938) Munich conspiracy of Prime Ministers Chamberlain (Great Britain) and Daladier (France) with A. Hitler and B. Mussolini and its endorsement by the U.S. government once again placed the USSR in international isolation, virtually nullifying efforts to create an effective system of collective security. The Soviet government condemned the Munich deal as illegal, but this did not change the situation. With Germany's military capabilities rapidly growing, the Western countries faced a choice. They could go for the creation of a united front against a potential aggressor, in which case they could cooperate with the USSR, or they could negotiate with Germany at the expense of third countries. The Western "democracies" chose the second option, which resulted in the Munich Agreement.

Judging by Stalin's report at the 18th Party Congress (March 10, 1939), the Soviet government wanted "to be careful and not to allow war provocateurs, accustomed to seize the heat with the hands of others, to draw our country into conflicts". It criticized the policy of "neutrality" of England and France, behind which was implied a desire "not to prevent Germany from getting involved in a war with the Soviet Union". The speech implied that it was England and France, not Germany, who were the instigators of the war. Thus the possibility of a rapprochement between the USSR and Germany was opened.

Nevertheless, after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, which occurred during the days of the congress, the Soviet government, on April 17, 1939, in order to prevent a new aggression on the part of Germany, the Soviet government made a proposal to conclude the Anglo-French-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Military Convention. Hitler, who had already decided to prepare for war with Poland, sought to prevent the Anglo-Franco-Soviet treaty and suggested that the Western powers conclude a "pact of four" (Germany, Italy, England, France). The Soviet line in the intricacies of world politics was called to conduct Molotov. On May 3, 1939, while remaining Chairman of the SNK, he replaced M.M. Litvinov, a Jew by nationality and clearly an unsuitable figure for a possible Soviet-German dialogue.

At the end of May, the British and French governments opted to negotiate political issues with the USSR. However, their true aim was not so much to reach concrete agreements as to oppose the possible

normalization of relations between Germany and the USSR. The British Prime Minister declared that he "would rather resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets," which would have provided for immediate assistance to the Soviet Union from England and France if the latter were at war with Germany. Molotov's negotiations with British and French diplomatic representatives in Moscow in June-July 1939 were unsuccessful. Western partners did not want to commit themselves to guarantee the independence of the Soviet-border states from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.

Considering it advisable, in order to reassure public opinion, to "continue to support negotiations for a while", the French and British governments agreed to continue negotiations for a political and military agreement with the USSR at the same time. However, their military missions, which arrived in Moscow on August 12, 1939 consisted of secondary persons, who had no authority to conclude it. The Soviet side in the negotiations proposed a plan providing for joint action by the armed forces of the three countries in all possible cases of aggression in Europe. The Polish government, requested in this connection, refused to accept an offer to let Soviet troops through its territory in the event of a German attack. The negotiations were deadlocked. Their failure contributed to Germany's unleashing of World War II. Moscow's termination of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations is also largely due to the fact that by this time it had received a concrete offer from Germany to "resume the political line that had been beneficial to both states for the past centuries." It was confirmed by Hitler in a personal telegram to Stalin of August 21, 1939. Germany clearly feared the successful conclusion of the

Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations in Moscow. For the first time about the possibility of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union the German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop spoke for the first time on May 25.

On July 26, the Soviet chargé d'affaires to Germany, G. A. Astakhov, was informed of the possibility of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. A. Astakhov was informed of the readiness of the German side "to prove in practice that it is possible to agree on any questions and to give any guarantees". Published Soviet diplomatic documents showed that the Soviet leadership had agreed to negotiate with Germany on August 3-4, and the final decision in favor of the pact was made on August 19-21.

Discussing the emerging situation with Politburo members on August 19, 1939, Stalin resolved a difficult dilemma: "If we conclude a mutual aid pact with France and England, then Germany will give up Poland and seek "modus vivendi" with Western powers. War would be averted, but later events could take on a dangerous character for the USSR. If we accept Germany's offer of a non-aggression pact with her, she will of course attack Poland, and the intervention of France and England in this war will be inevitable. Under these conditions we will have many chances of staying out of the conflict, and we can hope for our advantageous entry into the war." He was clearly impressed by the second version of events, which opened, among other things, "a wide field of activity for the development of the world revolution.

Therefore, Stalin concluded, "it is in the interests of the USSR - the homeland of the workers that the war broke out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French

bloc. Everything must be done to make this war last as long as possible in order to exhaust the two sides. It is for this reason that we must agree to the pact proposed by Germany and work to ensure that this war, once declared, will last as long as possible." Stalin's conclusion was quite consistent with the secret French-Polish protocol signed on May 19, 1939, in which France undertook to provide immediate military aid to Poland in the event of aggression, and with the agreement of mutual assistance between England and Poland concluded on August 25 of the same year.

On August 19, 1939, the Soviet government agreed to Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow. On the same day, a trade and credit agreement was signed in the German capital, which provided for a \$200 million loan to the USSR for five years at 4.5% per annum. The agreement was a turning point in the development of relations between the Soviet Union and Germany.

On August 23, 1939, after three hours of negotiation, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact for ten years, called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, was signed in Moscow. The attached secret protocol defined the division of spheres of interest of the two countries in Europe. Germany actually renounced its claims to the Ukraine and its plans to expand into areas where it could pose a threat to the USSR. The provisions of the protocol that "in case of territorial or political reorganization of the regions comprising the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern frontier of Lithuania is at the same time the boundary of the spheres of interest of Germany and the USSR... In case of territorial and political reorganization of the areas making part of the Polish state, the borders of spheres of interests of

Germany and the USSR will pass approximately along the Narew, Vistula and San rivers... Concerning the southeast of Europe from the Soviet side the interest of the USSR in Bessarabia is stressed. The German side declares its complete political disinterest in these areas. It meant that in case of war German troops would not go into Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Bessarabia, and on the territory of Poland would not go further than the named rivers.

The treaty and the protocol became the political and legal basis for the further development of the Soviet-German relations. They lost force after the German attack on the USSR. In opting for the fateful August decision, the Stalinist leadership, following the example of England and France, also preferred to take a position of "non-interference," so as not to shed blood for the interests of others on occasion and, moreover, to "push," as Stalin told the General Secretary of the Comintern, G. Dimitrov, one capitalist country against another, "so that they would be better apart." At any rate, the treaty was an opportunity to buy time to strengthen the defense of the USSR. In addition, it weakened the unity within the aggressive fascist bloc. For example, on August 25, 1939, the Japanese government decided to end the line to strengthen the anti-Mintern "axis" between Japan and Germany and "eliminate the previous plans". The Cabinet, headed by K. Hiranuma, which had advocated a joint Japanese-German war against the Soviet Union, resigned on August 28.

As further developments showed, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact largely predetermined the victorious outcome of the Great Patriotic War. It seems justified the opinion of the famous translator V.N. Pavlov, who

believed that if the USSR had not had two additional years of preparation to repulse aggression, the German armies, having begun the offensive from the Baltic bridgehead, could have taken Moscow already in a week. "And who knows how this first strike would have ended, maybe we would have had to conduct Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk and Novosibirsk defensive operations." At the same time, the post-war publication of the secret protocol, in which the signatory statesmen actually decided the fate of third countries without their participation, caused justified condemnation of these figures in the USSR and other countries of the world. On September 1, 1939 Germany attacked Poland. On September 3, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. World War II began. The Polish army could not provide sufficient resistance to the German troops and retreated to the east. On September 17, units of the Red Army entered Poland, and occupied the western Ukrainian and western Belarusian territories. Poland as an independent state ceased to exist. On September 28 the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship and Frontiers was signed, by which the western frontier of the USSR ran along the Western Bug and Narew rivers. The treaty was accompanied by the secret additional protocol, which said that the document, signed on August, 23rd, 1939 was changed "in such a way, that the territory of the Lithuanian state is included in the sphere of interest of the USSR, because on the other side the Lublin voivodeship (province) and the parts of the Warsaw voivodeship (province) are included in the sphere of interest of Germany". In the campaign for liberation of "consanguineous Ukrainians and Belarus" the Soviet armies had taken 450 thousand Polish servicemen, including 18.8 thousand officers. The fate of many of them turned out to be tragic. According to the decision of

Politburo of the Central Committee from March, 5th 1940. 21,857 officers and other arrested Poles were shot. (This affected the dislike of the "White Poles," who fiercely and mercilessly destroyed Red Army prisoners during and after the Soviet-Polish war in 1920. As it was noted in the note of Commissar G.V. Chicherin of September 9, 1921.) "Katyn case" was a kind of "retaliatory crime" of Stalin's regime, which deepened the conflict with the neighboring people.

After the "liberation march" to the west of Ukraine and Belorussia, the eyes of the Soviet government were fixed on the northwest direction from Moscow. In October 1939, the Finnish government was offered to withdraw the Soviet-Finnish frontier on the Karelian Isthmus for several dozen kilometers and to lease to the Soviet Union the territory at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland to protect Leningrad. After these proposals were rejected, the Soviet leadership went to war. The "Mainila incident" was used as a pretext - the shelling of the Soviet frontier territory near the village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus on November 26, 1939, which the Finns declared a provocation by Moscow. The hostilities, which began on November 30th, were seen by the Soviets as the end of their struggle against the "Finnish White Guards". Many Western countries did not find the Soviet position convincing. In December, the Soviet Union was excluded from the League of Nations as the "aggressor".

Despite heavy losses, in February 1940 the Red Army broke through the Finnish fortification system (the Mannerheim Line) and launched an attack on Helsinki. In March 12 the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed. Under the treaty considerable territory on the Karelian

Isthmus was ceded to the Soviet Union and the Hanko peninsula was leased.

March 31, 1940. After all these events, a new, twelfth Karelian-Finnish Union Republic was formed as part of the USSR. The government is headed by the well-known Communist International figure, O.V. Kuusinen.

In June 1940, the Soviet government accused Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia of violating the Mutual Aid Pacts of September-October 1939 and deployed its troops on their territories. Pro-Soviet governments were formed in all three countries and soon, with the support of the local population, the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian SSR were proclaimed. At the end of June 1940, the USSR demanded the Romanian Government to withdraw its troops from Bessarabia, which had been occupied in 1918 and from Northern Bukovina, which was mainly populated by Ukrainians. Bessarabia was annexed to the Moldavian ASSR, which was transformed into the sixteenth Union Soviet Republic. Northern Bukovina became part of Ukraine.

In an effort to secure its Far Eastern borders, the Soviet leadership in the spring of 1941, Japan having by that time occupied North Indochina, it was moving its expansion to the south and did not want to be drawn into a war with the Soviet Union on allied obligations to Germany. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed on April 13 after difficult negotiations with Japanese Foreign Minister Yo. Matsuoka. The term of the pact was set for five years from the date of ratification, renewable for the same period, unless one of the parties stated its denunciation one year prior to the expiration of the pact.

Germany, which had been at war with Great Britain and France since September 1939, focused on expanding its "living space" at the expense of Western countries, under the influence of its rapid success in Poland. On April 9, 1940, Hitler's troops invaded Denmark and Norway, on May 10, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, then in a blitzkrieg (lightning war) they defeated France, which surrendered on June 24. Beginning June 10, Italy participated in the war on Germany's side.

German losses at that were insignificant: 27,000 killed in the campaign against France, according to German analysts, were quite bearable, "given the enormity of the success achieved. The economy of the occupied countries was put at the service of the Reich.

The events of 1939-1940 were far from Stalin's predictions. His biggest miscalculation was that the countries neighboring Germany offered unexpectedly weak resistance to aggression. The debilitating "fight" between the capitalist countries essentially did not happen. Not only was Germany's potential not weakened as a result of the blitzkrieg, but it was greatly increased. However, in spite of this, the resources of Germany were insufficient to successfully complete the war with England. Hitler was tempted to first increase them by conquering the USSR and then to achieve colonial domination over the whole of Europe.

In July 1940 the German General Staff began to work out a concrete plan of war against the USSR, and on December 18, 1940 Hitler approved the directive, according to which the armed forces were to "defeat the

Soviet Russia in short-term campaign before the war against England will be over (variant of 'Barbarossa')".

According to "optimistic" forecasts, the campaign could be successfully completed in 1.5-2 months, according to "more cautious" in 4-5 months. In any case, the war was planned under the absolute condition that it must end before the winter of 1941.

Installments of Hitler left no doubt that the bet was to destroy the Soviet Union and a radical reduction of its population through the death of starvation and forced removal across the Volga-Arkhangelsk line. Above all, the extermination of the Russians as a people was envisaged. The Nazis intended to weatherize some part of the Soviet people with the slogan of liberation from the "Judeo-Bolshevik" power, thereby weakening their resistance.

The inevitability of war with Germany was clearly recognized by the top leadership of the USSR and the overwhelming part of the Soviet people. Among them there were certainly people who saw in the impending war the possibility of another "Bolshevik revolution" being won. For some, the coming events seemed even simpler. L.B. Mekhlis, head of the Main Political Department of the Red Army, said at the 18th Party Congress that Stalin's task in the event of war should be understood as follows: "To transfer hostilities into enemy territory, fulfil our international obligations and multiply the number of Soviet republics." Stalin, who took over the post of Prime Minister on May 5, 1941, was aware of the unpreparedness of the Armed Forces to participate in a modern war. Hoping that as long as Germany did not get rid of England it would not dare to attack the

USSR, he chose the tactic of delaying the start of the war in order to complete technical rearmament and increase the size of the army.

§ 2. The prewar phase of modernization of the Soviet economy and Armed Forces

By the beginning of the third Five-Year Plan the technical reconstruction of the USSR had been largely completed. By the total volume of industrial production the country ranked first in Europe and second in the world after the USA (in 1913 Russia ranked fifth). However, the USSR still lagged far behind the U.S., Britain, France and Germany in production efficiency. The third five-year plan of development of the national economy was calculated for 1938-1942, the Final Development.

The final drafting and approval of the plan by the 18th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (March 10-21, 1939) came in the years of the constant increase of the military threat. The task of the new five-year plan was to catch up and surpass the most advanced capitalist countries in per capita production. The plan set the volume of capital investment in the national economy at 192 billion rubles. That was almost equal to the investments for 1928-1937. It was planned to increase the volume of industrial production by 92%, to increase 1.5 times the production of agricultural products and public consumption. Expanded the coal and metallurgical base in the east of the country, oil - between the Volga and the Urals. Particular attention was paid to the development of high-quality metallurgy (special steel) and chemical industry. A feature of industrialization at

this stage was an accelerated increase in the capacity of mechanical engineering, defense industry, the creation of strategic reserves. The share of defense-related expenditures in the state budget grew from 12.7% in the second five-year period to 25.4 % in the third one.

The rapid deployment of production required breaking up cumbersome central departments and People's Commissariats. In 1940 the number of industrial commissariats was increased from 6 to 21. Each of them managed technologically homogeneous sectors of production. According to the decision of the 18th All-Union Party Conference (February 1941), the position of Secretary of the leading branches of industry and transport was introduced in city party committees and regional committees. The plans for 1941 provided for an increase of expenditures of the state on defense: from 1939 to June 1941, their share in the budget rose from 26 to 43%. In the eastern regions were built defense plants and enterprises-double plants. On the eve of the war almost a fifth of all military factories were located there.

During the first three years of the third Five-Year Plan gross output of industry grew by 1.5 times, and of machine building - by 1.7 times. Three thousand new large industrial enterprises were put into operation. Among those which came into operation were Kurakhovskaya TPP, Uglichskaya and Komsomolskaya hydroelectric power stations, Novotagilsky and Petrov-Zabaikalsky metallurgical plants, Sredneuralsky copper smelter, Ufa oil refinery, Moscow plant of small cars, Yenakievsky cement plant, Segezhsky and Mariinsky pulp and paper plants.

The sacrificial labor of the people ensured the expansion of industrial output in 1940 by 45% compared to 1937. Annual growth of all industrial production in the peaceful years of the Third Five-Year Plan averaged 13%, and defense - 39%.

The production of new types of military equipment, in particular the T-34 tanks (designed by M. I. Koshkin, A. A. Morozov and N. A. Kucherenko), the Klim Voroshilov heavy tank (Chief Designer Z. Ya. Kotin), BM-13 reactive mortars (designers I. I. Gvay, V. N. Galkovsky and A. P. Pavlenko), the Il-2 attack aircraft (S. V. Ilyushin) was mastered, which were far superior to their foreign analogs. The Pe-2 high-speed dive-bomber (designer V. Ilyushin) which faithfully served during the war was put into serial production. The M. Petlyakov fighters Yak-1 (AS Yakovlev), MiG-3 (AI Mikoyan, MI Gurevich), LaGT-3 (SA Lavochkin, MI Gudkov, VP Gorbunov).

During the years preceding the war were built 276 warships, including 212 submarines. All this allowed to significantly increase the technical equipment of the Red Army and the Navy. Rearmament required to increase spending on military needs to 32.5 percent of the country's budget in 1940. The annual increase in military production in 1938-1940 three times exceeded the growth of all industrial production. However, according to calculations, even at such a rate it was possible to fully provide the army with new weapons only in 1942-1943.

The implementation by June 1941 of the first three five-year plans (respectively, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th stages of industrialization) provided a steady increase in industrial production by about 15% per year. About 9 thousand large industrial enterprises of machine tool, aviation,

automotive, tractor, chemical industry, were advanced by world standards of those years. In the second half of the 30's the process of transforming the country from an agrarian to an industrial one was completed. The USSR achieved economic independence from the West. It overtook or came very close to Germany, Britain and France in gross output in a number of industries.

The fulfillment of the arduous plans of the Third Five-Year Plan was largely ensured by a return to the militarization of labor. Under threat of imprisonment, workers and employees were forbidden to move from one enterprise to another without the permission of the management. In 1938 the "labor booklets" were introduced which were kept in the personnel department at the place of work. The record on them included both gratitude for good work and violations of labor discipline, without a mark in the employment book about the reasons of dismissal from the previous job one could not be hired for a new job.

In 1940 the work regime of industrial enterprises became even stricter. Whereas in 1939 being late for work for only 20 minutes without a valid excuse was considered a truancy, from 1940 this could be followed by a six month "probationary sentence": a worker could continue to work at his position but up to 25% of his earnings were deducted from his salary to the state. From June 26, 1940, the length of the working day was increased from 7 to 8 hours and a seven-day week was instituted instead of a six-day week. Sunday, in accordance with religious tradition, became the only day of rest (it had not been a day of rest since September 24, 1929). In addition to Sundays, there were also Sundays - January 22, May 1 and 2, November 7 and 8, and December 5.

In fact, many branches of industry were converted to paramilitary. Since 1940 the annual mobilization of the youth for apprenticeship in the trade schools. The aspiration to build communism in one country and to catch up and surpass the most advanced capitalist countries in per capita production took on very peculiar shapes under these conditions.

The high rates of industrial development in the 1930s were achieved at the expense of both the low starting point and the total implementation of command methods of economic management. The goals of forced industrialization were met by massive use of cheap labor and enthusiasm of the masses inspired by the Bolshevik idea of building a classless society. A great role was played by various forms of competition (shockwork in the years of the first five-year plan, the Stakhanov movement in the second and third) for fulfillment and over-fulfillment of production tasks. The labor of prisoners was widely used in the system of the NKVD Main Directorate of Camps.

Before the Great Patriotic War the Gulag consisted of 53 camps, 425 correctional labor colonies, and 50 juvenile colonies. Within the system, special branch departments were created: Glavleslag, Glavpromstroy, Main Directorate of Mining and Metallurgical Industry Camps, and Main Directorate of Railroad Construction Camps. In 1934 the number of the prisoners in the camps was 500,000, in 1940 - more than 1.5 million. On the eve of the war their total number reached 2.2 million. The prisoners' labor accounted for up to 10% of all construction work and up to 20% of the country's construction work.

In 1940 the share of capital investments of the NKVD in the total centralized capital investments reached the highest level for the whole period of the 30's - early 50's. - 14%.

In terms of production, the Gulag system ranked first among all People's Commissariat. The NKVD enterprises produced cement, built steamships, boats, barges, motor-tractor trailers, road equipment, agricultural implements; produced furniture, knitwear, shoes and much more. By 1939 there were a number of talented designers and engineers in "Beria's department". Design bureaus, referred to in the camp slang as "sharashkas", emerged within the NKVD system. A.N. Tupolev, V.M. Petlyakov, and V.M. Myasishchev, rocket-builders S. P. Korolev, and V.M. Korolev worked there. P. Korolev and V. П. Glushko.

By the beginning of the third Five-Year Plan the collectivization of agriculture in the USSR had been largely completed. Individual peasant farms remained only 7%. Most of them were the farms of cattle breeders, reindeer herders, shepherds, hunters, fishermen on the outskirts of the country. The main cell of rural life were kolkhozes, which numbered 237,000. In 1937 the harvest was good (98 million tons), livestock reached the prewar level. By the end of the year the farms were closed.

The size of the "kulak exile" was reduced as part of the total collectivization program. In 1933, almost 400 thousand kulaks and members of their families were exiled, in 1934 - 255, in 1935 - 246, in 1936 - 165, in 1937 - 128 thousand.

In May 1934, the workers were restored the civil rights, from January 1935 - the voting rights. However, they were still not allowed to return to their old places of residence and were not drafted into the army. These restrictions were lifted from them at the end of 1938. In the years of the Third Five-Year Plan the situation in the agrarian sector stabilized, production tended to grow, although it was restrained by the shifting of attention and resources to the defense sectors of the economy. If on the eve of the "revolution from above" the country annually produced 72-73 million tons of grain, more than 5 million tons of meat, more than 30 million tons of milk, then in the late 30s and early 40s respectively: 75-80, 4-5 and 70 million tons. However, at the end of the 20s these products were produced by 50-55 million homesteaders, and in the prewar years by 30-35 million collective and state farm workers. In 1940, 38.3 million tons of marketable grain was produced, which was 17 million more than by the beginning of World War I. Increased productivity in the countryside ensured the release of 20 million people for industry, other sectors of the economy and the armed forces. From this point of view, the policy of forced collectivization, with all its mistakes and cruelty, seems justified. Assessing the results of the dramatic history of collectivization, V. P. Danilov, one of the major national historians, wrote: "Already in the first years of collectivization - even with a general decline in agricultural production - it became possible first to double and then to triple the grain procurements, to provide export operations and supply cities, the army of refugees from the countryside added to the army of urban working class, its labor was supplemented by the work of prisoners.

In other words, forced collectivization predetermined to some extent the success of industrialization, our victory over fascism."

The number of the Red Army, which in 1938 switched from a territorially cadre system to a cadre system of manning, was rapidly increasing. On September 1, 1939 the law "On Universal Military Duty" was adopted in the USSR. It increased the period of military service, reduced the conscription age from 21 to 18 years, and lengthened the time of service in the reserve. This allowed to double the army ranks within a year. At the beginning of 1939 there were 2,485,000 men in the Soviet Armed Forces and by June 22, 1941 their number reached 5,774,000 (For comparison: the German Wehrmacht numbered 7,329,000 people on June 15, 1941.) The commanders, who had distinguished themselves in Spain, Mongolia and Finland, were promoted to the leadership of the army. On May, 7th, 1940 S. K. Timoshenko replaced K. E. Voroshilov as People's Commissar of Defense. In June 1940, G. K. Zhukov was promoted to the post of Commander of the Military District, and in January 1941 - as Head of the General Staff - Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.

Deployment of mass defense work in the country contributed to the preparation of young people for the military. Only in 1941 about 14 million people were members of Voluntary Society of Assistance to Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction. In educational institutions of the society they were trained in small arms, air defense, bayonet techniques, technique of driving cars and piloting airplanes.

Qualified military personnel were trained in a rapidly expanding system of military schools and colleges. In 1937-1940 the officer corps of Soviet Armed Forces grew by 2.8 times and the number of officers with higher and middle military education increased by 2.2 times from 164,000 to 385,000. However, according to the data of the beginning of 1941. In the Ground Forces shortage of commanding officers amounted to 66.9 thousand, in the Air Force - 32.3%. Only 7. 1% of the present command staff had higher military education. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War three quarters of the commanders were on their posts for less than a year and had no proper military experience.

On January 17, 1939, the USSR carried out census of population which counted 170,6 million living in the country: about one third of them (32,9%) were city dwellers. The census reflected radical changes in the social composition of Soviet society, expressed primarily in the growth of the number of workers. Their ranks (25,4 mln. people) in comparison with December 17, 1926 (the date of the previous census) increased 3.6 times. In the social structure of society, there were 33.3% of workers, 47.2% of collective farmers and cooperated bushmen, 16.5% of clerks and intellectuals, and a small layer of peasant individualists and uncooperative bushmen - 2.6%. With the annexation of new territories to the Soviet Union in 1939-1940 and the overall increase in population, the number of Soviet people on June 22, 1941 increased to 196.7 million. Three Slavic nations accounted for 73% of the population: Russians (51.8), Ukrainians (17.6), and Belarusians (3.6). The demographic potential of the Soviet Union was much higher than that of its likely military adversary. By the beginning of World War II the population of Germany

was 69.3 million people. The Anschluss of Austria (March 1938) increased the population of the Third Reich to 80 million.

§ 3. Strikes against the potential of the "fifth column"

By the mid-1930s the Soviet leadership had largely accepted the notion and tried to convince the entire population of the country that the "enemies of the people" were operating with impunity in all Party, Soviet and economic organs and in the leadership of the Red Army.

The struggle to clear the country of internal enemies became widespread in 1937. It was just as intense in 1938, and, according to the Stalinists, was prompted by the need to eliminate the "fifth column" in the face of an impending war. This was only partly true. At the same time, it was a struggle for the preservation of the Stalinist regime. There is no doubt that the oppositionists, not only in the 20s, but for a good part of the 30s, were looking for ways to eliminate Stalin and his inner circle. However, "Stalin proved more cunning and resolute than his opponents, although sometimes his power hung by a thread" (A. V. Shubin).

The most notorious of the trials conducted in 1938. was the case of the "Right-Trotskyist anti-Soviet bloc". It began on March 2 in the October Hall of the House of Unions. There were 21 people in the dock. Three of them were members of the Leninist Politburo - N. I. Bukharin, A. I. Rykov, and N. N. Krestinsky. Another former member of this cohort, M. P. Tomsy, was

released from the fate of the defendant by suicide on August 22, 1936, on the eve of his arrest. Among the defendants were also former high-ranking officials of the central state and party apparatus - the People's Commissars for Foreign Trade, A. P. Rosengoltz, of the timber industry, V.I. Ivanov, Agriculture, M. A. Chernov, Finance, G. F. Grinko, Internal Affairs, G. G. Yagoda, and I. A. Zelensky, chairman of the Central Union.

A number of former first persons in the leadership of the Union republics were also on trial: Chairman of the Sovnarkom, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, X. G. Rakovsky, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus V. F. Sharangovich, chairman of the Sovnarkom of the Uzbek SSR F. Khojaev, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan A. I. Ikramov. Added to these main political defendants were several former employees of lesser rank: an adviser to the Soviet trade mission in Berlin, a secretary of the NKVD, Deputy People's Commissar of Agriculture, former secretaries of Yagoda, Kuibyshev and M. Gorky, and three well-known doctors.

In the indictment, it was stated that the defendants, "being implacable enemies of the Soviet power, in 1932-1933. On the instructions of the intelligence services of foreign countries hostile to the Soviet Union, they organized a conspiratorial group called the 'Right-Trotskyist Bloc', which united the underground anti-Soviet groups of Trotskyists, Rightists, Zinovievites, Mensheviks, SRs and bourgeois nationalists of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Central Asian republics. The "Right Trotskyist Bloc" aimed to overthrow the socialist social and state system existing in the

USSR, to restore capitalism and the power of the bourgeoisie in the USSR through subversive, sabotage, terrorist, espionage and treasonous activities aimed at undermining the economic and defense power of the Soviet

The defendants were also accused of other crimes - committing a number of acts of sabotage to reduce and spoil crops; reducing the number of horses and cattle; artificially spreading an epizootic, as a result of which in Eastern Siberia alone in 1936 about 25,000 horses; financing of Trotsky; preparation of bandit-insurgent kulak cadres to organize armed actions in the rear of the Red Army to begin an intervention against the USSR; creation of a terrorist group to prepare and carry out terrorist acts against Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov; personal attempt to commit terrorist acts against Stalin; assassination of Kirov, the death of M. Kuchma.

Gorky and his son, as well as Kuibyshev, Menzhinsky; instructed to commit an act of terrorism against Yezhov. The verdict also states that in 1918 Bukharin and his accomplices set out to kill Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov; to form a new government of Bukharinists, Trotskyists and leftist Social Revolutionaries; and the attempt on Lenin's life on August 30, 1918 was the direct result of the plans of "leftist" communists led by Bukharin.

On March 13, 1938, the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court announced the verdict. It turned out to be fatal for 18 defendants. As a result of this and similar judicial and extrajudicial reprisals, a significant part of the old Bolshevik guards and many representatives of the Party and state apparatus, who were suspected of

disloyalty and unfitness, were physically liquidated.

In 1938 the Chekist actions on "national operations" were completed. According to the archival sources in 1937 - 1938 the total number of repressed on these operations was 335,513 persons from whom 247,157 (73.6%) were sentenced to execution. Professional revolutionaries who moved from the neighboring countries to the territory of the USSR were also put on trial. In January 1938, the Politburo of the Central Committee adopted a special decision - to shoot all the arrested renegades if they crossed the border "with a hostile purpose" and to impose a 10-year imprisonment sentence if no such purpose was found.

Repressions based on nationality did not bypass the law enforcement agencies either. On June 24, 1938 the directive of People's Commissar of Defense was issued, according to which the military men of all "nationalities, not making part of the Soviet Union" were to be dismissed from the army. Those who were born abroad and had relatives there were discharged first of all. According to the incomplete information, the special departments revealed 13,000 of "nationals" which had to be dismissed. In May 1938, the UK Party instructed to remove from the NKVD organs, (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs), all employees who had relatives abroad and were from the "petty-bourgeoisie".

The number of Jews (from 21.3% at the beginning of September 1938 to 3.5% by the end of 1939) significantly decreased. Totally, only during the years of the "Yezhevshina" 14 thousand were "purged" from the NKVD. This number includes 2,273 KGB officers, arrested in the period from 1 October 1936 to 15 August

1938. The Soviet regime's "counter-revolutionary crimes," of which 1,862 Chekists were repressed for counter-revolutionary crimes.

After the arrest of Yezhov (April 10, 1939) there were repressed 101 of the higher officials of the NKVD - not only the deputy commissar, but almost all of the heads of departments of the central apparatus of the NKVD, the Commissars of Internal Affairs of Union and autonomous republics; the heads of many regional, provincial and city departments of the NKVD.

According to the directory "Who led the NKVD. 1934-1941" (Moscow, 2002), a total of 22,168 OGPU-NKVD officers were repressed in 1933-1939. This number, along with security workers, includes and constitutes the vast majority of police officers, firefighters, employees of the NKVD troops, the Gulag system, civil registry, etc. The sharp decrease in the percentage of Jews among employees of the NKVD in 1939 did not occur due to the fact that by this time, as S.L. Beria writes in his book "My Father Beria" (Moscow 2002), "the top of the Party apparatus and the state were Russophiles, who did not trust the 'foreigners' and hated them. The memoirist included Molotov, Andreev, Malenkov, and Zhdanov in the group of "Russian chauvinists," whose orders were carried out by Yezhov and Yagoda. The memoirist's father also allegedly became a forced "Russophile. The information he gathered showed that "three-quarters of the investigators and leaders of counterintelligence were Jews. Fearing that their too active presence in the representative organs might cause a wave of anti-Semitism, he decided to replace them with Russians.

For in that period there were often accusations that the "

"Jews were oppressing and destroying the Russian people." Statistics of the national composition of the repressed show that the bulk of them were indeed Russians. Thus, the "Russophilia" of L.P. Beria, expressed in a change in the national composition of NKVD leaders and investigators, is explained by his concern for the well-being of non-Russian people.

By the end of 1938 the struggle for the elimination of the "fifth column" decreased. On November 17, SNKSSR and CC of All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution prohibiting "mass arrest and eviction operations" and condemning "violation of legality". On November 25 the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs was relieved of his post, and soon he was arrested on charges of conspiracy and Yezhov was shot.

Appointed on the same day as the new People's Commissar, L.P. Beria began his activities with amnesties. Compared with the years of the Great Terror, the scale of repression was significantly reduced. In 1939, "for counterrevolutionary and state crimes" 2,552 people were sentenced to death (7 people per day), in 1940 - 1,649 people (4-5/ day), in 1941, including the war half-year - 8,001 (24 people per day). But in 1939-1940, 837,000 people were rehabilitated and released from prison.

The scale of repressions in the ruling party itself can be judged by the dynamics of expulsions from the ranks of the VKP(b). Thus in 1937-1938 216,000 people were expelled from the Party. Later on, the number of those expelled decreased. In 1939, 26,700 left the Party ranks against their will. At the same time in 1939-1940 164,800

were restored. It was later calculated that 17 (50% percent) of 34 Politburo members who were members in 1917-1939 were repressed. Repressed were 17 (50%); of the 27 members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, 15 (55.5%); of the 64 members of the Orgbureau, 42 (66%); of the 71 members of the Central Committee, 49 (70%); of the 70 chairmen and deputy chairmen of the Sovnarkom of the USSR

In March 1939 Stalin announced figures, according to which 270,000 less Communists were represented at the 16th 11th Party Congress than at the previous Congress in early 1934. In the period between Congresses "more than 500 thousand young Bolsheviks, Party and Party adherents, of whom 20 percent were women, were nominated for leadership positions in the state and Party lines." Assuming that the nominations were made mainly to replace repressed leaders (although no doubt nominees were also replacing newly opened vacancies), we can also conclude that the number of repressed Communists who held leadership positions in the Party and State was about or slightly less than 500,000.

There seems to be some sense in the cited judgments of Molotov and Bukharin that purging the country on the eve of the war from potential opponents of the Soviet system and the existing regime of power was necessary. Otherwise, the scale of Hitler's pandering to "liberators of the USSR from the Stalinist regime", which the aggressors were counting on, would have been many times greater than it turned out to be in reality during the war. But another thing is also obvious. As a result of the repressions, which completed the "revolution from above", the personal power regime of Stalin, who was able to obey the social and economic realities, but also

made extensive use of fear and violence along with other methods of ruling society, finally established itself in the country.

The regime established in the USSR at the end of the 1930s could not be effective without an authoritarian, cynical, and ruthless leader of the Stalinist type. The Red Army, especially its top commanding officers, suffered the most from repression. From 837 persons who in 1935 had personal military ranks from colonel and above, 720 (86%) were arrested. Totally, according to data of modern researchers in 1937-1938 37,000 officers were discharged from the Red Army, 29,000 of them for political reasons.

The Soviet Army, up to 8,000 officers were arrested and up to 5,000 shot. The number of those discharged was about 2.5 percent of the officer personnel on the eve of the war.

L. B. Mekhlis, who held the highest political position in the Red Army after the suicide of the head of the Red Army Political Department, Ya. B. Gamarnik, as well as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Personnel E. A. Shchadenko. According to the investigation's version the leadership of the conspiracy in the army after Tukhachevsky was unmasked and was executed by marshal A. I. Yegorov (since 1935 chief of the General Staff, since May 1937 first deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, in January 1938 he was appointed commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, in April of the same year he was arrested), then 1st rank commandant I. F. Fedko (in 1937 commanded the Kiev military district, since January 1938 he was first deputy People's Commissar of Defense, in July 1938 he

was arrested).

Outstanding military figures of the USSR later almost unanimously noted the destructive role of repressions in the army in pre-war years. Marshal Zhukov believed that "Without 1937 there would have been no summer of 1941. Marshal I. S. Konev held the same position.

"There is no doubt," he said, "that if there had been no thirty-seventh to thirty-eighth year, and not only in the army, but also in the party, in the country, we would have been incomparably stronger by the forty-first year than we were. "And I will say more," Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky argued. - Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in the forty-first year.

" True, some people, such as the famous philosopher A. A. Zinoviev, even today continue to assert: "If it were not for Stalin's brutal measures, we would not have been there in '41.

§ 4. the completion of the "cultural revolution" and patriotic preparation of the population for war

"The Cultural Revolution* was largely determined by the Soviet leadership's policy in education and science. Since the Civil War the country had been eradicating illiteracy. Thousands of schools, circles, centers, where adults and children were taught to read and write, were created. In the mid-1930s, after a number of leftist experiments of the 1920s an effective system of public education was formed. In secondary and higher education, the pre-revolutionary model with the regimented system of classes and rather strict requirements to evaluation of knowledge was actually

restored. Compulsory state educational programs were introduced, including stable textbooks, and a strict order of the educational process. The policy was subordinated to the task of total control over the whole social and cultural sphere of the society.

In accordance with the decree of the government and the Central Committee. CPSU(b) "On work on teaching the illiterates and the illiterate" (January 1936) by the end of the 30's the training of adults in secondary schools was expanded. In 1939 there were more than 750,000 people (81% in preparatory and 5-7 grades, 19% in 8-10 grades). A system of distance learning for adults was set up with the use of counseling centers. By the beginning of 1939 just in the RSFSR about 40,000 people were covered by correspondence education. In the 1940/41 school year in the USSR there were 18 distance learning institutions, 383 higher educational institutions had distance learning departments. By the end of the 30's the country had 152 thousand schools, over 800 colleges (in 1917 there were a little over 100 colleges, in 1941 - 817), more than 3,700 technical schools and other specialized secondary institutions. The number of students in schools reached 34 million, universities – 601,000. Technical schools - 1.1 million.

In all, about 48 million people were educated in the country. By this time, the transition to seven-year education was completed in the cities, the task was now moving to universal secondary education in the cities and seven years - in the countryside and national areas.

From 1920 to 1940 up to 60 million adults were taught to read and write. In 1940/41 school year the number of

secondary school students increased by almost 10 times compared to 1937, the number of students of incomplete secondary schools in rural areas increased by almost 3 times. In the early 40's the USSR came first in the world in the number of students and in the rate and volume of training of specialists,

According to the 1939 census, 81.2% of the inhabitants of the USSR could read and write. However, on the whole, the level of literacy in the country remained low. People with secondary education in the country amounted to 7.8%, with higher education - 0.68%. The vast majority of the literate (90%) had no more than a primary education. As of January 1, 1941 81.6% of the managers and specialists in industry (from the director to the foreman and economist) had no higher education. These figures were clearly insufficient to conclude that the "cultural revolution" had been completed.

Nevertheless, the actual elimination of illiteracy among the bulk of the population along with other cultural achievements gave grounds for the following conclusion: "In terms of cultural development of the people the reporting period (1934-1939) was truly the period of the cultural revolution. Without this revolution, as well as without industrialization and collectivization, victory in the Great Patriotic War would not have been possible.

The need for specialists was met through the formation of a new intelligentsia, mainly from the workers' and peasants' background. All in all, during the 1930s the higher educational establishments gave the national economy about 900,000 specialists. In 1940 there were 16,900 postgraduate students as compared with 3,000 in 1930.

Among the scientists in the party stratum was growing. If in 1929 in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR there were only 16 Party members (out of 1158 employees), in 1933 there were 348 Communists, including 17 academicians, 82 research workers, 137 postgraduate students. By the beginning of the Third Five-Year Plan about 13,600 Communists were already working in scientific institutions of the country.

By the end of the thirties there were 90 agricultural institutes, 127 socio-economic and pedagogical research institutes, 268 scientific institutions operated in the public health system. In 1940 the research work in the country was carried out by 1,821 scientific institutions, including 786 research institutes. There were 200 scientific institutions, including 78 institutes, functioning in the system of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Since 1938, the USSR Academy of Sciences had eight departments: Physico-mathematical, Technical, Chemical, Biological, Geological and Geographical sciences, Economics and Law, History and Philosophy, Literature and Language. In 1938-1939 the Academy's system was enlarged by establishing the Institute of Theoretical Geophysics (headed by O. Yu. Schmidt), the Institutes of Automatics and Telemechanics, Metallurgy, and Mechanics. In 1939-1941 were organized Uzbek, Turkmen and Tadjik branches of the Academy. In January 1941 on the basis of the branch the Academy of Sciences of the Georgian SSR was established and the Academy of Sciences of the Lithuanian SSR was formed.

The number of employees of the USSR Academy of Sciences had increased from 1,018 people in 1927 to 16,335 people in 1940. There were 98,300 people

working in all the fields of scientific activity, i.e. 4 times more than in 1928. 126 full and honorary members and 191 corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences, 402 doctors and 1,271 candidates of sciences were among the researchers of the Academy. In the pre-war academic year 61,400 people worked at universities of the country.

The country's scientific and teaching staff, and 91b6 scientists worked in scientific institutions of the public health system. All in all, there were more than 20 million specialists in the country by the end of the 1930s instead of 1.5 million in 1917.

By the beginning of the 40s, many representatives of the old intelligentsia were on the path of close cooperation with the Soviet power. A large part of the specialists of the pre-revolutionary formation died in the repressions. In 1938 the secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician N. P. Gorbunov, Academicians Historian N. M. Lukin, Microbiologist G. A. Nadson, and Orientalist A. N. Samoylovich were repressed. "Physicist L. D. Landau, specialists in the field of new technology S. P. Korolev, V. P. Glushko, A. N. Tupolev, etc.

By the end of the 1930s the proportion of the old intelligentsia among intellectual workers had significantly decreased. In 1939 there were only 10% left (in 1926 - 50). This allowed us to say that the formation of the new Soviet intelligentsia in the USSR was largely completed.

In the second half of the 1930s there was a mass renewal of the leading personnel of the national economy. The signal to renewal was the famous speech of Stalin on May 4, 1935 before the graduates of military

academies, when the slogan "Personnel solve everything" was put forward.

One of the barbaric methods of replacing managerial cadres with more skilled and energetic ones was the Great Terror of 1937-1938. Describing those years, the famous management expert Academician D.M. Gvishiani, who had a good idea of the layer of economic managers consisting of former professional revolutionaries and heroes of the Civil War, wrote that the objective reason for the promotion of the pleiad of new young leaders "consisted of the forced need for competent cadres for the management of the economy. This circumstance forced Stalin to abandon the established practice of appointing leadership cadres on the principle of ideological loyalty. The new people were specialists who had grown up in production, capable of responsibility for a particular case. Research by G. I. Khanin (2003) shows that in contrast to the late twenties and early thirties in 1937-1938 Stalin "suffered the least.

"Old specialists suffered the least from repressions - both technical (some of them continued to work in "sharashki") and, which seems more unexpected, economic. In some respect their role even increased. The second half of the 1930s is marked by a number of outstanding scientific achievements. P. L. Kapitsa made a great contribution to the development of Soviet and world technique of gas liquefaction. As noted above, in 1934 he created the world's first helium liquefier, and in 1939 he proposed the method of gas liquefaction by a low-pressure cycle. In 1938.

Kapitsa discovered the superfluidity of helium. The explanation of superfluidity was soon, in 1941, given by

L. D. Landau. Both of them were later awarded the Nobel Prize for this work. On June 14, 1940, G.N. Flerov and K.A. Petrzhak (Kurchatov's laboratory) discovered the phenomenon of spontaneous uranium fission.

The accumulation of considerable experience in nuclear physics was demonstrated by the Sixth (October 1938, Leningrad), Fourth (November 1939, Kharkov) and Fifth (November 1940, Moscow) All-Union Conferences of Soviet nuclear scientists and specialists in cosmic rays. At the meetings of the latter conference more than 40 reports were made on the following problems: cosmic rays; properties of fast electrons and hard protons; nuclear isomerism; fission of heavy nuclei; neutrons and nuclear structure; nuclear reactions inside stars; technique of fast particles; applications of nuclear physics to chemistry, biology and medicine. Soviet scientists had already, before the Great Patriotic War, kept in their hands the keys to solving the problems of mastering atomic energy. Emphasizing this, P.L. Kapitsa said at an anti-fascist rally in Moscow in the Hall of Columns: "The latest time gives us new opportunities to use atomic energy, the use of which was previously written about only in science fiction novels ... Theoretical calculations show ... an atomic bomb, even a small one, could easily destroy a major metropolitan city with several million people" (Pravda. 1941. October 13).

New successes have been achieved by Soviet chemists. The discovery of B. A. Dolgoplosky redox initiation (1939) made it possible to synthesize a special purpose rubber. In August 1939, O. I. Leipunsky (Institute of Chemical Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences) theoretically determined the conditions for the formation of artificial diamonds.

Much work was done in the second half of the 1930s by Soviet geologists and geographers. By 1939 the territory of the country was already 45.6% covered by geological survey (in 1929 - 17.7%). In the late 30's the Soviet Union was in first place in the world in terms of discovered reserves of oil, hydropower, peat, iron and manganese ore, zinc, lead, apatite, and potassium salts. The greatest achievement of the Soviet cartography in the prewar years were topographic maps at different scales and derived from them generalized maps, including the State Map of the USSR at a scale of 1:1,000,000 which was completed in the years of the Great Patriotic War. In 1940 there was published geological map of the USSR in scale 1:2,500,000, created under the leadership of D. V. Nalivkin. On the initiative of A. P. Gerasimov (Central Geological Prospecting Institute) in 1938 began work on the geological map of the USSR on a scale of 1:1,000,000 and a multi-volume monograph "Geology of the USSR". Agricultural practice was enriched by the achievements of the scientific schools of V. P. Williams, D. N. Pryanishnikov, and N. M. Tulaykov. A new soil map of the country was prepared under the leadership of Tulaykov. In 1939, a summary of the soils of the USSR in three volumes was published.

In the 1930s classic works in biology and genetics (N.I. Vavilov and others) were created. Unfortunately, these branches of science were detrimentally affected by the activities of the group of biologists led by Lysenko and Presentation, which resulted in repression against N. I. Vavilov, N. M. Tulaykov, N. K. Koltsov, and A. S. Serebrovsky.

Much more modest in comparison with the natural and exact sciences in the 1930s were the achievements of the humanities, which were under the greatest pressure of the dominant ideology. Nevertheless, in 1939 the work of L. V. Kantorovich's "Mathematical Methods in the Organization and Planning of Production," which gave a general statement of the linear programming problem and the method of its solution. For the work in this field the scientist was later awarded the Lenin Prize (1965) and the Nobel Prize in Economics (1975).

In the 1930s, other original works appeared on economics and the history of the national economy (E. S. Varga, P. I. Lyashchenko), as well as on the history of Russian feudalism (Yu. V. Gautier, B. D. Grekov, S. V. Bakhrushin), on the social movement of the 19th century (N. M. Druzhininin). In addition, I. D. Gauthier (Yu. Gauthier, B. D. Grekov, S. N. Bakhrushin) and the history of the social movement of the 19th century (N. M. Druzhinin and M. V. Nechkina), source studies (S. N. Valk and M. N. Tikhomirov), Slavic studies (V. I. Picheta), and general history (E. A. Kosminsky, S.D. Skazkin, E. V. Tarle, et al.).

The Decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet of December 20, 1939 established the Stalin Awards (from 1966 they were called State Awards) to encourage "outstanding work in science and art, the best inventions and outstanding achievements in the field of military knowledge". The first such prizes were awarded in March 1941.

In the 1930s, as before, great importance was attached to the training of personnel in the system of Party and state management of culture. Preparation of such cadres

was carried out by the special Party educational institutions: The Higher School of Marxism-Leninism, the Higher School of Party Organizers, and the Higher Party School. From the middle of the 20s, the higher educational institutions had departments of the history of the Party and Leninism. Party history was first studied on the basis of the 4-volume "History of the VKP(b)", edited by E. M. Yaroslavsky and published in 1926-1930. Since September 1938, right after the publication of the "Short course of the History of the VKP(b)", he began its elaboration in all universities, where were established unified departments of the basics of Marxism-Leninism, and in the entire propaganda system of the country.

The need for specialists was met through the formation of a new intelligentsia - mainly from the workers and peasants. By the end of 30s the country had more than 20 million specialists instead of 1.5 million in 1917. The introduction of new achievements of science and technology in production was stimulated by the development of fundamental branches of knowledge. The 30s were marked by important achievements in science and technology (production of synthetic rubber, the discovery of new oil fields in the Urals and Bashkiria, the beginning of work in the field of rocket science, the development of new models of aviation technology, research and development of the Arctic).

The completion of the "cultural revolution" was largely facilitated by the expansion of Soviet generations' familiarization with national history, folk traditions, and national values. National patriotic feelings were also shaped by various events that regularly reminded people of significant historical victories and deeds of outstanding people, with the active assistance of

historical, art, and memorial museums, and even through mass religious ceremonies. The sense of belonging to the nation is also formed by regular exposure to works of art and architecture created in the territory by people who identified themselves with the nation. All this became fully utilized to rally Soviet society in the pre-thriller years of the 1930s.

"The Great Past of the Russian People in Monuments of Art and Arms" was the theme of an exhibition opened at the Hermitage in September 1938. Alexander Nevskiy" created by S.M.Eisenstein - "patriotic film about greatness, power and valor of the Russian people, their love to their Motherland, about the glory of the Russian weapon, about selfless bravery in the struggle with the invaders of the Russian land" appeared on the movie screens in November, as "Pravda" newspaper wrote about it. In October 1939 the All-Union premiere of V. I. Pudovkin's Minin and Pozharsky took place.

The February 1939 exhibition opened in the Tretyakov Gallery was a notable event in the cultural and political life of Moscow. The best paintings of the 18th - 20th century Russian painters working in the field of historical painting, brought from various cities of the country, were presented there for the first time during the Soviet period. Paintings of Russian artists of the 18th and 20th centuries, who worked in the field of historical painting (V. Vasnetsov, V. Vereshchagin, V. Perov, I. Repin, G. Ugryumov, etc.).

This exhibition, as the newspapers of the time noted, instilled "enthusiasm in the hearts of visitors, confidence in the strength of our mighty people, who throughout their long history have repeatedly defeated their enemies

and managed to defend their independence and freedom. The opera "Ivan Susanin", which had its premiere in April 1939, had a great resonance. In autumn of the same year the 125th anniversary of the birth of "the great patriot poet" Mikhail Lermontov was widely celebrated. In the first half of 1941 there were released movies "Suvorov" (directed by V. I. Pudovkin) and "Bogdan Khmel'nitsky" (I. A. Savchenko), which had become a part of the Soviet classics.

The historical and national consciousness of the peoples of the USSR was largely enriched by the work of writers. In the second half of 30's they turned more and more often to the creation of images of outstanding statesmen and military figures of the past, to the disclosure of turning events in the history of the country and individual nations. The best known was the novel by A. Tolstoy's Peter the First. The heroic history of the Russian people was inspired by the poems "The Ice Battle" and "Suvorov" by K. Simonov, the novel "Dmitry Donskoy" by S. Borodin. The tragic pages of Russian history were artistically illuminated in the novel "Genghis Khan" by V. Yan. The high spirit of patriotism was imbued in the novels "Tsushima" by A. Novikov-Priboya, "Sevastopol Passion" by S. Sergeev-Tsenskiy, "Port Arthur" by A. Stepanov. Cultural, historical and patriotic motifs were the content of the novels "The Hand of the Great Master" by K. Gamsakhurdia, "The Great Mauravi" by A. Antonovskaya.

Sincere adherents of proletarian internationalism perceived the trend to depart from the "principles of communism" in the national question as a pernicious mistake.

The prominent literary scholar V. Blum believed that the films Alexander Nevsky* and Peter the First, the opera Ivan Susanin, and the play Bogdan Khmelnitsky distorted historical events and replaced the propaganda of Soviet patriotism with racist and nationalist propaganda to the detriment of internationalism. Having received no support in the Central Committee of the Party, he sent a letter to Stalin asking him to put an end to the distortion of the character of socialist patriotism, which received "features of racial nationalism" and to condemn "the knights of ugly, allegedly socialist racism" who "cannot understand that we will not beat the enemy-fascist with his weapon (racism), but with a much better weapon - international socialism".

In the second half of the 1930s, the desire to denigrate almost every work on a patriotic theme as an embodiment of "kouz-moi kryuchkovskaya" (literal patriotism) was not so rare. We had to reassure the zealous proponents of socialist cosmopolitanism by reminding them that the Bolsheviks' attitude toward patriotism was "far from being like that of Kuzma Kryuchkov," the Don Cossack who was the first Knight of the George Cross in World War I, "when the Leninists were on the defeatist line".

In September 1939 a special decree of the Central Committee of the Party was adopted condemning "the harmful tendencies of sweeping denigration of patriotic works.

At the end of the 1930s significant changes were made in the national-language policy of the state. The reorganization of the former national minority schools into "regular type schools" made it possible to unfold

more extensive work on introducing the population of the national republics to the Russian language. The Resolution of the Soviet of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Party "On the compulsory study of the Russian language at the schools of the national republics and regions" of March 13, 1938, played a huge role in this. The decree obliged all non-Russian elementary schools to start in September with the second grade and all incomplete secondary schools and middle schools with the third. The number of language teaching hours was increased, teacher training was broadened, and the publication of teaching and methodological literature was intensified.

The Latin alphabet was replaced with the Cyrillic alphabet, and the acquisition of the Russian language was facilitated. In accordance with the decision of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Central Executive Committee of October 16, 1936, the Kabardinians' writing system was transferred to Cyrillic. Writing of other peoples of RSFSR, having autonomous republics and regions, national districts were unified by the same measures. On December 16, 1939, the transformation applied to the scripts of the titular nations of Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Tajik, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Kazakh, Moldavian Union republics.

The new phase in the language policy opened the next stage in the construction of the multinational Soviet Army. In the Constitution of the USSR 1936 was written: "Universal military duty is the law. It became possible to fully implement this law only with the knowledge of the Russian language (the language of army orders, commands, statutes, and instructions) by conscripts from all national regions.

Almost simultaneously with the decree on the Russian language the decree "On national units and formations of the RK. CA." In the 20-30's the units created since the times of the Civil War according to the territorial principle were one of the basic forms of attraction to military service of the representatives of nationalities who "earlier did not serve in the army at all (Uzbeks, Turkmens, Buryats-Mongols, Kirghiz, some people of the North Caucasus, etc.)." Having played a positive role, the national formations, as the decree stated, "cannot justify their purpose at present". They relied on local cultural and economic conditions and were confined to their territory, which deprived them of the opportunity to train their fighters and units for action in a variety of climatic, lifestyle and combat conditions. The increasing linguistic training made it possible to enlist the citizens of the national republics and regions for military service on general terms.

In September 1939 the law "On the Universal Military Duty" was accepted which abolished the restrictions for conscription and considerably enlarged the conscription of "nationals" without the corresponding language training. The scale of the phenomenon turned out to be unexpectedly large: conscriptions in the Central Asian and Transcaucasian military districts showed that many Red Army soldiers did not speak Russian. The newly appeared problem had to be overcome on the basis of the Politburo decision "About teaching Russian language to conscripts to the Red Army who do not know Russian" of July 6, 1940.

The national policy, determined by the consciousness of the special importance of the national factor in the country's life, required an appropriate information

support. In the second half of the 30-s* there were significant changes in the system of information collection which allowed to judge in details the processes in the national sphere of society. In 1935, the Central Committee introduced a new form of registration of the nomenklatura personnel (certificate-objectivka), which for the first time included the column "nationality". The "fifth item" of official personnel documents became as important for their holders as the item of social origin. The systematic registration of the nationality of employees of state institutions was established. In 1937, the data about the nationality was included in the NKVD reports about the composition of the prisoners. On April 2, 1938, a new procedure was introduced for indicating nationality in passports, birth certificates and other official documents. If before (during the introduction of the Unified Soviet passport system in 1932) the nationality which the citizen considered to be his own nationality, now the passport had to be based exclusively on the nationality of the parents. In 1939, the NKVD received a directive requiring supervision over the percentage of people of a particular nationality in the leadership of the most important, from a security point of view, departments.

The policy was clearly determined by the desire to smooth out disparities in the representation of Soviet nationalities in the Soviet leadership. Contrary to the installation of overcoming the actual inequality of nationalities and the significant advancement of society along this path, the years of Soviet power were also a time when new inequalities emerged, which did not meet the trend of strengthening the unity and consolidation of the peoples of the Soviet Union. In terms of representation in the party and state apparatuses, as

well as in the spheres of science and art, Jewish nationality was leading by a wide margin in the 1930s. In the 1930s this factual inequality was perceived as an abnormal situation. This situation was exacerbated by the new German government's play on the contradictions in the USSR, which began immediately after Hitler came to power, to discredit the allegedly "Jewish Bolshevik government" in the eyes of the "oppressed" nations.

The government was forced to reckon with this. At first, its actions were purely decorative. In the summer of 1936 I. Stalin called L. Z. Mekhlis, editor-in-chief of Pravda, and suggested giving Russian pseudonyms to the Jews who worked in the newsroom. The advice was accepted for immediate execution. Soon the scenery was discarded. In May 1939, when V. M. Molotov took the post of Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Stalin told him, "Get the Jews out of the Commissariat." "Thank God for saying that!" - Molotov later said. - The fact is that the Jews constituted an absolute majority there in the leadership and among the ambassadors. This, of course, is wrong."

The leaders of the Soviet Union openly demonstrated their willingness to eliminate "irregularities". The displacement of Jews from positions in the state apparatus and in public life in favor of other "national cadres" and their deaths during purges could not help but be perceived by certain circles as a manifestation of the policy of state anti-Semitism. However, according to statistical data, the losses of the Jewish population, in relative terms, did not exceed those of the other peoples of the USSR. In 1937-1938 the NKVD arrested 29 Jews, which was 1.8% of the total number of those arrested. At

the beginning of 1939 Russians accounted for 63%, Ukrainians 13.8%, Belarusians 3.4% and Jews 1.5% of the total number of camp prisoners. These nationalities accounted for 58.4%; 16.5%; 3.1%; and 1.8%, respectively, of the country's population. Consequently, Russians and Belarusians were overrepresented among the prison population and underrepresented in the population. Ukrainians 1.2 times and Jews 1.4 times. Under the policy of state anti-Semitism these ratios would obviously have been different.

Under the conditions of the outbreak of World War the Soviet leadership was only strengthening the correctness of the previously chosen course of national policy and educational work with the population. The war with Finland showed the whole depth of the delusion and vainness for the hopes for proletarian solidarity in the coming big war. The Political Department of the Red Army was getting ready to eradicate the "harmful superstition", according to which the population of the countries which went to war with the Soviet Union "will allegedly rise up and join the Red Army inevitably and almost by all numbers". It seemed a win-win to educate the army on its heroic traditions and the past of the Russian people.

On the eve of the war there were signs of a clear change in state policy toward religion and the Church. According to the 1937 census of the population. More than 45% of the USSR population declared their belief in God. At the same time among the elderly there were almost twice as many believers as non-believers; among the illiterate the proportion of believers was 74%. This indicated the futility of efforts to complete the atheization of the population during the previous "godless five-year plan."

Reviving some Russian traditions, the authorities felt it necessary to moderate the anti-religious fervor of the party God-fighters. On November 11, 1939, a Politburo meeting adopted a decision cancelling Lenin's directive of May 1, 1919, and all the corresponding instructions "concerning the persecution of members of the Russian Orthodox Church and Orthodox believers". The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was instructed to revise the convictions and arrests of citizens in cases related to religious activity and "to release those convicted on the above grounds from custody and replace their sentences with non-custodial ones if their activities did not harm the Soviet authorities". By December 22, 1939, in fulfillment of this resolution, some 13,000 persons were released from the camps, and 11,000 more were discontinued. The Soviet authorities were also re-examining the cases of the 50,000 orthodox believers who were continuing to serve their sentences.

The struggle against the carriers of "low worship" before foreign countries, peculiar to certain representatives of both the old intelligentsia and the new political elite, became an integral part of the work of fostering Soviet patriotism. The opening of a new "front" was connected to the name of N. N. Luzin, an outstanding mathematician of the pre-revolutionary school, who was slandered in July 1936 in Pravda for publishing his works in foreign journals like many other prominent scientists. From January 1937, the Trotskyists were portrayed as the main "low worshippers. At the 18th Party Congress, "low-worship" was extended to almost all "enemies of the people" who had been "purged" from society. Paying tribute to the class chauvinism Stalin declared: "The Trotskyite-Bukharin bunch of spies, murderers and

saboteurs who groveled before foreign countries, imbued with a slavish sense of subjugation" are only "a bunch of people who have not understood that the last Soviet citizen, free from the chains of capital, is head and shoulders above any foreign high-ranking bureaucrat.

As the extremes of national nihilism were being eliminated in the 1930s, the theme of the need to overcome cosmopolitanism. Thus, the writer I. Kataev called: "The hopeless 'cosmopolitans,' the renegades, the flaccid bohemians who do not remember their kinship, should be swept out of art as soon as possible.

A. Tolstoy, tracing the development of national literature, said that by 1941 it had "come from the pathos of cosmopolitanism and sometimes pseudo-internationalism to the Motherland as one of its deepest and most poetic themes".

On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, Stalin set out to redefine the relationship between the national and international foundations of patriotism. "It is necessary to develop the idea of combining a healthy, properly understood nationalism with proletarian internationalism," he said to G. Dimitrov in May 1941. "Proletarian internationalism must be based on this nationalism. There is not and cannot be any contradiction between properly understood nationalism and proletarian internationalism. A homeless cosmopolitanism which denies national feelings, the idea of homeland, has nothing in common with proletarian internationalism. This cosmopolitanism prepares the ground for the recruitment of spies, agents of the enemy." (Note that "properly understood nationalism" does not at all contradict modern ideas about this

phenomenon. For example, the Encyclopedia Britannica defines it as loyalty and devotion to a nation or country, when national interests are placed above personal or group interests; the authors of the American Political Dictionary say that nationalism unites a people with common cultural, linguistic, racial, geographic features and shared historical experience, and it ensures loyalty to this political community; the Japanese Encyclopedia Dictionary defines nationalism as the universal commitment and devotion to the nation.)

However, in May 1941 there was no more time for a radical reorganization of outreach work in the USSR. Apparently, the fear of a complete rehabilitation of nationalism because of the possible identification of Stalin's policies with Hitler's policies stopped it. The defeats of the USSR in the early stages of the war with Germany were caused by many reasons. These include faulty nationalist policies from the outset, which led to flaws in the national-state structure of the USSR, its attitude toward pre-revolutionary Russian history, and the role of the Russian people in the inter-ethnic and inter-religious life of the Soviet Union and its interethnic relations.

The correction of nationality policy, which began in late 1924, and was especially noticeable from the middle of the 1930s, did not allow to overcome all these flaws completely. The processes of consolidation of the peoples of the USSR into a single Soviet nation were far from complete. Repressions did not contribute to this either.

The policy of establishing pan-national Soviet patriotism at the beginning of the war had not yet become as

effective as it was portrayed in the official propaganda. The Soviet Union's preparations in this respect were incomplete. All this affected already in the first weeks of the Great Patriotic War. Without the decisive transition of the ruling party to the national-patriotic defense of the national interests, victory in the war would have been unattainable.

Chapter V, THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. 1941-1945

§ 1. The initial period. 22 June 1941 - 19 November 1942

Hitler's invasion. Germany attacked the Soviet Union at dawn on Sunday, June 22, 1941. On the main sections of the Soviet-German border, the German troops began fighting at 3:15 a.m. After 15 minutes the General Staff of the Red Army began to receive reports about the bombing of the Soviet cities of the Ukraine and Belorussia. With the first volleys of German artillery the implementation of the "Barbarossa plan", providing for the disappearance of the USSR from the world map in 4-6 weeks, began. Contrary to popular belief, the full text of the plan was unknown to the Soviets.

The bombing of the Soviet cities began before the presentation of the German declaration of war. In Berlin it was handed over by the Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Ribbentrop to Soviet Ambassador V.G. Dekanozov. German Ambassador to Moscow F. Schulenburg presented the corresponding document to People's

Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov. Other members of the top leadership of the Soviet Union learned of the declaration shortly after their arrival (5 h. 45 min.) in Stalin's cabinet in the Kremlin. The German side presented "military countermeasures" (the word "war" was not used) as preventive.

The document stated: "The hostile attitude of the Soviet government and the concentration of Soviet troops on Germany's eastern border, posing a serious threat, compelled the government of the Third Reich to take military countermeasures. Subsequently, this fascist position was invariably reproduced by politicians and historians trying to whitewash the greatest crime of the 20th century. The fiction of preventive war was an attempt to give the attack on the USSR at least some semblance of moral justification and to attract the Western powers to its side as allies for the march to the East.

In reality, the decision to invade was made not because the USSR threatened Germany, but because it seemed easy for the Hitlerites to defeat it. In a statement by the Führer, read over German radio by Propaganda Minister I. Goebbels at 7 o'clock that morning, it was argued that the danger from the East could be quickly eliminated. If it took six weeks to defeat France, whose army was considered the strongest in the world, it would take less effort to do away with Russia: "All that was needed was to slam the door loudly. Hitler imagined the Russian economic system as being in a state of chaos, a communist dictatorship, a country hated by the people. At the Nuremberg trials in 1946, the chief press officer of the Third Reich, G. Fritzsche, said that "we had no reason to accuse the Soviet Union of preparing a military attack

on Germany. In my speeches on the radio I made every effort to frighten the people of Europe and the population of Germany with the terrors of Bolshevism."

The suddenness of the attack caused obvious confusion of the top leadership of the USSR. The Kremlin discussed the possibility of preventing further military developments by repeating the Brest Peace Treaty in new outlines - the cession to Germany of a large part of Ukraine, Belarus and the whole of the Baltics. In the directive of the Main Military Council of the USSR, sent to the troops by the Chief of the General Staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, Army General G. K. Zhukov. K. Zhukov 15 minutes after Hitler's speech was broadcast, it was ordered "to attack and destroy enemy forces in the areas where they violated the Soviet border", but "not to cross the border". The order in no way corresponded to the prevailing situation. Colonel General F. Halder, the chief of the general staff of the land forces, the person responsible for the daily assessment of the Red Army, wrote in his diary: "Russian units were seized in their own barracks, planes stood untouched on the runways, and the attacked units asked their leadership what to do.

Until the middle of the day, the Soviet people remained in the dark about the war that had begun. The chairman of the SNK, I. V. Stalin refused to address the country, he still had "nothing to say to the people." Apparently, he felt his guilt for the miscalculation and suddenness of the attack of the former ally. Only at noon on June 22, V. M. Molotov announced to those gathered at the radio and loudspeakers that "at four o'clock this morning, without making any claim to the Soviet Union and without declaring war, German troops attacked our country."

Calling on the Soviet people to fight back resolutely against the aggressor, Molotov ended his terse speech with the words that became programmatic for all the days of the war: "Our cause is right. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours".

In the first days Romania, Finland and Italy joined the war against the USSR on the side of Germany; in July Hungary joined them. Military actions on the frontier with Finland began on June 29; on the frontier with Romania - on July 1. Before the attack on the Soviet Union, Germany's armed forces numbered 8.5 million men. To the western borders of the USSR 153 divisions and two brigades were advanced. In addition, 29 divisions and 16 brigades of Germany's allies were put on alert there. In total there were 5.5 million persons, 47.2 thousand tools and mortars, 4.3 thousand tanks and 5 thousand warplanes in the East grouping of the enemy. They were resisted by the Soviet armies in the western military districts numbering 2.9 million people. It was more than a half (60.4%) of the total personnel of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) and the Navy. In total by June 1941 in the army and navy there were 4.8 million people. In addition, there were about 75,000 men in the formations of other departments in the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO). Another 805,300 enlisted men were in the troops at "large military training camps." With the announcement of mobilization on 22 June they were included in the list of troops.

The total mobilization of men born between 1905 and 1918, aged 23 to 36, allowed by July to replenish the army by 5.3 million men (its size more than doubled). In August 1941, to make up for combat losses and create reserves, military men born in 1890-1904 and conscripts

born in 1923 were mobilized. The conscription of the following ages (up to the year of birth 1927) was carried out according to the usual order. During all the years of war, 34.5 million people, or 17.5 % of prewar population of the country, were called up to the army and to work in industry (taking into account those, who served till the beginning of war and went to war as volunteers).

More than one-third of this composition was in the army, of whom 5-6.5 million served in the active army. (For comparison: 17,893,000 men, or 25.8% of the German population in 1939, were drafted to serve in the Wehrmacht.) Mobilization allowed to form 648 new divisions during the war, and 410 of them - in 1941. The Soviet armies, moved to the western borders of the country, had 167 divisions and nine brigades; they had 32.9 thousand guns and mortars, 14.2 thousand tanks and 9.2 thousand warplanes (16 % of the total number of tanks and 18.5 % of the airplanes were in repair or needed it). In general, forces and means of Germany and its allies at the beginning of the war exceeded the Soviet forces 1.2 times. The Soviet Armed Forces were quantitatively superior to the enemy armies in a number of aspects, but inferior to them in strategic deployment, quality of many weapons, experience and personnel training. In contrast to the German army, 75% of the Soviet troops had no modern combat experience. A significant part of the Red Army command staff (55%) held their positions for less than six months. This was due to the fact that the size of the Red Army had almost doubled since 1939. The cadres were damaged by Stalin's purges.

The blitzkrieg-minded German troops, after a brief artillery preparation, rushed deep into the USSR in three

main directions.

Army Group North (commanded by Field Marshal General W. Leeb) had the task of destroying Soviet forces in the Baltics and capturing Leningrad. Group "Center" (Field Marshal General F. Bock) attacked along the Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow line. Group "South" (Field Marshal General G. Rundstedt) was to defeat the forces of the Red Army in Western Ukraine, to reach the Dnieper and to attack in a southeasterly direction to Kiev. According to the plans of the German command the main task of the war should have been solved by the troops of F. Bock, possessing the greatest power. Soviet strategists made a mistake in determining the direction of the main strike, and the main forces to repel the enemy were concentrated in the south.

By the end of the first day of the war the German troops advanced deep into the Soviet territory in the Baltics to 80 km, in Belorussia - to 60, in Ukraine - to 20 km. On the same day German aviation bombed about 70 airfields, destroying on the ground 1,489 planes. 322 Soviet planes were shot down in the air. German tank columns, not being afraid of air strikes, could boldly move forward. On the main directions the German army managed to secure three or fourfold superiority in strength over the Soviet units trying to advance. During the decisive first days of the war the Moscow leadership failed to manage the troops. The top of misunderstanding of the situation was the order of Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, Commissar of Defense of the USSR, to Soviet troops in the evening of June 22, "immediately throw the enemy back into their territory. In some border areas the Soviet troops fiercely resisted the advancing enemy troops and for a long time delayed

his advance into the interior. Three and a half thousand defenders of the Brest Fortress (among them the heroic fighters were representatives of more than 30 peoples of the USSR), led by Captain I. N. Zubachev and the regimental commissar E. M. Fomin for a month held off the enemy infantry division, supported by tanks, artillery and aviation.

Counterstrokes of the 8th, 9th and 19th mechanized corps (by the beginning of the war the 9th and 20th corps were still being formed) inflicted serious damage to the advancing German armored divisions in the Dubno, Lutsk and Rivne regions, repelling them by 10-35 km, which not only delayed the enemy offensive against Kiev until late June, but also enabled to get the main forces of the Southwestern Front out of danger of being surrounded near Lvov.

Not having a proper view of the situation at the fronts, the Soviet government began a hasty restructuring of the leadership of the Armed Forces. On June 22-24, the Northern, Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern Fronts were formed on the basis of the pre-war border districts. Their commanders became Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, Colonel-General F. I. Kuznetsov, Army General D. G. Pavlov, and Colonel-General M. P. Kirponos. On June 25, the 9th and 18th armies formed the Southern Front (Army General I. V. Tyulenev). Up to 10 to 15 fronts operated simultaneously during subsequent phases of the war. Each included: 5-9 combined arms armies of 8-9 rifle divisions; 1-3 tank, 1-2 air armies; several separate tank, mechanized and cavalry corps; artillery formations and units; and special troops of front subordination. The number of officers and soldiers at the front reached 800,000 men.

On the second day of the war the CPC and the Central Committee of the Party established the General Command Headquarters, led by Marshal Timoshenko. The very name spoke of the restoration of Russian historical traditions. (The last Stavka was the supreme command of Russia in World War I.) The Stavka was designed to make decisions of a strategic nature; it included the marshals of the Soviet Union, the chief of the General Staff, and the heads of the naval and air forces; later it included the heads of the branches of the armed forces.

Confusion in Moscow lasted until the end of June. Of all the orders received by the troops, actually acted only one - to fight to the last man. However, the situation at the fronts was not changing for the better. The Soviet troops were retreating. On June 24, they left Vilnius and on June 28, they were forced to leave Minsk. In June 30, the Germans captured Lvov, were fighting for Riga, which fell in July 1. Murmansk, Orsha, Mogilev, Smolensk, Kiev, Odessa, and Sevastopol were continuously bombed. On June 29, Hitler declared, "In four weeks we will be in Moscow, and it will be plowed over." On June 30, Halder pronounced: "The Russians have been defeated in this war within the first eight days." And soon "clarified": "The campaign against Russia was won in fourteen days. These estimates, while still quite consistent with the "Barbarossa plan" and the assertiveness of the aggressor, were erroneous. Major events on the Soviet-German front were just beginning.

The restructuring of the country in a military way. It began with the first hours of the war, the restructuring of life in the country began to gain noticeable order from

late June 1941. In the figurative remark of the People's Commissar of the Navy NG Kuznetsov, "state machine, sent by rails of improbability of Hitler's attack, was forced to stop, survive a period of confusion and then turn around 180 degrees". On the evening of June 29, Stalin was extremely mortified by the loss of Minsk and the enormity of the scale of the disaster unfolding in the west. On leaving the People's Commissariat of Defense he uttered a phrase, which was later reproduced in different versions by memoirists, and which Khrushchev made public at the 20th Party Congress: "We have lost everything Lenin created forever. Feeling responsible for the catastrophic development of events, Stalin apparently felt he had no right to play first fiddle in directing military affairs and the country. He recovered his spirits only after his comrades-in-arms not only did not express any claims to him, but also offered to form and head the extraordinary body - the State Defense Committee (GKO), and give him the full weight of the party and state power in the country.

The decision of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) and the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR to establish the GKO was adopted on June 30. At first, in addition to Stalin, it included V. M Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, G. M. Malenkov, and L. P. Beria. Later, according to resolutions of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in February 1942, A. I. Mikoyan, N. A. Voznesensky and L. M. Kaganovich were included in GKO, and in November 1944 - N. A. Bulganin, who replaced Voroshilov. When establishing the GKO, Molotov (practically the second man in the state) was appointed Deputy Chairman. However, with the establishment of the GKO Operative Bureau on

December 8, 1942, and Beria's confirmation as its head and deputy chairman, Molotov began to gradually lose his position, and the unofficial tandem of Beria and Malenkov came in second place after Stalin.

The Committee had an extensive competence: it appointed and dismissed the supreme command, solved military strategic issues, prepared military and labor reserves, adjusted the work of industry, transport, and agriculture. Each member of GKO was in charge of a particular range of questions. The Committee's resolutions had the force of wartime laws. All party, government, military, economic and trade union agencies were obliged to unconditionally implement its decisions and orders. In its activities GKO relied on the apparatus of the USSR SNK; its local commissioners, who, as a rule, were secretaries of the party committees of the territories and regions; on local city defense committees, party and state bodies.

The working bodies and executors of the Committee's decisions were the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy and their directorates. Strategic management of the armed struggle was carried out through the Stavka of the All-Russian High Command. In the cities, which were in close proximity to the front, city defense committees were created (consisting of a chairman from local leaders, the front commander, a representative of the NKVD). They functioned in more than 60 cities, had the right to declare a city under siege; carry out mobilization, evacuation of the population; create militias and fighter units; give plants the task of producing weapons and ammunition; organize the construction of defensive lines. During the war the GKO adopted about 10 thousand

resolutions, directed the activities of all the government departments and agencies, on which the course and outcome of the war depended. Under the guidance of the Committee the Stavka planned 9 campaigns, 51 strategic and 250 front operations. Not all of them were successful, but many of them became, according to G.K. Zhukov, "unprecedented in the history of warfare, both in their scale and for their classic implementation". The battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, the Battle of Kursk; the Iasi-Kishinev operation; the defeat of German forces in Belarus; the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations. On June 30, 1941 the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved a general mobilization national economic plan, providing for the restructuring of the economy on a war footing in the shortest possible time. In August, adopted a military economic plan for the last quarter of 1941 and for the entire 1942 in the Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

The basic program of actions to transform the country into a single combat camp was formulated in the Directive of the USSR National Committee and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) to party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions to mobilize all forces and means to defeat the Nazi invaders" of June 29, 1941. It denounced the "complacent and peaceful mood" saved in the country from the prewar times, lack of understanding of the threat and danger created by the continued offensive of the German troops. It was explained that the purpose of the attack was not only to destroy the Soviet system, but also to rob the country, to seize grain and oil, to restore the power of the landlords and capitalists, that in the war "the question of life and death of the Soviet state is decided, whether the people

of the Soviet Union will be free or fall into enslavement. The Motherland was in the greatest danger, and "we must quickly and decisively rebuild all our work in a military way.

From the text of the original version of the directive the call to mobilize all forces for the "organization of victory" was removed. The emphasis was placed on defense tasks, the need to "defend every inch of the Soviet land, to fight to the last drop of blood for our cities and villages, to show courage, initiative and vision peculiar to our people. The directive called to "organize merciless fight against all kinds of rear disorganizers, deserters, panic-mongers and spreaders of rumors, destroy spies, saboteurs and enemy parachutists, providing prompt assistance to destructive detachments in all this". A separate paragraph of the directive demanded "to immediately bring to trial before a military tribunal all those who by their panicking and cowardice hinder the cause of defense, regardless of their faces.

When Red Army units were forced to retreat, the directive ordered to leave only scorched earth on the path of the invaders, not one locomotive, not one carriage, not one kilogram of bread, not one liter of fuel, steal cattle, and give them "All valuable property, including non-ferrous metals, bread and fuel, which cannot be taken out, must be unconditionally destroyed."

In the areas occupied by the enemy it was required "to create partisan detachments and subversive groups to fight against units of the enemy army, to incite partisan war everywhere and everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, to damage telephone and telegraph communications, to set fire to warehouses, etc. In the captured areas to create unbearable conditions for the

enemy and all his accomplices, to pursue and destroy them at every step, to disrupt all their activities.

This directive was the basis of Stalin's speech on the radio on July 3 and defined the nature of the actions of the Soviet leadership and all the people during the war. Stalin, however, included in his speech a number of important new topics, and most importantly, managed to find such words and such a tone that turned the directive into one of his most stirring speeches, which had a tremendous impact on fellow citizens. He acknowledged the heavy losses, justified the 1939 pact with Germany, spoke of the tremendous danger hanging over the country, and expressed the hope for the help of Britain and America, who were becoming allies in the struggle.

Unusual were the first words of the address: "Comrades! Citizens, Brothers and Sisters," which clearly echoed those of the priests of the Russian Orthodox Church. Stalin had most likely already read the "Epistle to the Shepherds and Shepherds of Christ the Orthodox Church" by the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow and Kolomna (secular name: I. N. Stragorodsky). It was written early in the morning of June 22. The priests (in 1941, there were 5,665 priests officially registered in the USSR) read the message in the churches, and it soon became known to a significant portion of the faithful population of the country.

In his message, the highest hierarchy of the church wrote: "In recent years, we in Russia have been comforting ourselves with the hope that the conflagration that has engulfed almost the entire world will not touch our country. But fascism, which recognizes only naked force as law and is used to mock the high requirements of

honor and morality, has once again proved loyal to itself. Fascist robbers attacked our homeland. They broke all sorts of treaties and promises and suddenly came upon us, and now the blood of civilians is already watering our native land. The time of Batyi, the German Knights, Karl the Swede, Napoleon, is repeating itself. The wretched descendants of the enemies of Orthodox Christianity once again want to try to bring our people to their knees before unrighteousness and with naked violence to force them to sacrifice the good and integrity of the homeland, the blood covenants of love for their Fatherland.

But this is not the first time the Russian people have had to endure such trials. With God's help, and this time he will scatter into ashes the fascist enemy force. Our ancestors did not lose heart even in the worst of times, because they remembered not their personal dangers and advantages, but their sacred duty to the Motherland and the faith and emerged victorious. Let us not disgrace their glorious name, nor do we, the Orthodox, their kindred by our own flesh and by faith. The Fatherland is defended by weapons and the common people's feat, a common willingness to serve the Fatherland in the difficult hour of trial, with all that everyone can. There is work for workers, peasants, scientists, women and men, young and old. Everyone can and must contribute his share of labor, care and art to the common feat.

Let's remember the holy leaders of the Russian people, such as Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, who sacrificed their souls for the people and the homeland. And not only the leaders did this. Countless thousands of simple Orthodox soldiers, whose unknown names Russian people immortalized in its glorious legend of the heroes Ilya Muromets, Dobryn Nikitich, and Alyosha Popovich, who smashed to the head of Solovyov the

Robber. Our Orthodox Church has always shared the fate of the nation. She bore with him and tests, and was consoled by his successes. She will not abandon her people now. She blesses with her heavenly blessing also the forthcoming national exploit.

The First Hierarchy urged the clergy not to remain silent observers of the course of the war, but to encourage the fainthearted, comfort the sorrowful, and remind those who waver about their duty.

Stalin could not ignore the fact that the arguments of the hierarchy largely coincided with the arguments of the leaders of the state, and also that the word of the Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church carried a huge charge of patriotism, pointing to the deep historical source of the people's strength and faith in the ultimate victory over the enemy. An important overlap was also revealed in the need to define the war that had begun not as a class war, but as a national, domestic and patriotic one.

According to religious scholar E. I. Lisavtsev, in July 1941 there was a brief meeting between Stalin and Metropolitan Sergius, which both were pleased with. In any case, the actual normalization of relations between the Church and the state can be traced from the very beginning of the war. Anti-religious propaganda ceased in the country and the magazines "Bezbozhnik" and "Antireligionist" stopped being published. Since the fall of 1941 there were almost no arrests of clergymen. With the beginning of the war, Stalin stopped all attempts to update the previously popular idea of turning the war into a revolution. G. Dimitrov, the head of the "headquarters of the world revolution," was already

instructed in the morning of June 22: "The Comintern should not speak openly. The local parties are deploying a movement in defense of the USSR. Do not raise the question of the socialist revolution. The Soviet people are fighting a patriotic war against fascist Germany. It is a question of defeating fascism, which has enslaved a number of peoples and seeks to enslave other peoples."

At an urgently assembled meeting of the ECKI Secretariat, Dimitrov repeated these attitudes: "We will not at this stage call for the overthrow of capitalism in individual countries, nor to the world revolution," the Communists must join the struggle "for national freedom" as its leading element. In the cables to the Communist parties and sections of the Comintern sent on the same day, it was emphasized: "Note that at this stage it is a question of defending peoples against fascist enslavement, not of socialist revolution."

These same thoughts were echoed in Stalin's July speech. In it a special emphasis was placed on the fact that the war with Nazi Germany should not be regarded as an ordinary confrontation between the armies, it is - "the war of the Soviet people", "all-national home war", "the war for freedom of our Fatherland", which "will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence, for democratic freedoms. Stalin did not forget the national aspects of the war. He spoke of the danger of the destruction of the national culture and national statehood of the Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Uzbeks, Tatars, Moldavians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis and other peoples of the Soviet Union, the threat of their Germanization, their transformation into slaves of German princes and

barons.

The speech, which began with the words about the perfidy of the enemy and the enormous losses, about the ominous threat hanging over the country, in the course of the speech gave the psychological installation to active resistance to the invasion, set specific tasks, confidently called for decisive action and immediate restructuring of all work and life of the country and every Soviet man in a new, military way, resulting in the enemy should not be spared. According to the definition of K. Simonov, the main impression that arose in the audience of this exciting speech could be designated as "the end of illusions". At the same time, the speech encouraged and instilled confidence: Stalin was ready to lead the country in the hour of severe tests and lead it to victory. The principle of maximum centralization of leadership was the basis of restructuring the activities of the Party, government agencies and administration. During the war there were no party congresses, no Central Committee plenums (with the exception of September 1941 and January 1944). The Central Committee Orgbureau did not meet, decisions on behalf of the Secretariat were taken by oral questioning. The Politburo performed its functions insofar as the GKO was practically formed from its composition.

The tendency toward centralization can also be seen in the evolution of such an institution as the Stavka. On July 10, 1941 the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command was reorganized into the General Headquarters of the Supreme Command. Instead of Timoshenko it was actually headed by Stalin. On July 19, he replaced Timoshenko as Commissar of Defense. The tendency toward centralization and further

restoration of historical traditions also manifested itself in the establishment in the Soviet Union of the post of Supreme Commander. One of the active promoters of these trends was the Deputy Marshal B. M.

Shaposhnikov, a recognized military theoretician, Chief of the General Staff since July 1941, graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1910.

August 8, 1941 by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Stalin was appointed Commander-in-Chief. At the same time, the Stavka of the Supreme Command was transformed into the Stavka of the Supreme High Command (VGK). Heading simultaneously the Party, the government and the armed forces, Stalin was endowed with extraordinary powers over all departments and institutions of the country. Georgy Zhukov, appointed in August 1942 as First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief, later recalled: "It was hard to tell where the State Defense Committee ended and the Stavka begins, and vice versa". Stalin "commanded everything, he conducted, his word was final and not subject to appeal. But, noted the commander, at the beginning of the war he "poorly understood the methods, techniques and forms of modern warfare, especially with such an experienced and powerful enemy. According to Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, "in the early war Stalin clearly overestimated his strength and knowledge in directing the war. In practice it meant unnecessary losses at the front.

Carrying out the restructuring in a wartime mode, the government in early July 1941, adopted a decree that significantly expanded the rights of the People's Commissars in wartime. In September and November,

the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR formed new People's Commissariats - the Tank Industry and Mortar Arms, respectively. There was also restructuring of the structure and work of the other People's Commissariats.

The All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was reorganized in a military way. Over 500 secretaries, beginning with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet republics, were mobilized and appointed members of the Military Councils of fronts and armies. 270 senior members of the Central Committee were sent to the Red Army and the Navy. At the same time, the institute of the Central Committee partisans was expanding. They worked in 1,170 large factories. In November of that year the political departments of collective and state farms were created (till May, 1943). During the first half of the war more than a million party members joined the army, which accounted for one third of its membership. In 1942 there were more than 2 million Communists in the ranks of the Red Army and Navy, 54.3% of the total membership of the Party. At the end of the war in the army there were 2.6 million Communists.

In July 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) adopted a decree on the organization of guerrilla movement in enemy-occupied territories by Party bodies, subversive military groups and the NKVD bodies. (According to Soviet data, in 1941 in the occupied territories were more than 5.5 million people born in 1890-1925.) By the end of the year began to create headquarters and departments of the partisan movement in the political management of the fronts. In May 1942 the Central Headquarters of the Partisan

Movement was formed under the Commander-in-Chief.

The Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (headed by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, P. Lukashenko). P. K. Ponomarenko, the Commander-in-Chief of the Partisan Movement in September - November 1942 - K. Ye. E. Voroshilov).

On July 18, 1941 the deteriorating food supply of the country forced to enter cards (rationing) for bread, meat, fat, sugar and other essential products in Moscow, Leningrad and their suburbs. At the beginning of the war there were 56 million people - 26.9 million workers, 17.4 million dependents, and 11.7 million children under 12. By December of 1942, due to the occupation of the territory which was home to 80 million people before the war, the number of people supplied with cards decreased to 38.1 million people, but then it rose again. The population of the countryside was not taken on the state allowance. The main source of food for peasant families was homestead plots, (Artels?).

In the summer of 1941 the evacuation of industrial enterprises to the eastern parts of the country began. For this work was established the Council for Evacuation under the GKO (Chairman N. M. Shvernik; his deputies A. N. Kosygin, M. G. Pervukhin). Later (in October) the Committee for evacuation of food supplies, industrial goods and industrial enterprises was formed. By the beginning of 1942 over 1.5 thousand industrial enterprises (including 1,360 defense plants) were transported and soon launched, the number of evacuated workers reached a third of the staff. From June 26, 1940 the criminal responsibility for AWOL,

truancy and tardiness to work was introduced, and from December 26, 1941 workers and employees of military enterprises were declared mobilized for the whole period of the war and AWOL from enterprises was punished as desertion.

The defensive battles of the summer and fall of 1941

The phase of defensive battles, severe setbacks and retreat of the Red Army lasted from June to December 1941. The German troops were tearing toward Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev, the centers of the districts in which about 70 percent of all military plants of the country were located. Unified and coordinated the efforts of troops operating in these areas, created on July 10, the three headquarters of the main command of the troops of the following directions-. The North-Western (commander-in-chief K. E. Voroshilov, member of the Military Council A. A. Zhdanov), the Western (respectively - S. K. Timoshenko and N. A. Bulganin), South-Western (S. M. Budenny and N. S. Khrushchev). The main role in the war was assigned to the heroes of the Civil War.

In an attempt to halt the catastrophic development of the situation at the fronts, the government resorted to extraordinary measures. Three weeks after the beginning of the war, on July 16, 1941, the institution of military commissars in corps, divisions and regiments, and political instructors in companies, batteries and squadrons were restored. Subsequently, these organs for enhancing Party influence in the Armed Forces were disbanded.

Other structural units of the Red Army and Navy.

The institution of military commissars restricted the principle of one-man rule in the army and was to promote the full fortitude of commanders and staff, their readiness to fight to the end. In July 1941, D. G. Pavlov, the commander of the Western Front, and a group of generals of the Western and Northwestern Fronts were tried, accused of cowardice, inaction, and deliberate collapse of the troops' command and sentenced to the capital punishment. Until April 1942, 30 generals were shot on charges of similar crimes. On August 16, 1941 there was an order about responsibility of the servicemen for surrendering and leaving weapons for the enemy. It declared captured commanders and political workers "persistent deserters", subjected their families to repression, the relatives of captured soldiers were deprived of benefits. However, the methods of intimidation did not give the expected result. On October 9, 1942 the institution of military commissars was abolished.

Already in the first months of the war the Red Army had to leave the Baltics, Belarus, Moldavia, and the western regions of Ukraine. As a result of the two-month battle of Smolensk (the heroic city was abandoned on July 29, but fighting to the east of it continued until September 10), the German plan for a lightning war was thwarted, but the German offensive continued. By the end of July there was a threatening situation for Soviet troops near Kiev. G.K.Zhukov proposed to leave the city. Indignant with this proposal Stalin removed him from his post. Marshal Shaposhnikov became the new chief of the

General Staff.

.Zhukov was appointed commander of the Reserve Front, and he managed to successfully conduct an offensive operation to defeat a group of German troops near Yelnya. On September, 5th the town was released. It was the first, though not a very large-scale, victory of the Soviet arms in the Great Patriotic War.

In other directions the success accompanied the enemy troops. On September 1, they took the Mga station, and Leningrad fell into the terrible ring of siege. Together with a million and a half of inhabitants, 30 Soviet divisions were locked in the city. On September, 16th fascists entered Novgorod, cut in Chudovo the October railroad, connecting Moscow with Leningrad.

In mid-August, the troops advancing on Moscow met with stubborn resistance. At the beginning of September Hitlerite command gave the order to pass to the temporary defense of the troops on the Moscow direction and began to prepare the offensive operation on capture of Moscow under the codename "Typhoon". The tank group of German Colonel General X. Guderian received orders to turn from the Smolensk area to the south. The Bryansk Front (commanded by Lieutenant General A. I. Eremenko) created to repel the danger was unable to prevent the movement. On September 5, the German troops advancing from the north closed in Lokhvitsa, 200 km east of Kiev, with armored columns.

E. Kleist's group, advancing northward from the south, from the area of Kremenchug, abandoned by Soviet forces on 8 September.

Surrounded Kiev fell on September 19. 655,000 Soviet

soldiers were captured; Colonel-General M. P. Kirponos, the commander of the Southwestern Front, M. A. Burmistenko, the secretary of the Military Council of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Major-General V. I. Tupikov, the chief of staff of the front were killed during surrender.

Leaving the borders of the Ukraine on the territory of the RSFSR, the German troops took Belgorod (October, 24) and Kursk (November, 2). On October 25 Kharkov was captured. By November the Germans captured the southwestern part of Donbas, in November they came to the outskirts of Rostov-on-Don and created a threat of a breakthrough to the Caucasus. On November 21, the city was abandoned, but a week later it was repulsed. In October, 16 Odessa that had been heroically fighting for 73 days and was deep in the enemy's rear was surrendered.

More than 100,000 defenders and a large quantity of various equipment and weapons were transported to the Crimea by ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet (commanded by Vice-Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky). By late October the front on the peninsula was close to Sevastopol. In November 16 the Soviet troops were forced to leave the Crimean industrial center and the port of Kerch. Since October, 30 an unprecedented by severity battle for Sevastopol, which lasted 250 days and nights, was fought.

In September, 30 German troops began to implement the operation "Typhoon". The battle for Moscow began. Under the command of Field Marshal Bock three quarters of German troops were drawn. They were opposed by three Soviet fronts. The forces of the

Western Front (Colonel-General I.S. Konev) occupied the defense belt, 340 km wide, from Ostashkov to Yelnya. The troops of the Reserve (Marshal Budyonny) were defending a front of 100 kilometers in length on the Roslavl direction and were in the rear of the Western Front. The troops of the Bryansk Front (Colonel-General A. I. Eremenko) held the line to the west and south of Bryansk, 290 km long. At the same time the Soviet troops were significantly inferior to the Germans in tanks, aviation, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery.

By October, 7th the enemy managed to encircle four Soviet armies near Vyazma. Under the command of Lieutenant-General M. F. Lukin they had been fighting in encirclement till the middle of October. On October 10 the troops of the Western and Reserve fronts were united into the Western front under the command of G. K. Zhukov, and continued to fight on the Mozhaisk line of defense. By the end of October the enemy was stopped to the east of Volokolamsk and further - along the Nara and Oka rivers up to Alexin.

The German tank troops advancing from the areas of Roslavl and Shostka, bypassed the main forces of the Bryansk Front. On October, 3rd, Orel was seized. By October, 23rd the Soviet armies broke through the encirclement front and withdrew on the line of Belev-Mtsensk-Poniri. Having overcome this line, the Germans by the end of the month came to the line of Tarusa-Tula. But all attempts to capture Tula, undertaken since October 29, were repulsed. On November, 18th fascists began the offensive with the purpose to bypass Tula from the East and by November, 25th came to the approaches to Kashira, advanced to Ryazan, creating threat of their breakthrough to the east of Moscow.

However, as a result of counterstrokes of the Western Front the enemy began to retreat from the northeast of Tula.

An especially alarming situation was to the northwest of Moscow. In October, 14, despite the stubborn resistance of the Western Front, the Germans captured cities of Rzhev and Kalinin. The troops of the new Kalinin Front (Colonel-General I. S. Konev) established in October, 17 managed to repulse their attempt to break through from Rzhev to Torzhok (in the rear of the North-Western Front) and gain a foothold on the Selizharovo-Kalinin-Volzhskoye reservoir.

The hardest days for Moscow began on October 15. On that day the GKO adopted a decree on the evacuation of the capital. At a meeting with Stalin the commander of the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant General P. A. Artemiev was ordered to prepare a plan of defense of the city and to hold at least a part of it until the troops from Siberia came and knocked the Germans out of Moscow. Trucks were delivering explosives to mine bridges, which were to explode "at the sight of the enemy." Two hundred trains and 80,000 trucks took out embassy and state property, In Moscow even skilled workers were accepted into extermination battalions. More than half a million Muscovites were digging the frozen ground, creating defensive lines around the capital.

Meanwhile, rumors of approaching German troops and the government's decision to leave Moscow quickly spread through the city. In a number of cases they gave rise to the disorderly flight of administrators at various levels, the burning of archival records, and the looting of

abandoned stores. On October 17, on Stalin's instructions, A. S. Scherbakov, head of the capital's party organization, spoke on Moscow radio. S. Scherbakov. He assured: "We will fight hard for Moscow ... to the last drop of blood." And yet the panic and turmoil did not stop until it became clear that the government officials and Stalin himself remained in Moscow.

On October 19, GKO decree on the introduction of a state of siege in the capital was signed. All traffic - both individuals and vehicles - was prohibited from 12 p.m. to 5 a.m.: those who violated the order were immediately prosecuted. During the two months of the decree 16 persons were shot on the spot; 357 were shot by court martial; 4,741 were sentenced to different terms of imprisonment. The riots were suppressed. Meanwhile the Soviet command hastily advanced to Moscow the divisions of the Far Eastern Army, which were called "Siberian". 750,000 well-trained and well equipped soldiers and officers were preparing to repel Japanese aggression. By December the Soviet side had reliable information that Japan did not intend to start military operations against the USSR in the Far East. In November, 15 the enemy increased the pressure on the Klin-Solnechnogorsk and Volokolamsk-Istria directions, the enemy managed to go to Dmitrov, took Yakhroma, for one night Lobnya, as well as several villages on the eastern bank of Moscow canal, captured Krasnaya Polyana and Kryukovo. In a winter night blizzard the German reconnaissance battalion passed through Khimki to the northwestern suburbs of Moscow, fifteen kilometers from the Kremlin.

However, at the beginning of December the offensive

ran out of steam. The German command believed that by December 1941 the Red Army's forces would be completely exhausted. Meanwhile, 59 new Soviet infantry and 17 cavalry divisions were waiting for orders to engage. On November 30, G.K. Zhukov submitted to Stalin a plan of counteroffensive at Moscow.

The results of the summer-fall campaign of 1941 were horrific. By 1942 irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops were 3.1 million people (0.8 million were killed, 2.3 million were missing and captured). Together with sanitary losses (wounded, shell-shocked, and sick) the losses rose to 4.5 million people. The big advantage in tanks and planes, which the Red Army had at the beginning of the war, melted away. The enemy captured a third of the railroad tracks. The country lost a third of its most fertile wedge of arable land, now having half as much bread and meat per capita as before the war. Production of aluminum, copper, and manganese, vital to the war industry, fell by two-thirds. The loss of three hundred war factories drastically reduced the supply of shells, mines, and bombs to the army.

The fall in ammunition production continued until the end of the year. Aircraft production dropped from 2,300 in September to 627 in November. Since the summer of 1941 only a half of the planned number of tanks was sent to the front. The volume of gross output of industry of the USSR from June to November 1941 decreased 2.1 times. Most of the military factories were still moving eastward. Hundreds of thousands of skilled workers were either killed or mobilized for the army, and they were replaced by women, teenagers, and old people who had not previously worked in production. However, the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant was already receiving the Kharkov diesel engine shop, which produced the

unsurpassed duralumin motor (created in the design bureau headed by K. F. Chelpan) for the famous T-34, and the shops of the Kirov plant partially evacuated from Leningrad. Uralmash had already reduced the production time of one tank from 110 hours to 30. In December 1941, the decline of industrial production in the country was halted, and in March 1942, it began to increase rapidly.

The failures of the first phase of the war called in question the fundamental, previously seemingly unshakable, ideological tenets that defined the life of Soviet society, domestic and foreign policy. The creation of the anti-Hitler coalition dampened the anti-imperialist propaganda. The international class solidarity did not prove to be effective. The German proletarians, contrary to expectations and naive appeals from the Soviet trenches, were in no hurry to take up arms against the exploiting government and did not show any respect for the USSR, the homeland of the world proletariat (that is, the German proletariat too). Like the proletarians of the other capitalist states at war, they were in no way inspired by the idea of using the world war to bring about a world communist revolution.

National solidarity united the people much more firmly than class solidarity, not only in the camp of the enemy, but also in the Soviet Union. During a conversation with A. Harriman, the coordinator of the American lend-lease program, who headed the U.S. delegation to the Moscow meeting of representatives of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain on September 29 - October 1, 1941. Stalin said of his compatriots: "We know the people do not want to fight for the world revolution, he will not fight for the Soviet government. Maybe they will

fight for Russia.

Stalin's unexpected recognition was a clear sign of a significant revision of the ideological foundations of the party and political work in the army and the country. Hence - the rejection of the policy of militant atheism and a demonstration of readiness to respect the traditional beliefs and national feelings of the people, the end of the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church and the grateful recognition in her ally in the fight against the invasion. Hence the resurrection of the inspiring traditions of the old Russian army, expressed, in particular, in the revival of the ranks of the Guards. The word "guard," which appeared in Russia back in Peter the Great times, has always meant the most select, combat-ready troops, distinguished by a special courage. The appearance of this word in the order of the Stavka of the All-Russian High Command on September 1941 testified to the fact that the best fighting traditions, the basis of which was devotion to the homeland, were passing from the Russian army to the Soviet army. The resurrection of traditions and the restoration of ties with the country's heroic past was evidenced by Stalin's exhortation to the troops at the famous November 7 parade: "Let the courageous image of our great ancestors inspire you in this war." The English journalist A. Werth writes in his book "Russia in the war of 1941 - 1945" (1964) that this ideological turn soon found a fairly accurate analogy: in the USSR "a nationalist neopas was proclaimed.

Following the Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church, Stalin called for remembering the names of those who had created and defended Russia, its historical heroes - Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Alexander Suvorov,

and Mikhail Kutuzov. On December 10, 1941 an order was given to remove from all military newspapers the slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" so that it could not "misdirect certain strata of the military." The salvation of the country and socialism was seen in turning the war into a domestic, national, and not a class war. The ideological turn connected with the introduction of national-patriotic slogans into Communist ideology, and the recognition of the spiritual and cultural values of pre-revolutionary Russia as the great patrimony of the USSR from a position of Communist fundamentalism were factors of a temporary departure from the ideas of the revolution and proletarian internationalism, tolerated only as a forced concession. Nevertheless, this choice turned out to be the only right one. The ideological turn preceded the radical turn in the war.

The Battle of Moscow. The counteroffensive at Moscow involved the forces of the Western (commander of the Army General G. K. Zhukov), Kalinin (Colonel-General I. S. Konev) and Southwestern (Marshal S. K.

Timoshenko) fronts. The counter-offensive was a simultaneous defeat of shock groups of Army Group "Center" threatening Moscow. The Soviet side had 1,100 thousand soldiers and officers, 7.7 thousand guns and mortars, 774 tanks, 1 thousand planes against 1,708 thousands of enemy soldiers and officers, 13.5 thousand guns and mortars, 1,170 tanks, 615 planes. There was an approximate equality. To decide the outcome of the battle had to be the morale of troops, the will and talent of commanders.

Morale of the German troops was considerably broken. Their losses on the Eastern Front had no precedent. In June-November 1941 they were three times more than during the whole campaign in Poland and on the

Western Front - in France, Belgium and Holland. Losses in the officer corps were five times more than in 1939-1940. In the battle of Moscow only from November 16 to December 5 German troops lost 155 thousand killed and wounded, about 800 tanks, 300 guns and up to 1.5 thousand planes. In total from the beginning of war till the end of 1941 armies of Germany and its allies lost on East front 273,800 persons killed, 802,700 wounded, 57,200 missing.

On our side was not only well-known "General Frost" who gave many surprises to the Germans dressed in summer uniforms. According to the "Barbarossa plan" their "work" on the Eastern Front should have been over long before the cold weather. In this regard the Reich Minister of Armaments Fritz Todt said to Hitler on November 29, 1941: "The war must be stopped immediately, as it is militarily and economically already lost. Hitler did not want to admit the rightness of his minister. Subsequently he had to convince him first of all the Soviet military leaders (K.E. Voroshilov and others), who were skilled in modern military art and superior in the field of warfare to the heroes who had remained at the level of experience of the Civil War, had to convince him.

Already shone with their talents strategists GK Zhukov and AM Vasilevsky; commanders of field armies I.S. Konev, K.K. Rokossovsky, L.A. Govorov, N.F. Vatutin; high-class military specialists N.N. Voronov, A.A. Novikov, M.P. Vorobyev, I. T Peresyppkin; energetic and courageous military commanders X. Bagramyan, M. E. Katukov, P. A. Rotmistrov, S. I. Bogdanov. In the same line with them stood hundreds of thousands and millions of talented and selfless toilers of the war and home front.

At 3 a.m. on December 5, 1941, at -30° C, the Soviet front lines crashed into the snow-covered front lines of the German troops. At the cost of incredible effort and heroism, the Red Army launched a counteroffensive on the front from Kalinin (Tver) to Yelets. At the same time our troops were actively fighting to the southeast of Leningrad and in the Crimea, which deprived the Germans of the opportunity to transfer reinforcements to their forces near Moscow.

The surprise effect worked in full force. The German troops trembled and began to retreat. Their fortitude did not increase even after Hitler had removed from command positions 35 corps and division commanders and dismissed the commander-in-chief of the Army of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal W. Brauchitsch (Hitler himself took this post on December 17). The Soviet troops were advancing at an average of 3 to 6 kilometers a day. During first six days of the offensive 400 cities and villages were recaptured from the enemy. On December, 15 - Klin, 16 - Kalinin, 20 - Volokolamsk, 30 - Kaluga, 17 January, 1942 - Velikie Luki. The advancing troops discovered the barbarous cruelty of the enemy, who until then boasted of the height of his culture, toward the occupied population. What the Soviet soldiers saw paled before the fascist accusations of Stalin's order in the USSR. The Battle of Moscow produced what I. G. Ehrenburg called "genuine hatred of the enemy," which translated into reality Stalin's warning: "If the Germans want to have a war of extermination with the peoples of the USSR, they will have it.

During a month of bloody battles the Moscow, Tula and a large part of Kalinin region were liberated. However, by

March of 1942 the power of the Soviet offensive dried up. The Siberian divisions suffered heavy losses. Winter, which turned out to be the most severe in 140 years, unfortunately for us and for the enemy, came to the end.

To develop success in the Soviet counteroffensive along the entire front, which lasted until April 20, 1942, did not succeed.

The offensive operation at Barvenkovo (to the south of Kharkov), conducted on January 18-31, 1942 had not achieved its objectives. The attempt to break the blockade of Leningrad failed. January 1942 was the fifth siege of the city. Two hundred thousand inhabitants had already died there. The 2nd shock army of Volkhov front, which was expected to break the siege, was encircled in January and suffered heavy losses. In July, its commanders were taken prisoner. Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov, commander of the army, being in Vinnitsa military camp for captured officers, agreed to cooperate with the enemies of his people and lead the Russian "anti-Stalinist movement. On May 12, 1945, he was captured and later deservedly executed.

Nevertheless, the main event of the first year of the Great Patriotic War, one of the bitterest in Russian history, was the apparent transfer of the strategic initiative to the USSR and the first major defeat of Germany in the battle of Moscow. The notorious German "Blitzkrieg" was finally buried. A radical turn was taking place: Germany was faced with the prospect of a protracted and disastrous war. Allied Turkey and Japan refrained from action against the Soviet Union. The anti-fascist resistance in Western Europe began to rise. The

Soviet Union became a decisive factor in the Second World War, which contributed to strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Creation and strengthening of the anti-Hitler coalition. After the German attack on the Soviet Union, the governments of England and the United States declared their support for the USSR in its struggle against aggression. They did not believe that the USSR would be able to offer prolonged resistance to German troops (British intelligence determined the period of resistance to the USSR to be 10 days), but were interested in assisting. "Not to secure a stunning Russian victory, but to keep Germany tied up until our own weight in the war was decisive," was the belief in U.S. military circles. Be that as it may, the vital interests of the USSR and the leading countries of Western democracy for the near future coincided. On the evening of June 22 1941, the head of the British Cabinet W. Churchill announced on the BBC his intention to provide the USSR "all possible assistance". US President F. Roosevelt made the same public statement at a press conference on June 24.

On July 12, 1941, as a result of negotiations in Moscow, the Soviet-British Agreement on Joint Actions in the War with Germany was signed. Both countries pledged to aid and support each other, not to negotiate with Germany, and not to conclude an armistice or a peace treaty except by mutual agreement. Similar agreements were concluded with the governments of Czechoslovakia (July 18) and Poland (July 30), which were in exile. According to them Czechoslovak and Polish military formations were created on the territory of the USSR. In August 1941, Great Britain and the United States

signed a declaration on the objectives of the war, which became known as the Atlantic Charter. In it stated that territorial changes as a result of the war would only be possible if the states concerned agreed that they would respect the right of peoples to choose their own forms of government, and create equal opportunities for trade and economic cooperation among all countries.

The Soviet government in September expressed agreement with the basic principles of the charter. However, the question of opening a second front against Hitler in the West (in Northern France), posed by Stalin in a letter to W. Churchill on July 18, 1941. The British Prime Minister believed that England "could not have been ready before the summer of 1943".

More concrete results were achieved at the conference of the USSR, USA and England on military supplies, which was held in Moscow from September 29, 1941 to October 1, 1941. The USA and England undertook to deliver to the USSR 400 airplanes, 500 tanks, 200 antitank guns and military material from October 1941 to June 1942, every month. The Soviet government, in turn, pledged to supply the Allies with raw materials for the production of military products. The interest-free credit for \$1 billion was provided to our country. On November 7, 1941 the president of the United States decided to supply the Soviet Union with military material under the Lend-Lease Treaty.

Such a right was given to it by Congress on March 11, 1941, and could be applied to any country if its defense against aggression became vital to the United States. Materials supplied by the Lend-Lease and destroyed, lost or consumed during the war were not subject to any

payment after the war was over. What remained was paid in full or in part and could be claimed back.

Lend-lease aid undoubtedly strengthened the military power of the USSR. In total, supplies accounted for about 4% of its production during the war. But in some kinds of aid-tanks and airplanes, especially trucks (famous "Studebaker"- Jeep?), canned food-it was essential and contributed to our military success.

Assessing the importance of the Lend-Lease, Mikoyan believed that without it, "we would probably have fought another year and a half extra". So it is not without reason that our people have always been grateful to the American people for the Lend-Lease deliveries. But it is also worth pointing out that it took the United States almost six months to decide whether defending the Soviet Union against Hitler's aggression was vital for them.

The connection with the Allies became more tangible in the days of the Battle of Moscow for other reasons as well. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor without a declaration of war. The next day the U.S. declared war on Japan, and England did the same. On December 11, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. On January 1, 1942, 26 states of the anti-fascist coalition (including the USSR and China) signed a declaration pledging to use their military and economic resources against the Nazi bloc. More than 20 countries later joined the declaration. Together they became known as the United Nations.

New setbacks on the front

Congratulating the Red Army and Red Navy on the occasion of May 1, 1942, I. V. Stalin ordered the Red Army "to ensure that 1942 was the year of the final defeat of the German fascist troops and the liberation of Soviet land from Hitler's scum". The opinion of Zhukov, who suggested switching to a strategic defense for a period while the military industry mastered new types of weapons and decisively surpassed the German industry, was not supported. However, a successful Soviet offensive in all directions failed.

In spring and summer of 1942, the German troops took advantage of miscalculations of the Soviet command, expecting a new attack on Moscow, and concentrated here more than half of the armies, 62 percent of the planes, and up to 80 tanks. German command was preparing the main strike in the south, trying to seize the Caucasus and the Lower Volga. Soviet troops in the south were clearly insufficient to deter this offensive. Distracting, according to Stalin's plan, offensive operations in the Crimea and in the Kharkov direction with the lack of forces turned into major defeats. On December 30, 1941 the Soviet troops liberated Kerch and began to prepare a new offensive. On the Kerch Peninsula three Soviet armies of the Crimean Front stood close to each other, designed to draw the German forces away from Sevastopol. Lieutenant General D. T. Kozlov commanded the front, and the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters was Head of the Main Political Department of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army L. Z. Mekhlis, the front was patronized by S. M. Budyonny, commander in chief of the North Caucasus direction. The Germans by simulated attack

managed to attract the attention of the command of the Crimean Front to the northern flank, and on May 8 they struck from the south, mixed the order of the Soviet forces and in a week came to the outskirts of Kerch. For six days the desperate crossing of men and equipment to the Taman Peninsula continued. In May, 14th Germans occupied Kerch again, captured big trophies and took as captives 176 thousand soldiers and officers. An attempt to strike a blow to the German troops in the vicinity of Kharkov by the troops of south-western direction (Commander in Chief Marshal S. K. Kovalev) failed. Timoshenko, (member of the Military Council N. S. Khrushchev, Chief of Staff I. X. Bagramyan). The Kharkov battle (May 12-29) was lost. Thus 240 thousand persons were captured, 1,249 tanks and 2,026 tools were taken.

Strategic initiative again appeared in hands of the enemy. After the Kerch disaster the position of besieged Sevastopol became more difficult. Despite the dedication of defenders of the city, their forces were thawing. On July 4, after 250 days of heroic defense, Sebastopol fell. On June 28, the German Army Group "Weichs" launched an attack from the area north-east of Kursk in the Voronezh direction. July 6, the enemy managed to seize most of Voronezh. The Nazis called it a "cursed city" because of the fierceness of the fighting for survival in the city quarters. The main forces of the Voronezh Front (commanders F. I. Golikov and N. F. Vatutin) retreated behind the Don in its lower reaches. During the fighting on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, the German troops occupied the Donbas, reached the big bend of the Don River, threatening Stalingrad. On July 24, the enemy captured Rostov-on-Don, the key to the gates of the Caucasus. The situation

was critical. Failures of summer battles had a negative impact on combat effectiveness of the troops, their morale. According to the recollections of Zhukov, "panic moods and violations of military discipline reappeared.

On July 28, People's Commissar of Defense order 227 ("Not one step back!"), which was to suppress cowardice and desertion by the most brutal measures. It categorically prohibited any retreat without a special order of the command. It was read out to all soldiers of the Red Army. The reading was accompanied by the heavy thoughts everywhere: everyone understood that such orders are issued only in the moment of the greatest danger to the state. And the order played its role, because it corresponded to the internal mood of the people. There really was no place to retreat. In summer and autumn of 1942 the war was already being fought on the territory of the RSFSR and was in the full sense of the word a war to save Russia. To raise the spirits of the people in difficult times, the authorities not only issued a tough order, but also once again turned to the historical sources of patriotism. On July 29, military orders were established in honor of military heroes of Russia's past: Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Alexander Nevsky. The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Sergius, renewed his appeal to the faithful to do everything for victory. The Pravda newspaper began to print the word God with a capital letter, which could not but inspire the believers.

Order No. 227 introduced penal battalions and companies to serve soldiers' sentences for criminal and military crimes. They were used in the most difficult and dangerous areas of combat operations. In 1942 they sent 25 thousand men, during the following years of war

- 403 thousand. According to the order, 3 - 5 barrier troops (200 men in each) were created in each army. In case of panic and chaotic retreat of division units they were to shoot panickers on the spot. The need for such detachments, about which many tall tales were spread later, with the change of the situation to the advantage of the Red Army disappeared, they were disbanded in accordance with the order of the Commissar of Defense of the USSR of October 29, 1944.

In August 1942, the enemy came to the banks of the Volga near Stalingrad and to the foothills of the western part of the Caucasus Range, to the passes of its central part, and to the Terek frontier, in the area of Mozdok. On these lines the enemy was stopped. On August, 25th began the battle for Stalingrad, which became crucial for the outcome of the war. The German command attached particular importance to the city, the capture of which could cut the Volga transport artery and create a deadly danger to the center of the country. On September 13, the storming of the city, which lasted more than two months, began.

The onslaught of the Germans was repulsed by the troops of the Southeastern and Stalingrad Fronts under the single command of Colonel General A. I. Eremenko. Stalingrad became a synonym of total heroism of the soldiers, the fortitude of the Soviet people.

The brunt of the fight fell on the armies led by V. I. Chuykov, M. S. Shumilov, A. I. Lopatin; the divisions of A. I. Rodimtsev and I. I. Lyudnikov, on the thousands of soldiers of the Red Army and inhabitants of the hero-city. German generals recalled the battle as "indescribable battle, which became a symbol of the struggle of two

hostile worlds.

The defensive operation in Stalingrad cost in lives of 324 thousand Soviet soldiers. In a little smaller figures were measured by sanitary losses. By mid-November the offensive capabilities of the Germans were finally exhausted, and they turned to the defense.

§2: Radical turning point war from November 19, 1942 - 1943.

Victory at Stalingrad, the fortitude of the Soviet forces once again bought time, mobilized reserves and prepared the offensive near Stalingrad. By the second half of 1942. The Soviet leadership managed to achieve overall superiority of forces over the enemy forces. The industry, put on a war footing, began to rapidly increase the production of weapons.

Red Army, despite all losses, began to increase and approached 6.6 million people against 6.2 millions of Wehrmacht and its allies. It reached the superiority on guns (78,000 against 52,000), tanks (7,300 against 5,000), planes (4,500 against 3,500).

The idea of counter-offensive at Stalingrad was born practically with the beginning of the storming of the city. On September 12, G.K. Zhukov (Deputy of Supreme Commander-in-Chief) together with A.M. Vasilevsky (Chief of General Staff, who inherited this post in June, 1942 from his teacher, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov as his best pupil) reported to Stalin the situation in the city and around it. When he began to study the map with the location of the reserves of Stavka, the strategists, moving away from the table, began to say that

apparently we must look for some other solution than just help the defending reserves. Hearing this conversation, Stalin asked "to think good-think hard" about what should be done around Stalingrad and report back the following evening.

The idea underlying the operation plan was simple: weaken the enemy by active defense, then strike a powerful blow on the flanks of the Stalingrad group, covered by Romanian troops, which would dramatically change the strategic situation in the south of the country in our favor. The plan was named "Uranus" and was meticulously developed in September-October 1942. Thanks to unprecedented secrecy, the operation was prepared secretly from the enemy. It was carried out by the troops of the newly created South-Western Front (commander N. F. Kamchatka) and the allied front, Vatutin, the Don, the former Stalingrad (K. K. Rokossovsky) and the newly created Stalingrad (A. I. Eremenko) Fronts, assisted by the Volga War Flotilla (Rear Admiral D. Rogachev). G. K. Zhukov was put in charge of preparing counteroffensive on the Southwestern and the Don fronts, on the Stalingrad front - A. M. Vasilev, and M. Vasilevsky.

On November, 19, 1942 the Soviet troops assumed a counter-offensive. In November, 23rd the tank parts of Stalingrad and South-Western fronts linked up at the town of Kalach-on-Don and closed the encirclement ring in which there were 22 divisions of the enemy (over 330 thousand men). Destruction and capture of the encircled troops lasted till February 2, 1943. A day earlier, Moscow radio reported about capture of the commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal F. Laulus. In all, the enemy lost one-fourth of the forces operating on the

Eastern Front in the Battle of Stalingrad.

The successful fulfillment of the Stalingrad operation was marked by awarding the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union to the outstanding commanders - Zhukov (January, 18) and Vasilevsky (February, 16). On March 6 of the same year the title of Marshal was awarded to I. V. Stalin. These were the first assignments of the highest military ranks since the beginning of the war. In 1944 six more commanders became its owners: I. S. Konev, L. A. Govorov, K. K. Rokossovsky, R. J. Malinovsky, F. I. Tolbukhin, K. A. Meretskov. In total, during the years of Soviet power we had 41 Marshals of the Soviet Union.

The victory at Stalingrad was supported by the general offensive of the Soviet troops. The enemy was forced to withdraw from the North Caucasus. Millions of Soviet people and a vast territory rich in bread, coal and oil were liberated from the occupation. Of great importance was a partial breakthrough of Leningrad blockade, made after seven days of fighting on January 18, 1943.

Between the Ladoga lake and the front line there was formed a corridor, 11 km wide, on which in two weeks were built automobile and railway. The Hero-City, which lost 642,000 people from starvation, diseases, and 21,000 from artillery attacks during the siege, breathed a sigh of relief. During the first half of 1943, the cities of Rzhev, Vyazma, Rostov-on-Don, Shakhty, Kursk and many others were liberated.

Battle of the Kursk Bulge

By the summer of 1943, the front had stabilized. The sides were preparing for the summer campaign. Since

April the German command had been developing the operation "Citadel", hoping, as Hitler said, "to achieve success quickly and completely". It was planned to defeat the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, defending the Kursk Bulge, and to develop the offensive against Moscow. To fulfill this operation Germans concentrated over 900,000 of military men, about 100,000 of guns and mortars, 2,700 tanks and assault guns, more than 2,000 planes. It was possible to achieve manpower replenishment of the troops due to total mobilization.

This time the Soviet command figured out the enemy's plan in time and developed the counterplan, first to exhaust the enemy in defensive battles, then to go on a counteroffensive. Important information about the Citadel being prepared was received from Britain. British cryptographers in July 1941 unraveled the code of the German encryption machine Enigma used on the Eastern Front. Churchill ordered that the information be given to the Russians without revealing the source of receipt.

By 1943 the Soviets had more than one opportunity to verify the reliability of British intelligence. The decoded Enigma made it possible to monitor the Citadel from April 15. Information from the agent group of the London residence of Soviet intelligence, known as the "Cambridge Five", also played a role. On the eve of the Battle of Kursk John Kern-cross, one of the members of the Five, reported the deployment of 17 German airfields in this direction and the Soviet aviation destroyed 500 planes there.

On July 5, 1943 German troops launched an offensive to

encircle the Soviet units near Kursk. German soldiers, taken prisoner the day before, showed that the attack was scheduled for 4 a.m., and the soldiers had already received schnapps and rations for five days. Thus it was possible to clarify information about the beginning of the offensive, which had been repeatedly postponed. Front commanders K. K. Rokossovsky (Central) and N. F. Vatutin (Voronezh) ordered to preempt the offensive by counterpreparation with artillery. At 5:30 am on July 5, 1943 the battle began, which was decisive for the fate of the war and the country.

The enemy managed to cut into our defense up to 10-35 km at some sectors. On the northern flank of Kursk prominence the Germans by July, 7th advanced to a large settlement Ponyri, which became, as one of German participants of events said, "the Stalingrad of the Battle of Kursk". Here there was a powerful battle between shock units of three German tank divisions and the Soviet armies of the 2nd tank {commander, Lieutenant-General A. G. Rodin) and the 13th army (Lieutenant-General N. P. Puchov). Having lost up to 50,000 men killed and about 400 tanks, the enemy was forced to halt the offensive.

On the southern flank of the Kursk bulge the culmination of the battle fell on the seventh day of the German offensive and the desperate defense of the Soviet troops. At dawn on July 12 in the location of the troops of the Voronezh Front, near the village of Prokhorovka, on a field of about 7 by 5 km began a battle in which about a thousand Soviet and German tanks came together in a counter battle. Unseen battle under the merciless thunder rain lasted 18 hours in a row. The military happiness passed in turns from one side to another. The battle fell silent far after midnight. The remains of 300

German tanks were left on the field.

Among them were 70 new heavy Tigers. In between lay twisted 88 guns, 300 trucks, thousands of soldiers. However, the battle was not over in one day, although the losses of the Germans were such that it was no longer possible to count on a decisive breakthrough. Nevertheless, for the next three days they rushed to Prokhorovka, but could not break through or bypass it.

The Wehrmacht's omnipotence on the battlefields was over. The elite "Dead Head" Panzer Division was forced to withdraw from the front line. H. Goth's tank army lost half of its personnel and vehicles. The Soviet 5th guards tank army of Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov and infantrymen of the 66th army of Lieutenant General A. S. Zhadov suffered heavy losses. In this huge battle the enemy lost 2,952 tanks, 844 guns, and 1,397 planes. According to German data, on the southern flank of Orlovsko-Kurskaya Bulge 10 tank formations of the Soviet Union were lost, 1800 tanks and 1000 antitank guns were destroyed.

On July 15 the Germans returned to the initial positions. Operation "Citadel" was officially terminated. The commander of Army Group "South", Field Marshal E. Manstein and his staff believed that the Soviet side had no forces left for active operations. It was a big mistake: G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky had already begun to realize the second part of the plan in the Orlovsko-Kurskaya Bulge.

On July 12, the troops of the Bryansk (commander M. M. Popov), Central (K. K. Rokossovsky) and Western (V. D. Sokolovsky) Fronts launched an attack on the Orel

enemy grouping (operation "Kutuzov"), the first major result of which was the liberation of Orel (August 5). On August 3 the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation "Rumyantsev" began. On August 5 Belgorod was liberated, and on August 23 - Kharkov. On August 5, for the first time during the war Moscow saluted with 122 cannons in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod. This salute was also sounded in memory of 70,000 of people, fallen in battles at Kursk Bulge. All in all 183,000 of our soldiers died a heroic death during the operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev".

It is encouraging to note that the great victory at Kursk was achieved with less blood. Stalingrad took the lives of 470,000 of our soldiers and officers. Losses of the German party became more and more appreciable. According to its data, from the beginning of the war up to August 31, 1943, Wehrmacht lost on the East front 548,500 soldiers and officers killed and more than 2 million wounded. The number of enemy prisoners of war was growing: In 1941 - 10.6 thousand, in 1942 - 178.8 thousand, in 1943 - 442.8 thousand. In 1943 - 442.6 thousand people. To make up for these losses to Germany was very difficult.

Having liberated Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov, the Soviet armies passed to the general strategic offensive on the front of 2 thousand kilometers. A radical change in the war, which began at Stalingrad, was completed by the Battle of the Dnieper. On November 6th, the capital of Ukraine was released. From enemies a number of areas of RSFSR, Left-bank Ukraine, Donbass were cleared, bridgeheads near Novorossiysk ("Minor Land") and in Crimea (on the north-eastern outskirts of Kerch and to the south of the city, near Eltigen) were seized. From

November 1942 to December 1943 46.2% of the Soviet territory captured by the enemy in 1941 - 1942 was liberated. In December 1941 - 1942 over 41 million people lived there before the war. In total, from December 1941 to December 1943, 53% of Soviet territory was liberated (before the war there were almost 46 million people). By 1944 half of divisions of the enemy were defeated. Italy was withdrawn from the war. The defeat of Italian troops at Stalingrad and the landing of Anglo-American troops in Sicily (July 9, 1943) led to the king's dismissal as prime minister on July 25 and the arrest of B. Mussolini. However, he was freed by the Germans and established under their protection the "Republic of Salo". On September 8, 1943 the north and center of Italy were occupied by Germany. The Nazis held out here until the end of the war, fighting Italian Resistance partisan units.

§ 3. Domestic and foreign policy during the war years, Mobilization of the national economy

The main factor in the radical turn in the war on the Soviet-German front was the restructuring of the home front, which was completed by the middle of 1942. Almost all branches of industry were switched to military production, the output of civilian products was sharply reduced. During 1941 - 1942 over 2.5 thousand plants were evacuated and put into operation in the east of the country. The Urals and other eastern regions became the main base of the war economy. The share of military industry enterprises in the eastern regions rose from 18.5% in June 1941 to 76% in June 1942. By heroic work of local and evacuated to these areas (25 million people) were produced three-quarters of all the military

equipment, weapons and ammunition.

In 1942 the volume of gross industrial output exceeded the level of 1941 by 1.5 times. By the end of 1942 the USSR had established a coherent military economy and in 1943 the output of military products increased by 20% again as compared with 1942.

In August 1943, in accordance with the decree of the USSR SNK and CC of the CPSU (b) "On urgent measures to restore the economy in the areas liberated from occupation", all new territories, conquered from the enemy, were connected to the military production. Despite wartime hardships, from June 1, 1941 to January 1, 1946 in the country 3.5 thousand new industrial enterprises were built and 7.5 thousand large industrial enterprises were restored. In 1944 - early 1945 the gross output of industrial output exceeded the pre-war level. Military production increased threefold. In the military economy the USSR achieved complete superiority over Germany.

The ultra-centralized system of economic management in the USSR demonstrated its advantages during the war. During the war the country produced almost twice as much military equipment and armaments. At a rate of 1,000 tons of steel smelted, 5 times more tanks and weapons were produced than in Germany. In general, the Soviet Union had less industrial potential than the Third Reich and the countries working for it, but since late 1942 significantly more than they did, began to produce tanks, planes, and other weapons. By 1945 labor input in manufacturing of T~34 tank was 2.4 times lower than before the war, and labor productivity in tank manufacturing was 2 times higher than before the war.

The quality of Soviet combat vehicles: fighters by A. S. Yakovlev, S. A. Lavochkin; attack planes by S. Ilyushin; bombers Tupolev, Polikarpov, Petlyakov; medium and heavy tanks Koshkin, Morozov, Kotin; artillery armament Grabin, F. F. Petrov, I. I. Ivanov - was higher than similar samples of the German army.

Losses in the first months of the war revealed acute shortage of small arms, guns, and mortars. Soon this priority task was solved. The Tula and Izhevsk weapon factories in 1942 sent 4 million rifles to the soldiers, and mastered the production of infallible G. S. Shpagin submachine guns. During war the Soviet industry delivered 1,515,900 machine guns of all types, 12,139,900 rifles and carbines, 6,173,900 submachine guns. New models of antitank guns of V. A. Degtyarev and S. G. Smirnov were produced to fight tanks. G. Smirnov. The need for ammunition was aided by enterprises and the civilian sector, where their production was mostly carried out by women.

During this period the production of ammunition increased to the point that the weight of an artillery-mortar volley, which was 548 kg in 1941, rose to 1,589 kg in December 1944. In 1942 the industry satisfied the demand of the army for mortars, and serial production of mortars especially formidable for the enemy was mastered.

Katyusha rocket systems were mastered. Aircraft production (especially in Povolzhye) and tank production rapidly expanded. A real Tankograd was created in Chelyabinsk. This is where the evacuated from the Leningrad Kirov Plant workshops were housed. Kharkov and Stalingrad Tractor Plants. Heavy tanks were created

at its complexes, and medium T-34 tanks were produced at Uralmash and Gorky Shipyard "Krasnoye Sormovo" (before evacuation - at Kharkov Tank Plant and St. Petersburg Tractor Plant).

In August 1942, the Institute of Electric Welding of the USSR Academy of Sciences was evacuated to Nizhny Tagil under the leadership of E. O. Klimov. O. O. Paton the line of automatic electric welding of armored hulls of the T-34 tank was created which was introduced into 40 plants of the country. The automatic welding line increased the productivity of the work by a factor of 8 and for the first time in the world it enabled an automatic production of tanks on stream. During 1942 the USSR produced 28,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, in 1943 – 27,300; in 1944 – 34,700; in 1945 (January - August) – 13,700 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts. (Armored aircraft – 22,000; 33,100; 35,600; 15,000; guns of all types and calibers – 57,400; 57,700; 41,300; 9,800; rocket artillery installations – (42, 43, 44, 45) 3,300; 3,300; 2,600; 800. Behind these figures was the power that crushed the Wehrmacht.

The leading branches and enterprises of the military economy were skillfully managed by talented and strong-willed organizers of production: B. L. Vannikov (Commissar of Ammunition), V. A. Malyshev (Commissar of Medium Machine Building, Tank Industry), P. I. Parshin (Commissar of Mortar Arms), I. T. Peresyphkin (Commissar of Communications), I. F. Tevosyan (Commissar of Iron and Steel), D. F. Ustinov (Commissar of Armaments), A. V. Khrulev (Head of the Red Army Home Front and simultaneously Commissar of Railway), A. I. Shakhurin (Commissar of Aviation) and others, as Stalin said, "generals and marshals from oil,

metallurgy and transport, machine building and agriculture".

The battles on the labor front were won with a sharp reduction in the number of workers and employees. From 31.2 million in 1940, it fell to 18.4 million in 1942. A large part of the employed in the economy were women. In 1945 they accounted for about 60% of all workers and employees and up to 70% of agricultural workers. Besides them hundreds thousands of teenagers and old people worked in factories and collective farms. Patriotism, conviction of their cause, for many - and faith in God, in Stalin, helped not to break down from a terrible strain.

Toilers of long-suffering villages in extremely difficult conditions (mobilization of men to the front, loss of the most arable regions, reduction of machinery and tractor fleet and number of horses, paltry capital investment) managed to provide the front and cities with food. Gross agricultural production in 1943 was only 37% of the 1940 level. The consumption of important products had to be reduced by 2-3 times compared with the low pre-war level. A turning point for the better was outlined only in 1944.

Scientists made an important contribution to the victory. As V.L. L. Lysenko, the President of the Academy of Science of the USSR, outlined at the celebrations on the occasion of the 220th anniversary of the Academy in June 1945.

Soviet physicists created theoretical and experimental prerequisites for the design of new weapons; mathematicians developed techniques for the fastest

calculations for artillery, aviation and combat ships; chemists found new ways to produce explosives, alloys, pharmaceuticals; biologists found additional food resources for the Red Army. Scientists did much to mobilize resources and develop the productive forces of the eastern regions. In particular, thanks to the geologists' search the development of large oil and gas field of the Volga-Ural region was started, which allowed to supply the army with liquid fuel. Complex problems in achieving technical superiority over the enemy (deactivation of electromagnetic mines, creation of new optical devices, the use of automatic electric submerged arc welding, directional explosion technology, etc.) were also successfully solved). The outstanding scientists I. B. Bardin, A. I. Berg, A. A. Blonravov, S. I. Vavilov, A. N. Kolmogorov, M. A. Lavrentyev, and E. O. Paton played invaluable role in supplying the Army with the best models of arms and military equipment in the world.

The beginning of difficult research was laid by the orders of the State Defense Committee from September 28, 1942 "On the organization of work on uranium" and from February P, 1943 "On additional measures in the organization of work on uranium". In accordance with these decisions in Moscow on April 12, 1943 Laboratory 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was established, which received in February the following year the rights of the academic institution. The scientific leadership of the atomic project was headed by I. V. Kurchatov, a 39-year old professor of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology. His brother B.V. Kurchatov made the first steps to success together with him (he conducted experiments on getting plutonium), V.A. Davidenko and G.N. Flerov (he studied resonance absorption of neutrons in uranium-238), theoretical physicists Yu.B.

Khariton, Y.B. Zeldovich, I.Y.Pomeranchuk, etc.

Numerous representatives of medical science and military medical personnel made considerable contribution to the general victory. Thanks to the new methods of military medicine, they managed to reduce the mortality rate in the hospitals to the limit. This selfless work allowed to return to the army over 70% of the wounded and about 90% of the sick soldiers. During the war 43 military doctors were awarded the title of a Hero of the Soviet Union, over 115 thousand medical organizers, doctors, paramedics, nurses and sanitary instructors were awarded orders. Among them - T. E. Boldyrev (chief epidemiologist of the Soviet Army), N. N. Burdenko (chief surgeon of the SA), M. S. Vovsi (chief therapist of the SA), F. G. Krotkov (chief hygienist of the SA), E. I. Smirnov (head of the main military sanitary department of the SA).

Behind enemy lines. One of the factors of the victory was firmness of the Soviet people which were under occupation. On the occupied territories Hitlerites established a regime, fully consistent with their misanthropic ideology and criminal plans. Economic exploitation and robbery were accompanied by mass repression and extermination of the population. The total number of victims of the occupation regime exceeded 14 million persons - about one fifth of the population living there. Over 4.8 million people were taken into slave labor in Germany. The Jews and Gypsies were subjected to total extermination: different ethnic groups were set against each other, especially against the Russians. This was calculated to separate the peoples of the USSR, for example, by the decision of the military authorities of 25 July 1941 to free the Volga Germans, Ukrainians,

Byelorussians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Romanians and Finns from German captivity. The widely publicized order was in force until November 13, 1941. On November 13, 1941, 318,800 people were released.

By means of false propaganda, promises and threats the occupants tried to win over to their side a part of the local population dissatisfied with the Bolshevik regime and the national policy in the USSR. Collaborators were sent to police units and various military formations. By 1942 only Polizei, village headmen and petty officials of the local population on the occupied territory amounted to 60,400 people. By this time the military-economic potential of the latter had been severely undermined by defeats in the Pacific. On August 6 the U.S. dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and on August 9 on Nagasaki. The world was shown the terrifying power of the new means of mass destruction, which was what the US ruling circles were after, because the bombings made no military or strategic sense.

By August the Soviet command moved to the Far East part of the forces which had been released in the West (more than 400,000 people, over 7,000 guns and mortars, 2,000 tanks). Together with the troops stationed there they formed three fronts: the Transbaikal (commanded by Marshal R. Malinovsky), the 1st Far Eastern (Marshal K. Meretskov) and the 2nd Far Eastern (Army General M. Purkaev). More than 1.5 million soldiers, over 27,000 guns and mortars, over 700 rocket launchers, 5,200 tanks and ACP, and more than 3.7 thousand planes were concentrated against the millionth Kwantung Army. The Pacific Fleet (416 ships, about 165,000 sailors under the command of Admiral I.S. Yumashev), the Amur Flotilla (Commanding Officer Rear

Admiral N.V. Antonov) and the frontier troops were also involved in the operation. The actions of naval and air forces were coordinated by Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov and Air Chief Marshal A. A. A. Novikov. Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky was the commander-in-chief of the Soviet forces in the Far East. Together with our troops against the Japanese armed forces were the troops of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army.

On August, 9th the Kwantung Army was simultaneously attacked by land, air and sea. The Japanese could not withstand the powerful blows. Our troops during the first week of the offensive forced the Amur and the Ussuri, overcame the mountain ranges of the Great and Small Khingan, the desert steppes of Inner Mongolia. By August, 20th they had advanced into depth of North-East China from the West for 400-800 km, from the East and the North for 200-300 km, reached the Manchurian plain, divided the enemy troops into isolated groups and completed their encirclement. Marines of the soldiers of the Pacific landed in the ports of North Korea. Airborne landings were made in Harbin, Girin, Dalian, Chanchun, Shenyang, and Port Arthur. On August, 19th, the Japanese began to capitulate. Their losses for 25 days of war totaled 83,700 persons killed and more than 640,000 prisoners of war. Non-return loss of the Soviet Army in this war was about 12,000 men, and the Mongolian army - 72 men. Successful realization of the offensive operation has allowed in comparatively short terms to release Manchuria, Northeast China, northern part of Korea - the territory of more than 1,3 million sq. km with the population over 40 million people, and also Southern Sakhalin and Kuril Islands.

At 9:40 on September 2, 1945, the Act of Unconditional

Surrender of Japan was signed aboard the American battleship Missouri as it entered Tokyo Bay. On her side the Act was signed by Foreign Minister M. Shigemitsu (on behalf of the emperor and the Japanese government), General Y. Umezu (on behalf of the Imperial General Staff). From all the Allied nations at war with Japan - the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, American General D. MacArthur, and from the USSR - Lieutenant General K. N. Derevyanko. World War II ended with the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Results and Consequences of the War

The Soviet Union left the war with the biggest army in Europe (11 million 365 thousand people) and expanded borders of its state. The treaties with allies fixed the rights of the USSR on the territories of the Baltic States, western Ukraine, western Belarus, Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, annexed in the beginning of the Second World War, on the part of Prussia (Konigsberg and the adjoining areas, which became Kaliningrad and Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR). Klaipeda was reunited with the Lithuanian SSR. Under an armistice agreement with Finland, the Soviet Union expanded to include the Petsamo area (now the Pechanga district of Murmansk Oblast) and became a border with Norway. Under the boundary treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland, the Soviet Union included Podkarpattia Rus (present-day Zakarpattia region of Ukraine) and the Vladimir-Volynsk district. In the east, the borders of our country included South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, and in October 1944 the RSFSR voluntarily joined the autonomous region of Tuva, which was later transformed into an autonomous republic (1961).

The main outcome of the Great Patriotic War was the elimination of the mortal danger, the threat of enslavement and genocide of the Russian and other peoples of the USSR. The powerful, inhuman enemy in only four months reached Moscow and up to the Battle of Kursk retained its offensive capabilities. The turning point in the war and the victory was the result of incredible strength, the mass heroism of the people, which amazed both enemies and allies. The idea that inspired the toilers of the front and the rear, uniting and multiplying their strength and even reconciling them with the cruelty of emergency measures of their own leadership, with unjustified sacrifice, was the awareness of the need to defend the Fatherland as a righteous and just cause. The victory awakened in the people a sense of national pride and confidence in their abilities.

The authorities attributed the victory mainly to the advantages of the socialist system and to the "moral and political unity of the Soviet people". However, it was forced to admit that the victory was ensured not by tanks and communist doctrines, but primarily by the patriotism of the Russian people. In the famous victory toast: "To the health of the Russian people" (May 24, 1945) - I.V. Stalin proclaimed that this nation "is the most outstanding nation of all the nations comprising the Soviet Union" and "has earned in this war general recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union."

Unfortunately, in the post-war preparations of the USSR for the further struggle for the establishment of a socialist order throughout the world, reliance was placed not so much on the "clear mind" of the people as on such qualities as steadfast character and patience, trust in the

government in moments of desperation, and willingness to make sacrifices. You might add; so great, in fact, that for years the government could not even speak the truth about their size. All this began to color Stalin's postwar foreign and domestic policies and Soviet patriotism with the colors of Russian nationalism and great power.

Transformed in this bizarre way, the idea of world revolution and Russian universal responsiveness were fed by the very fact of victory, despite the terribly high cost.

The damage caused by the war to the Soviet Union was enormous. The official figures, published in February 1946, were clearly understated, and estimated at 7 million people. A month later, in an interview about Churchill's Fulton speech, Stalin repeated: "The Soviet Union lost irrevocably in fighting the Germans, as well as through German occupation and the deportation of Soviet people to German penal servitude - about seven million people ... several times more than England and the United States of America combined". On November 5, 1961, Khrushchev specified: the war took "two dozen million lives of Soviet people". Four years later, according to Leonid Brezhnev, the country lost "more than 20 million people" in the war. In March 1990, the results of many years of work of the commission, which worked under the aegis of the Defense Ministry of the USSR, were published in the Military History Journal. President M. S. Gorbachev, referring to these results, declared in a report devoted to the 45th anniversary of the Victory: The war took the lives of nearly 27 million Soviet people.

The most up-to-date casualty figures established by the

Goskomstat Department of Demographic Statistics are presented in the book "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: A statistical survey" (Moscow, 2001). According to those data, from June 1941 to early 1946, the country's population decreased from 196.7 to 170.5 million. The total irrecoverable demographic losses of the USSR as a result of the war were 26.6 million people - 13.5% of the prewar population. In Russia the pre-war population was restored only in 1955.

Losses of the Armed Forces of the USSR during the war, including the campaign in the Far East in 1945. Of them 5.2 million died in combat and died of wounds in the stages of medical evacuation. 1.1 million died of wounds in hospitals. 0.6 million were different non-combat losses - from illnesses, accidents, suicides and shootings; 5 million were missing and were in Nazi concentration camps. If we take into account the 1.8 million persons who returned from captivity after the war and about 1 million persons who were previously reported missing in action but survived and were called up again in the liberated territory, the demographic losses of the Soviet armed forces equaled 8.7 million enlisted men.

It meant that each day on the Soviet-German front 21,000 persons were lost on average, of them about 8,000 - irrevocably. The highest average daily losses were noted in summer-autumn campaigns of 1941. (24,000: 17,100 irretrievable, 6,900 sanitary) and 1943 (27,300: 7,700). (27,300: 7,600 irretrievable, 19,700 sanitary).

The total demographic losses of the USSR (26.6 million) were 2.2 times higher than the losses of Germany and its satellites (11.9 million). The large difference in losses

is explained by the genocide of Hitlerites against the civilian population in the occupied territory, which took the lives of 17.9 million people. (For comparison: the United States lost 405,000 people in World War II). Millions of civilians were victims of the war. They were killed by the enemy in the front-line areas, in blockaded and besieged cities.

7.4 million Soviet people were deliberately exterminated by the Nazis in occupied territory. 5.3 million Soviet citizens were forcibly removed to work in Germany. Of them 2.2 million died in fascist captivity, 451,000 did not return for various reasons and became emigrants. The population in the occupied territory decreased by 4.1 million people as a result of increased mortality from the brutal conditions of the occupation regime (hunger, infectious diseases, lack of medical care). Because of the increased mortality, 1.3 million children born during the war died.

In addition to their own country, Soviet troops liberated in whole or in part 13 countries of Europe and Asia. More than one million Soviet soldiers, resting in the ground of Poland (over 600,000), Hungary (over 140,000), Czechoslovakia (about 140,000), Germany (102,000), Romania (69,000), Austria (26,000), China (9,300), Yugoslavia (8,000), Norway (3,400), Bulgaria (977 persons), North Korea (691 persons), were killed outside our country.

The World War II unleashed by Hitlerites turned out a tragedy for Germany and its allies. Only on the Soviet-German front (from June 22, 1941 to May 9, 1945) the irretrievable losses of Germany were 718,000 military men, and together with allies - 8,649,000 men. Between

June 1941 and June 1944 (landing of Anglo-American troops in France) 93% of total losses of German troops were incurred in fighting with the Red Army.

The ratio between Soviet and German irrecoverable losses is 1.3:1. This ratio was largely influenced by the fact that the number of prisoners of war who died in Nazi camps (over 2.5 million out of 4.6 million), was more than 5 times higher than the number of enemy troops who died in Soviet captivity (420 thousand out of 4.4 million). For example, more than 55,000 Soviet Jews who were taken prisoner by the Nazis were victims of the Holocaust, while 10,172 Jews who fought on the side of Germany and were taken prisoner by the Soviets, did not meet with such a fate.

The war left behind millions of wounded, maimed and ill-health. As of July 1, 1945, more than a million people were being treated in hospitals. Among 3.8 million people discharged from the army during the war due to wounds and illness, 2.6 million were disabled. The specifics of the war and occupation led to the emergence of special demographic categories.

According to Hitler's rate, by the end of the war almost 11 million German servicemen visited the Soviet territory, from whom about 3 million children were born. According to data of FRG, in the Soviet zone of occupation about 292,000 German women gave birth to children from the Red Army soldiers.

During war years all peoples of the USSR incurred irreplaceable losses. Thus losses of citizens of Russia made 71.3 % from total demographic losses of Armed forces of the USSR. It is known, that on the eve of the

war the composition of the population of the USSR was: Russians - 51,8 per cent; Ukrainians - 17,6 per cent; Byelorussians - 3,6 per cent. Among those who were mobilized to fight for their duty to the Motherland during the war Russians were 65.4%; Ukrainians - 17.7%; Belarusians - 3.2%; Tatars - 1.7%; Jews - 1.4%; Kazakhs - 1.1%; Uzbeks - 1.1%; other peoples of the USSR - 8.3%. Of the non-combatants killed by nationality, Russians accounted for the largest proportion, 5.7 million (66.4% of the dead); Ukrainians were 1.4 million (15.9%); Belarusians, 253,000 (2.9%); Tatars, 188,000 (2.2%); Jews, 142,000 (1.6%); Kazakhs, 125,000 (1.5%); Uzbeks, 118,000, (1.4%); other USSR peoples, 8.1%.

The vast territory in the western part of the USSR by May 1945 was practically in ruins. The material damage caused to the country by the war was equal to the loss of almost 30% of its national wealth.

(For comparison: in Great Britain - 0.9%, in the USA - 0.4%.) The enemy completely or partially destroyed 1,710 cities and towns, more than 70,000 villages, about 6 million buildings; rendered homeless 25 million people. Almost all the plants, factories, mines, which were on that territory were destroyed; 65,000 km of railroads were plundered; museums and libraries were robbed. By the end of the war the restoration of the economy here was mostly limited to removal of rubble; repair of surviving structures; putting into operation of enterprises, the least affected by the destruction or extremely necessary for the military and economic needs; restoration of railroad tracks. By the end of the war the industry of the liberated districts produced 30% of the pre-war production.

The most difficult situation by the end of the war was in the countryside, which suffered far greater loss of life than the city. The grain harvests almost wiped out the reserves of collective and private farms. In the rural areas liberated from the occupants, many villages and towns were left with only furnace chimneys. 7 million horses, 17 million heads of cattle were taken to Germany or destroyed. Returning to the ashes of their homeland, the inhabitants were forced to start all over again; to get housing, livestock, tools and seeds. Helping these areas placed an additional burden on the peasantry, which had not suffered from the occupation. In the spring of 1944, with the result of extraordinary efforts, it was possible to sow 60% of the areas under crops in the liberated territories.

By the end of the war the repatriation of five million Soviet citizens ("displaced persons", including prisoners of war, "eastern workers", concentration camp prisoners, soldiers in the German formations, and so on) who found themselves outside the Soviet Union became a pressing problem.) Those who were outside the Soviet Union and survived. Under the Yalta agreements, the "displaced persons" were obliged to return to their homeland. Until March 1, 1946, 4.2 million Soviet citizens (2.7 million civilians, 1.5 million prisoners of war) were repatriated to the USSR. As a result of the discord between the Allies, the obligatory repatriation line began to be violated, first for the "Westerners" (citizens from the areas of the USSR annexed after 1939) and then for the "Easterners". The "non-returnees" made up the so-called second wave of emigration from Russia in the West. In 1952 the number of this emigration (mostly people who did not want to or were afraid to return to the USSR) was

about 620,000 people. Of them, 140,000 were Soviet Germans who accepted German citizenship.

The fate of those who were returned to the USSR was also not the same. The Stalinist leadership feared that the lengthy uncontrolled stay of the Soviet people abroad would affect their peace perceptions and political attitudes. 'The contrast between the standard of living in Europe and at home, the contrast faced by millions of people who had fought,' wrote K. M. Simonov, 'was a moral and psychological blow which our people could not easily bear, even though they had been victors in the war. This contrast could become the basis of "worshipping the West", which spread among the Soviet people, and was very much feared in the country's power structures. It also created a special wariness on the part of the authorities towards Soviet citizens who had been to the capitalist countries of Europe during the war.

The stage of return to their native homes for all these persons became the collection and transit points of the People's Commissariat for Defense (NKVD) and inspection and filtration points of the NKVD (for civilians), special reserve units of military districts (for prisoners of war - former soldiers of the Red Army). The "criminal elements" (those who had served with the Germans), and "suspects" identified as a result of the checks were sent to the NKVD screening and infiltration camps "for further inspection" or directly to the correctional labor camps. As a result, 2.4 million repatriates were sent to their homes, 800,000 were drafted into the army, 608,000 were enrolled in the labor battalions of the NKVD and 273,000 (123,000 officers among them) were transferred to NKVD camps.

The special destiny waited for "Vlasovites" and all collaborators. Under the law of wartime of many countries, the persons, defecting to the side of the enemy, were assumed to be punished by death. Softening the rule, the Soviet leadership replaced this measure for the majority of ordinary collaborators with imprisonment or six years of exile in settlements. The stigma of being a traitor became shameful and terrible for them. The work to identify and punish them continued for many years after the war. Among prisoners of camps and colonies 335,000 "traitors of the Native land" were counted (on January 1, 1951), among Special settlers – 135,000 "Vlasovites" (on January 1, 1949). Severe punishment awaited those who sullied themselves by cooperation with Germans in occupied areas. The partisans and underground resistance fighters did not escape the political and punitive inspection.

In liberated areas, citizens were required to surrender weapons and military property within 24 hours. Evasion was punishable by imprisonment and, under aggravating circumstances, by firing squad. Special attention was paid to men of conscription age. It was investigated why they were in the occupied territory, whether they joined the partisans or not and how they proved themselves in the ranks. Honors and promotions were given to known participants in the fight against the occupiers. Therefore, some were tempted to present themselves as active partisans or underground fighters without proper justification. Those who tried to "grovel" for partisan glory risked being put in a very uncomfortable position after the appropriate checks.

The armed anti-Soviet nationalist organizations in the

territories that had become part of the Soviet Union shortly before the war, primarily in Western Ukraine and the Baltics, were a consequence of the war. Nationalists who had collaborated with the Nazis and fought alongside them against the Red Army even after they left continued their armed struggle against the Soviet regime. From March 1944 unfolded NKVD actions on suppression of groups of the Organization of the Ukrainian nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian insurgent army (UPA) in the western Ukraine. Members of OUN-UPA gangs were often killed together with their families; sympathizers were deported. Only from February to October 1944 more than 44,000 of OUN-UPA members were killed, more than 37,000 were taken prisoner. About 100,000 people were deported. In Lithuania, where many insurgent detachments under the Lithuanian National Front were active, by March 1, 1945, 2,257 punitive operations were carried out. According to the official data, 17,000 gangster-groups were liquidated, more than 10,000 bandits were captured and more than 31,000 people were arrested. Battles with nationalists were fought in Ukraine and the Baltics until the end of the war and continued for many postwar years. A tragic legacy of the Great Patriotic War was the deportation to Kazakhstan, Siberia, and other eastern regions of populations from a number of national regions

The reason for the eviction of some was an increased readiness to cooperate with the occupiers or suspicion of doing so (Ingermanlanders, Finns and Germans in 1941, Karachais and Kalmyks in 1943, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars and Crimean Tatars in 1944). In these cases the deportations had a punitive or preventive character. Other peoples were deported only because they had the misfortune to live in border areas which were at risk of

becoming new theaters of military operations (Kurds, Meskhetian Turks in 1944). The expulsion of Muslim peoples of the Caucasus and Crimea is largely related to the tense relations between the USSR and Turkey during World War II, as well as to the pan-Turkic plans of Turkish nationalists which were approved by Hitler's Germany. Turkish emissaries were present in Crimea and the Caucasus during the German occupation; some of the people living in these areas served in Hitler's military formations. This was the basis for the accusation of treason against entire peoples. The deportations were carried out primarily for reasons of military strategy.

On July 7, 1945 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet had declared an amnesty in connection with the victory over Hitlerite Germany. Under the decree 841,000 prisoners, sentenced for a term not exceeding three years, were released. The amnesty did not affect those convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes, the proportion of which among the prisoners rose to 59% not released. The Gulag, as well as the whole sphere of the forced labor was mainly replenished with this contingent.

However, the main thing that remains in people's memory of the war is the ruthlessness of the enemy and the greatest trials, which our compatriots endured with honor. The acts of supreme self-sacrifice and heroism in the name of victory will remain forever in the grateful memory of posterity. Their embodiment and symbols were the commander of a squadron of bombers Nikolai Gastello (who made his immortal exploit in June 1941), 28 Panfilov fighters, led by political commander V. G. Klochkov (November 1941), underground fighter Liza Chaikina (November 1941), partisan Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya (November 1941), fighter pilot

Alexei Maresev (March 1942), sergeant Yakov Pavlov and his famous "Pavlov House" in Stalingrad (September 1942), Oleg Koshevoy, an underground member of the "Young Guard" (February 1943), soldier Alexander Matrosov (February 1943), scout Nikolai Kuznetsov (March 1944), young guerrilla Marat Kazey (May 1944), Lieutenant-General of the Corps of Engineers D. M. Karbyshev (February 1945) and many thousands of other heroes of the Great Patriotic War.

At the 41st kilometer of the Leningrad highway is a majestic monument to the fallen defenders of Moscow. Here, in December 1941, the Guards infantrymen of the 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions, AS Gryaznov, the soldiers of Panfilov's 2nd Cavalry Corps led by L. M. Dovator and the tank crew of the 1st Tank Brigade led by M. E. Katukov together with other units and formations of the 16th Army stopped fascist hordes rushing to Moscow, defeated them and made the first steps to our great victory. Here, on December 3, 1966 ashes of the Unknown Soldier were taken and solemnly transferred with all military honors to Alexander Garden and buried by the Kremlin wall. On May 8, 1967 an eternal flame was lit above the tomb (the torch was delivered from Leningrad from the Eternal Flame on the Field of Mars), and the Unknown Soldier was the pride of the Fatherland for all time.

More than 38 million orders and medals were awarded for courage and heroism to the defenders of the Motherland, more than 11,600 people received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Among them there were representatives of the majority of nationalities of the country, including 8,160 Russians, 2,069 Ukrainians, 309 Belarusians, 161 Tatars, 108 Jews, 96 Kazakhs.

104 people were awarded this high title by the end of the war twice, and G. K. Zhukov, I. N. Kozhedub and A. I. Pokryshkin - three times. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on May 9, 1945 the medal "For victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945" was established. " It could be obtained by all military personnel who participated in the war at the front, as well as those who did not take part in hostilities, but served a certain time in the system of the People's Commissariat of Defense; workers of the rear evacuation hospitals of the Red Army and Navy; workers, employees and collective farmers who participated in the struggle against the invaders as part of the partisan detachments behind enemy lines.

In total, this medal was awarded to 14 million 900 thousand people, and the medal "For the Victory over Japan" was awarded more than 1 million 800 thousand.

16 million 100 thousand toilers of rear - workers, office workers, collective farmers, workers of science and culture, workers of the Soviet, party, trade union and other public organizations, which have provided with their selfless labor a great victory, are awarded the medal "For Valorous Labor in the Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945". In order to be awarded this honor, one should have worked for at least one year between June 1941 and May 1945. The title of Hero of Socialist Labor during the war was awarded to 202 home front workers. Not all exploits were assessed in time and on merit. For example, bishop Luka (V. F. Voyno-Yasenepky), who was in exile in one of the remote villages of Krasnoyarsk Territory, telegraphed to M. I. Kalinin at the beginning of the war: "Being a specialist in purulent surgery, I can render aid to soldiers at the front or at the rear, wherever

I am entrusted. Please interrupt my exile and send me to a hospital. At the end of the war I am ready to return to exile. The bishop was the most talented surgeon of his time, a doctor of medicine, a professor, and did not want to remain an indifferent witness to the tragedy that had befallen the country. The answer to his telegram came immediately. In September 1941 the bishop was allowed to move to Krasnoyarsk and was appointed chief surgeon of the evacuation hospitals. The professor immediately set to work, spending 9-10 hours in the operating room and performing up to five complicated operations every day. The results were brilliant, the rumors about the Siberian wonderworker spread very widely. The treatment of the wounded was combined by the bishop with his archpastoral ministry. In 1943 he was appointed governor of Krasnoyarsk diocese, and in February 1944 was transferred to Tambov, became archbishop of Tambov and Michurinsk. Thousands of life-saving operations were performed by him.

Awarded the medal "For Valorous Labor in the Great Patriotic War" in December 1945 and the Stalin Prize of the 1st degree for outstanding achievements in medicine hardly corresponded to the feat of the healer and archbishop, ranked in 2000. The Russian Orthodox Church has been elevated to the list of saints in the year 2000.

The captain of the third rank, A. I. Marinesko, was an excellent fighter on the Baltic. He stayed overnight with his fellow officers in a restaurant in the port of Turku and did not show up at his base until the third day. The crime was supposed to be "washed away in blood". On January 13th 1945 the "Penal Guards" put to sea after a long search found the German superliner near Danzig

bay. On January 30th the "Wilhelm Gustloff" was sunk by the torpedo attack of the submarine "C-13". Along with it went to the bottom over 7,000 German soldiers and officers, including over 370 specially trained submariners to staff 70 submarines. This sinking was equated to the loss of seven Titanics.

After the sinking of another powerful ship, the cruiser "General Steuben" (3,600 soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht), a three-day mourning period was declared in Germany. A. I. Marinesko - a personal enemy of A. Hitler. And under the order of W. Churchill for the submariner there was a life-long monument established in the Museum of the Navy in Portsmouth "for the failure of the blockade of Great Britain. In his native country Marinesko was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union only in 1990. Many years after his death, which followed in 1963.

The total displacement of ships sunk by the submarines commanded by Marinesko was one fifth of the displacement of all the ships destroyed by our submarine fleet in the Baltic Sea. The number of annihilated fascists per crew member on Marinesko's submarine strikes the imagination. Especially when one considers that taking out each Wehrmacht soldier on the Soviet-German front required the battle effort of an average of four armed men.

In May 1945, the Soviet Union emerged from the war not only with the joy of victory and the hope of its peoples for a better future. And not only with new territorial gains. But also with a distorted economy, with lopsided development of the military-industrial complex, with a

broken social structure of society, with an even more flawed social sphere than before the war, with an ingrained habit of leadership to act with orders and coercion, with intolerance to dissent, with excessive confidence in the inexhaustibility of forces and resources of the country.

Chapter VI, THE SSR IN 1945-1953

§ 1. Foreign and Domestic policy in the post-war period and The beginning of the "cold war".

The post-war life in the USSR was largely determined by changes in the foreign-policy conditions of the country's development, by the development of relations with the anti-Hitler coalition allies. Although at the final stage of the war the alliance began to demonstrate its fragility. People were returning to peace, hoping not only for a better life in their country, but also for harmony and the expansion of ties with the former allies in the war. Much of it, enlivened by pride in its victorious power, felt a sense of invincibility, of the possibility, at least in Europe, of the establishment of righteous communist ideas and orders.

The population as a whole continued to believe in the wisdom of Stalin, "the great Stalin," even after the war. V. Stalin, "the great builder of national happiness," (in the words of Patriarch Alexis). Soviet people supported the party and government headed by him. All this was reflected in the February 1946 elections to the highest

authorities. Responding to the expectations of his fellow citizens, Stalin in his pre-election statements confirmed the pre-war course to build complete socialism in the next 15-20 years, while insisting that it is possible to build communism in one country, especially such as the USSR. To begin with, he believed, it was necessary to triple the level of industry in the next three five-year plans. This would serve as a guarantee "against all kinds of accidents.

At the same time, being well aware of the correlation of the potential of the USSR and of the capitalist world, he did not share the excessive illusions about the possibility of our quick victories in the international arena.

According to his speeches, not intended for the press (April 1945), in 15-20 years, we should expect inevitable resumption of the war between the USSR and capitalist countries.

At the same time, Stalin's entourage, as Khrushchev testifies, had their hopes for Europe, which, "having survived the catastrophe of World War II, would become Soviet." In particular, it was believed "that post-war Germany would make a revolution and create a proletarian state, ... had the same hopes for France and Italy." Indeed, the Soviet Union's enormous contribution to the victory caused a surge of sympathy for socialism in the West. The number of Communist parties there almost tripled during World War II. In 1945-1947, Communists were in the governments of 13 bourgeois states of the world, in Italy and France they were close to coming to power.

The relative unity of the victorious powers after the war was short-lived. It showed up at the creation of the

United Nations in San Francisco in June 1945 and at the Nuremberg Trials of 1945-1946, which punished the German military leaders and their opponents. It was also seen at the signing of the peace treaties of the victorious states of World War II with five former allies of Hitler's Germany: Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. The treaties were signed on February 10, 1947, and came into force on September 15, 1947, after their ratification by the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France.

However, it was not possible to reach agreement on a number of other important questions. The leaders of the U.S., who during the war seized the leadership in the Western world, saw the prospects of the world development differently than the Soviet government. They believed that with time the whole world would live according to American principles. This confidence was based on a powerful economic potential of the state, which during the war had grown one and a half times. Industrial production in the U.S. during these years increased by 2.5 times and was 5 times greater than in the USSR. The output of agricultural products increased by 36%. The United States already had a stockpile of atomic bombs in 1945. The Cold War policy was a reaction of the West, led by the U.S., to the revolutionary processes in the world and the growth of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Ideological confrontation between pro-American and pro-Soviet blocs of states became its expression.

The UK was particularly suspicious of the USSR. Churchill, the leader of Great Britain, which was losing leadership in the world, in the spring of 1945 suggested to the commander of the British troops in Germany, Field

Marshal B. Montgomery to collect German weapons for arming the German prisoners in the event that the Russians did not stop in Berlin and continue their march to the West.

On March 5, 1946, in a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, in the presence of the American president, he declared that "Soviet Russia wants an unlimited spread of its power and its doctrines," and called to counter this with the power of "the fraternal association of English-speaking peoples.

Such appeals were echoed in the United States. In March of 1945, the country's intelligence chief A. Dulles put forward a plan for the postwar struggle against the USSR, during which "episode by episode the grandiose tragedy of the death of the most recalcitrant people on earth will be played out". By December of 1945, the first plan for the bombing of industrial centers was drawn up.

Soviet industrial centers and the route of the Trans-Siberian Railway with atomic bombs. In February 1947, the U.S. president promulgated the Truman Doctrine, according to which "the world as a whole must accept the American system," and the United States was obliged to fight any revolutionary movement, any claim of the Soviet Union.

U.S. policy toward the USSR was defined by the strategic objectives of preventing the Soviet Union and its communist ideology from expanding further (the doctrine of containment of socialism) and then forcing socialism back to its former limits (the doctrine of discarding socialism).

A concrete step toward this goal was to provide massive economic aid to the countries of Europe, making their economies dependent on the United States and effectively cementing American hegemony in the world. It was done in accordance with the program officially declared by the US Secretary of State George C. Marshall on June 5, 1947, which came into force in April, 1948. The same idea was aimed at creating military-political alliances against the USSR, placing the US network of military bases near its borders and supporting the antisocialist forces inside the Soviet bloc. The possibility of using the armed forces for direct interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the Soviet sphere of influence was also envisaged. The confrontation of the sides began to clearly manifest itself in connection with the discussion of the Marshall Plan at the meeting of the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France and the USSR in late June - early July in Paris. Central European countries also expressed an interest in it. However, the conditions for the implementation of the plan put forward in such a way that the USSR, the People's Democracies and Finland refused to take part in it.

During four years of its implementation 16 countries joined the "Marshall Plan" and received aid in the form of supplies of mass consumption goods worth 17 billion US dollars, a considerable part of which (about 60%) fell to the UK, France, Italy and Germany. Implementation of the plan actually completed the division of spheres of influence in Europe.

1947 was a turning point in the formation of the pro-Soviet bloc of states. Joseph Stalin hoped that in the conditions when the "Big Three" conferences de facto

recognized the postwar division of the world into spheres of interest of the great powers, the socialist transformations in Eastern Europe would be gradual and without worsening relations with the allies. These hopes were not realized. Communist governments immediately after liberation from the invaders were established only in Yugoslavia and Albania. In Eastern Europe, the process of establishing communist regimes was more difficult. The Communists came to power in these countries in two stages.

The basic model of the state structure was the "people's democracy," based on the concept of "national roads to socialism," which was based on the recognition of a gradual, evolutionary progression toward a new system. Such a process focused on civil peace and broad inter-class alliance, ruled out civil war and dictatorship of the proletariat. The economy denied the Soviet practice of violent expropriation of private property.

But the Cold War made significant adjustments to these plans. From the middle of 1947, the situation in Europe shifted to the right. The Communists lost their positions in France, Italy and Finland. The Communist Resistance was defeated in Greece. Afraid of losing its influence in Eastern Europe and wishing to shield it from American influence, Moscow set out to force socio-economic and political transformations there.

The transformation of Eastern European countries according to the Soviet model meant the resignation of the coalition governments of the "Popular Front" and the nomination of Communists to the leadership. In November 1946 such a government led by Georgi Dimitrov was formed in Bulgaria. In January 1947

Boleslaw Bierut, chairman of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, became president and chairman of the State Council of Poland.

From August 1947 to February 1948, communist regimes were established in Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia. Together with the USSR, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, and China, all these countries formed a single socialist camp, or, as they came to be called later, the world system of socialism. In January 1949, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was created to coordinate their economic cooperation. Together with the USSR, it included five more European countries of people's democracy (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia), and later Albania, Vietnam, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia. One form of rallying the communists of the socialist camp and other European countries was the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), formed in September 1947.

Open confrontation among the former World War II allies arose in the summer of 1948. The Soviet government was trying to prevent a split of occupied Germany (including over reparations). The Americans, the British and then the French, having united their zones of occupation (in December 1946 into "Bisonia", in 1948 - into "Trisonia"), led the way to the formation of a separate West Germany. Due to worsening relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the Control Council in Germany ceased to exist in March 1948. On June 17, a special currency was introduced in the "Trizone" which also applied to West Berlin. In an attempt to prevent this, the Soviet Union on June 24 closed rail and road transport links with West Berlin.

There was an acute crisis that threatened to escalate into a full-scale war. In May 1949 I. V. Stalin retreated. After lengthy negotiations by the four powers in New York, an agreement was reached. On May 12, 1949, a caravan of flower-decorated trucks from the West drove through East Germany and into Berlin. The crisis ended, but it hastened the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany,

The FRG came into being on September 20, 1949. when it was announced that a government headed by K. Adenauer was established in Bonn. In response, the GDR led by President W. Pick was created in the Soviet occupation zone on October 7. The division of Germany (which lasted until October 1990) was a vivid manifestation of the division of the world into two camps - capitalist and socialist. It was cemented by the formation of opposing military-political blocs. One side was represented by NATO, established in April, 1949 by the USA, Canada and ten Western European countries, and by ANZUS (September, 1951, with the participation of the USA, Australia and New Zealand). The other side was the Warsaw Treaty Organization (May 1955) formed by the USSR and seven Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Albania, which had not participated in its activity since 1962 and had left the treaty in 1968).

In 1948 there was a split in the Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The reason was Stalin's negative attitude toward the aspiration of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to take the leading position in the Balkans, to unite the Bulgarians and Yugoslavs into a federation on conditions weakening the position of the USSR in that region. In June, Pravda published a resolution of the

Cominform, which discreetly criticized the "wrong line" of the Yugoslav leadership. However, a second resolution was published on November 29 under the title "Yugoslav Communist Party at the mercy of murderers and spies. As a result, normal diplomatic relations with this country were interrupted, and from 1950 the economic relations of the USSR and the People's Democracies with Yugoslavia ceased completely.

After the formation of the PRC (October 1, 1949), the Soviet and Chinese leadership established the most friendly relationship. On February 14, 1950, the two countries signed a treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance, which also contained mutual guarantees of military assistance in the event "that either side is attacked by Japan or its allies." After negotiations, the leaders of the USSR and China agreed to assist the leadership of communist North Korea, led by Kim Il Sung, to reunify the country by armed force. After the withdrawal of Allied troops from Korea, a pro-Soviet regime existed on part of its territory north of the 38th parallel; a pro-American regime existed to the south.

On June 29, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the border and quickly defeated South Korean troops. The U.S. State Department stated that the United States held Russia responsible for the war. The UN Security Council unanimously (the USSR boycotted it in protest of Taiwan's participation instead of the PRC) accused the DPRK of aggression and authorized military support for South Korea by UN troops, represented by Americans. The Soviet Union assisted the DPRK with arms and, since November 1950, - air divisions. From October 1950 Chinese volunteers took part in the war. The armed confrontation lasted until July 28, 1953.

The Korean people suffered incalculable suffering and loss of life: to the Americans, up to 140,000, to the Chinese and North Koreans, about 2,000,000. In the battles were also lost 299 Soviet fighters. Korea was left divided. The same fate befell Vietnam.

Stalin, who did not live to see peace in the Korean War, wrote in Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (1952): "To eliminate the inevitability of wars, we must destroy imperialism". With the elimination of the U.S. nuclear monopoly, the danger of a destructive war increased. In January 1951, Stalin declared that within the next four years it was possible to establish socialism throughout Europe. Since the early 50s the construction of airfields in Chukotka, Kamchatka in case of war with the United States was rapidly accelerated. In spring 1952 it was decided to form in the Soviet Union 100 divisions of jet bombers and release over 10,000 of these combat vehicles. It was not only the leaders of NATO who were to blame for the aggravation of the situation, but also the Stalinist leadership and its allies.

Changes in the political leadership of the country.

Stalin's comrades-in-arms, who held key positions in the party and state power structures, were not at all a united and homogeneous team, as might have seemed in the light of the ostensible veneration and praise devoted to the leader. In seeking to consolidate their power, they were in some respects a united team, but in others they were not squeamish about coercion and political intrigue. Victories and defeats in the invisible struggle for access to power allow us to distinguish three stages in the nearly eight-year postwar Stalinist leadership.

The line between them is March 1949 and June 1951. At the first stage, Stalin and his comrades-in-arms tried to secure the Olympus of power from possible assaults by the generals who emerged from the war haloed in the glory of the saviors of the Fatherland. (In August 1944 the Red Army, without the Navy, NKVD and NKGB, had 2,952 generals, of whom 1,753 received the rank of general during the war.)

Under scrutiny immediately after the war was the most famous commander of the Soviet Army, Marshal G. K. Zhukov. On June 27, 1945, he invited notable guests to his dacha near Moscow. Among them were military commanders Sergei Bogdanov, VV Kryukov and his wife, a celebrated performer of Russian folk songs, LA Ruslanova, AV Gorbatov, V. I. Kuznetsov, V. D. Sokolovsky, K. F. Telegin, I. I. Fedyuninsky, and V. I. Chuikov. As they continued to celebrate the victory, they extolled Zhukov's contribution to it in every possible way, speaking of him as the victor of Germany. And the next day Stalin was acquainted with records of these conversations, and it became one of the first reasons of his postwar dissatisfaction with the ambitious marshal.

Western propaganda fueled suspicions in the Soviet upper classes about the military, claiming that they would run on alternative lists of candidates for the Supreme Soviet of the Union republics at the next elections. The promotion to the highest state posts was promised to G. K. Zhukov, who since June 1945 was Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Army Group and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet military administration in Germany. The commander justified these expectations and suspicions by his independence and

independence of actions, manifestation of obvious disrespect for one of Stalin's then favorites, Minister of State Security V. S. Abakumov, and not particularly hidden desire to see himself as Minister of Defense. To compromise Zhukov, the so-called "case of the aviators" was also used. The commander of the Soviet Army Air Force, Air Chief Marshal A. A. Novikov and People's Commissar of Aviation Industry A. I. Shakhurin, according to testimony of the arrested in early 1946, and air marshal A. S. Khudyakov, were accused of accepting aircraft and engines with manufacturing defects, which led to a large number of accidents. On the basis of fabricated materials in the office of V. S. Abakumov, Novikov, Shakhurin and five of their subordinates were sentenced by decision of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court to different terms of imprisonment. The shadow also fell on G. M. Malenkov and L. P. Beria, who were responsible for the aviation industry. During the investigation of the case there was also evidence of Zhukov's attempts to "belittle the leading role in the war of the Supreme High Command".

In spring 1946, 74 generals and officers of the Soviet troops in Germany were arrested on charges of embezzlement of funds and export of various property, furniture, paintings and jewelry for themselves from Germany and Austria. An anti-government military conspiracy led by Zhukov soon became part of the charges.

G. K. Zhukov was removed from his leading positions in Germany, where he was replaced by elevated to the rank of Marshal, V. D. Sokolovsky, and then (from March 1949 to March 1953) Army General V. I. Chukov.

In March 1946 Zhukov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the Soviet Army and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. And on June 1, 1946 there was held a review of the "Zhukov case" at the meeting of the Supreme Military Council with the participation of the marshals of the Soviet Union and the armed forces. Charges against him were supported by Politburo members G. M. Malenkov and V. M. Molotov.

However, Marshals I. S. Konev, A. M. Vasilevsky, K. K. Rokossovsky, and P. S. Rybalko, although they noted the character flaws of the accused, mistakes in his work, stood firm that he could not be a conspirator. "He is a patriot of the Motherland, and he proved this convincingly in the battles of the Great Patriotic War," Marshal Rybalko asserted. The discussion ended with Stalin's conclusion: "Still, you, Comrade Zhukov, will have to leave Moscow for a while." On the surface it seemed that he did not want to go to conflict with the Politburo members because of the Marshal.

On June 3, 1946 G.K. Zhukov was relieved of the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and appointed commander of the Odessa Military District. However, this was not the end of the case. New charges were fabricated against him. In February 1947.

He was dropped from the Central Committee, and in January 1948 he was appointed to command the less important Ural Military District. Stalin, who had resigned his duties as Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR, handed them over to N. A. Bulganin (March 3, 1947), then to A. M. Vasilevsky (March 24, 1949). The latter performed them until March 1953.

In February 1950 the USSR Navy was separated from the Ministry of Armed Forces and the USSR Navy Ministry was formed (Ministers - I. S. Yumashev in 1950-1951, N. G. Kuznetsov in 1951 - 1953) and the USSR Ministry of Armed Forces was renamed the USSR Military Ministry. On March 15, 1953 it was again united with the Ministry of Navy into one Ministry of Defense of the USSR, which existed until December 26, 1991. Zhukov's disgrace ended in the summer of 1951. At the 19th Congress of the Party he was again elected a candidate for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The victims of intrigues after the war were also other representatives of the generals, patronized by Zhukov. So, Marshal G. I. Kulik and the commander of the troops of the Volga Military District, Colonel-General V. N. Gordov, who were demoted for their mistakes during the war, after the war they were denounced as "supporters of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. Kulik was arrested in January 1947 with the rank of major-general, and in July 1950 he was shot. Gordov was arrested in 1950. In December of the next year he died in prison. Major General F. T. Rybalchenko, chief of staff of the Volga Military District, who shared with Gorlov the belief that "collective farmers hate Stalin", that "if they remove collective farms today, tomorrow there will be order, there will be everything"; that "we need to have real democracy." V. V. Kryukov and his wife L. A. Ruslanova were subjected to repression.

At the end of 1947 the Admiral of the Soviet Union Navy N. G. Kuznetsov, who was head of the People's Commissariat of the Navy in 1939-1946, Admiral L. M. Kuznetsov was put on trial. Admiral L. M. Galler, Admiral

V. A. Alafuzov and Vice-Admiral G. A. Stepanov. The naval commanders were accused of passing documentation for a parachute torpedo to the Allies during the war as part of agreements on the exchange of military and technical information between the USSR, Great Britain and the United States. The transfer was declared illegal. The verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR demoted Kuznetsov, the other defendants were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

Marshal of Artillery N.D. Yakovlev, who during the war was chief of the Main Artillery Directorate, and since 1948 Deputy Minister of War, by the decree of the Council of Ministers "On shortcomings of 57-mm automatic anti-aircraft guns C-60" (December 31, 1951) was removed from office, and in February 1952 he was arrested on charges of sabotage. Colonel-General of Artillery I. I. Volkotrubenko and Deputy Minister of Armaments I. A. Mirzakhanov were removed from their posts together with him. But for more than 15 months the investigation had not revealed any facts that could provide a basis for conviction of the arrested, and the investigation against them was terminated in April of 1953.

Already by the end of the war, changes in the balance of power in the Politburo of the Party Central Committee were becoming noticeable. The positions of Stalin's senior political associates - K. E. Voroshilov (withdrawn from the GKO in 1944), L. M. Kaganovich (he was assigned less responsible positions in the leadership), V. M. Molotov were distinctly weakening. The main reason for ousting the latter from power was apparently Stalin's intention to shift responsibility for the unsuccessful

alliance with Germany and the disastrous beginning of the Great Patriotic War to him.

Stalin began to demonstrate his dissatisfaction with Molotov's decisions and actions as early as December 1945. His sanction for the publication of Churchill's speech in the Soviet press, promises to weaken censorship in the USSR were condemned. And even - the belittling of the dignity of "statesman of the highest type" by agreeing to be elected an honorary member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1946.

The "case of the aviators" shook the position of G. M. Malenkov, who was responsible in the Politburo for the aviation industry during the war. On May 6, 1946, a Politburo resolution adopted on Stalin's report was issued, the first paragraph of which stated: "To establish that t. Malenkov, as chief over the aviation industry and over the reception of aircraft - over the air force, is morally responsible for the outrages uncovered in the work of these departments (production and acceptance of substandard aircraft) that he, knowing about these outrages, did not signal them to the Central Committee of the CPSU(b). The second paragraph of the decree read: "To deem it necessary to remove Comrade Malenkov from the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b)". G. M. Malenkov lost his influential position. However, he remained one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Council of Ministers and a Politburo member, elevated to this rank from the candidates on March 18 of the same year. On May 13, 1946, he became head of the Special Committee on Reaction Technologies, formed at the time, and for the first months of his disgrace he was concentrated on this committee, spending some time at the Kapustin Yar test

site in the Astrakhan Region.

As a diminution of L.P. Beria's exorbitant power, his transfer from the post of Minister of Internal Affairs to the post of Chairman of the Special Committee under the GKO to direct "all work on the use of atomic energy of uranium" should be considered. He was appointed to that position on August 20, 1945. Staying in the Politburo, Beria and Malenkov took every opportunity to discredit A. A. Zhdanov and his nominees, who strengthened their positions in the highest positions in the Party and state apparatus (Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee N. A. Voznesensky, Secretary of the Central Committee A. A. Kuznetsov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR, M. I. Rodionov), and were waiting only for a convenient opportunity for revenge.

Meanwhile, events in the international arena were unfavorable for the "Leningradites. Their predictions were not justified. The contradictions between socialism and capitalism manifested themselves to a greater extent than those within the leading capitalist countries. They were also objectively to blame for the liberalism shown against the poetess Anna Akhmatova and the writer Mikhail Zoshchenko in Leningrad, which was under Zhdanov's charge. Akhmatova's main transgression was that in November 1945 she met several times without the approval of the authorities with Isaiah Berlin, the second secretary of the British Embassy in the USSR, a well-known literary scholar and later president of the British Academy. They talked not only about poetry, Dostoevsky, Joyce and Kafka, but also about the deaths of N.S. Gumilev and O. E. Mandelstam and the shootings in the camps. Stalin's

displeasure was also expressed over Akhmatova's triumphant poetic soiree in Moscow's Hall of Columns (April 1946), despite the unspoken decree of 1925: "Not to arrest her, but to prevent her from being arrested. "Not to arrest, but also not to print. Zoshchenko's "faults" turned out to be even more significant. Zhdanov's political ill-wishers informed Stalin that the writer's satirical works were used during the war by Goebbels to make derogatory appraisals of Russian man. As proof, a specially translated volume of the speeches of the chief Nazi propagandist was presented, with the relevant places in the text underlined.

The fate of A. A. Zhdanov and his nominees was decisively affected by their willingness, to a greater extent than Stalin allowed, to play the card of Russian patriotism, up to the organizational strengthening of the positions of the RSFSR. The first secretary of the Leningrad regional and city party committees, P. S. Popkov proposed the creation of a Communist Party of Russia, modeled on the other Soviet republics, with headquarters in Leningrad and the transfer of the Russian government there. This was immediately seen as a desire to isolate Leningrad and its party organization following the example of G. E. Zinoviev.

The defeat of the "Leningraders" was clearly revealed on July 1st, 1948, when G. M. Malenkov returned from disgrace and was appointed Secretary of the Central Committee. The sudden death of A. A. Zhdanov on August 31, 1948, hastened the defeat of the "Leningradites". In January 1949 A. A. Kuznetsov was relieved of his duties as Secretary of the Central Committee; on March 7 1949, N. A. Voznesensky was removed from the Politburo. The fall of the

"Leningraders" further weakened the position of the "old guard" - Molotov, Mikoyan, and Andreev, who had been oriented toward this group, acting as allies on many issues. On March 4, 1949, Molotov lost his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs (A. Y. Vyshinsky was appointed to that post). Mikoyan (related to Kuznetsov) was relieved of his duties as Minister of Foreign Trade. The removal of Molotov, who remained in the minds of the masses the second person in the state, in fact meant depriving him of the opportunity to inherit the highest power in the country in the event of Stalin's resignation.

The period from March 1949

Up to June 1951 it is characterized by a sharp strengthening of the positions of Malenkov and Beria (the chances of the latter were fortified by the successful testing of the atomic bomb), the approach of Nikita Khrushchev to the Olympus of power (in December 1949 through the efforts of Malenkov he was elected first secretary of the Moscow committee and secretary of the Central Committee of the Party). At the same time, the positions of N.A. Bulganin, the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers were being strengthened. On February 18, 1948 he was transferred from the candidate list to the Politburo and in February 1951 was approved as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Bureau for Military-Industrial and Military Affairs. In fact, this meant a new infringement of Beria's position.

In 1949, the "Leningrad case", which was concocted with Malenkov's active participation, began the criminal prosecution of a large group of leaders nurtured by the Leningrad party organization. The first arrests were

made in August. A. A. Kuznetsov, M. I. Rodionov, and P. S. Popkov were accused of holding the All-Russian Wholesale Fair in Leningrad without special authorization by the USSR government. N. A. Voznesensky was accused of deliberate understatement of government plans, falsification of statistical records, and the loss of secret documents. Obviously, in connection with the arrests of the "infiltrators" who had "infiltrated" such high-level positions of power, in January 1950, the death penalty, which had been abolished on May 26, 1947, was reinstated.

At the end of September 1950, the accused "Leningraders" were brought before a closed trial, which was held in the presence of 600 people from the party activists of Leningrad. The media reported nothing about this trial in order to avoid giving rise to rumors of a split in the country's leadership. After the execution of the main accused (October 1, 1950) followed a "purge," which ended with the dismissal and conviction of 69 executives who owed their nomination to the Leningrad party organization, and 145 of their close and distant relatives. In addition, two people died in prison before the trial. Of the 214 persons convicted, 36 worked in the Leningrad Regional Party Committee and City Party Committee as well as in the regional and city executive committees, 11 held leading positions in other regional party committees and regional executive committees, and 9 worked in the district committees and district executive committees of the Leningrad Region.

The defeat of the "Leningraders" was not due to the fact that their opponents were more skilled in intrigue and hardware combinations. In a broader sense, it signified the defeat of the direction in the country's leadership,

which had prioritized the solution of internal political, economic and civil problems: shifting the priorities of economic development toward Group B, solving the problems of political education and culture, and preparing a new constitution and party program.

At the same time, this was a victory for the tendency associated with the leadership of the military-industrial complex, which focused on its comprehensive development as the main instrument in the battle on the fronts of the Cold War, and, ultimately, on the attainment of world domination under the flags of socialism and communism.

The arrest of Minister of State Security V. S. Abakumov (June 12, 1951) marked the beginning of the phase of preparation of more radical changes in the country's leadership. The Minister of MGB, who had been the chief executor of the massacre of the "aviators," G. K. Zhukov, and the "Leningraders," apparently did not completely suit Stalin as the organizer of the investigation of the "crimes" of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.

The persecution of the committee passed to an active phase after the death of the head of the EAC S. M. Mikhoels (January 13, 1948). The People's Artist of the USSR, head of the Moscow State Jewish Theater was suspected of trying to use Stalin's daughter Svetlana and her husband G. I. Morozov in the selfish interests of Soviet and world Jewry. Stalin's special indignation was aroused by the fact that rumors were broadcast through the channels of the Jewish Committee in the United States about his guilt in the death (1932) of his wife, Nadezhda Sergeyevna, and other relatives. In this

connection, members of the academic institutions of I.I. Goldstein and Z. G. Greenberg, who "exposed" Stalin's relatives on his wife's side, A. S. Alliluyeva, E. Alliluyeva, her second husband N.V. Molochnikov, and the daughter from her first marriage, K.P. Alliluyeva, as the source of "slandorous fabrications against members of the government. Mihoels was "exposed" as a "Jewish nationalist" and distributor of these fabrications. It was decided to put an end to the activities of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee after the visit of the Israeli envoy Golda Meerson to Moscow in September 1948. (In 1956 she took the name of Meir, which in Hebrew means "illuminator.") This happened after a series of enthusiastic meetings arranged by Soviet Jews (most likely not without the YAC's participation) with the envoy of the newly created state of Israel (proclaimed May 14, 1948, based on the decision of the UN General Assembly of November 29, 1947). Israel immediately established the closest relations with the United States of America, hostile to the USSR, the US which remained in the minds of many Jews, "the golden country". For example, I. S. Fefer, the YAC secretary, in connection with his forthcoming trip to the United States in 1943, said that "at last, he was due a little bit of bliss - to be in America". The readiness of many Soviet Jews to move to their historic homeland or to volunteer for the Israeli-Arab war was particularly wary.

All this was seen as treason against the socialist homeland. Stalin did not like the friendship between Meerson and Molotov's wife Polina Zhemchuzhina, who stated during a diplomatic reception: "Ich bin a Yiddish tochter" ("I am the daughter of the Jewish people"),

The Soviet leadership tried to keep Israel in its orbit of

influence by helping with weapons and with an unprecedented offer to resettle the Palestinian Arab refugees (over 500,000) in Soviet Central Asia and establish an Arab Union republic or autonomous region there. The proposal was made by Soviet representative D. Manuisky in the UN Security Council in the fall of 1948. However, it did not provoke the expected reaction. Jewish "nationalism," as in the case of other punished peoples, was punished. On November 28, 1948, the Politburo of the Central Committee decided to "immediately dissolve" the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. Fourteen members of the presidium and activists were arrested in the "YAK case. They included the poets D. R. Bergelson, L. M. Kvitko and P. D. Markish; S. L. Bregman, Deputy Minister of State Control of the RSFSR; V. L. Zuskin, who took over for Mihoels at the Jewish Theater; I. S. Fefer, Secretary of the EAC; B. A. Shimeliovich, chief physician of the Central Clinical Hospital named after Botkin; Academician L.S. Stern, head of the Institute of Physiology of the Academy of Medical Sciences; I. S. Yusefovich, a junior researcher at the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences. S. A. Lozovsky, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the Soviet Information Bureau, was also arrested, Lozovsky, who was responsible for the Committee's work through state structures, and P.M. Zhemchuzhina, who had given the Committee protection.

B. S. Abakumov was slow in organizing the investigation into the "EAK case". (It was already completed without his participation in the summer of 1952.) There began to be suspicions that he was doing this on purpose. This suggestion was made on 2 July 1951 in a letter to Stalin from the Special Investigator of the USSR M.D. Ryumin,

which was prepared with the help of the staff of Malenkov. It stated that Abakumov deliberately hampered the investigation of the "Jewish nationalist" doctor Ya. G. Etinger, which allegedly allowed him to obtain information about the large-scale sabotage activities of the doctors.

A commission composed of G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria, Deputy Chairman of the Party Control Commission under the Party Central Committee M. F. Shkiryatov, and the new Minister of State Security S. D. Ignatyev had to verify the facts stated by Ryumin. Thus was born the "case of the poisoners," who allegedly murdered Politburo members A. S. Shcherbakov and A. A. Zhdanov and intended to murder other top leaders of the country and bring to power V. S. Abakumov and the conspirators from the ministry he headed.

The conspiracy was justified by the testimony of Colonel L. L. Shvartsman, the arrested Deputy Chief of the Special Investigation Department of the MGB, who had denounced many of his colleagues in the repressive organization and confessed to the most incredible crimes against himself, including vicious Jewish nationalism, organization of Kirov's murder, homosexuality, and incest, clearly counting on being deemed insane. However, a forensic psychiatric examination found Shvartsman to be sane. A part of his testimony was found to be so significant that the Abakumov case was henceforth referred to as the Abakumov-Shvartsman case. The "denunciation" of L.F. Timashuk, which according to recent conceptions had given impetus to the "doctor's case", in the light of present knowledge of the events of 1952-early 1953 had no essential importance.

Her letters to the MGB and the Central Committee, in which she defended her diagnosis of Zhdanov's terminal illness, which turned out to be correct, were used to discredit N.C. Vlasik and A. N. Poskrebyshev.

For Stalin, the MGB conspiracy version was a great boon. Using the bugaboo of Jewish nationalism and Zionism, it was possible to finally eliminate from power V. M. Molotov, K. E. Voroshilov, A. I. Mikoyan, L. M. Kaganovich, A. A. Andreev and many other figures who had family ties in the Jewish environment.

The personnel reshuffle, arranged after the XIX Congress of the Party at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on October 16, 1952. This was the beginning of this process. If, by decision of the previous Congress, the Politburo had nine members and two candidates, and the Secretariat had four members, the new composition of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee (the 19th Congress gave a new name to the highest body of the party power) included 25 members and 11 candidates, while the Secretariat had 10 members.

The new Areopagus was becoming a kind of a reserve for the promotion of new real rulers to replace those who had been pushed to the back rows. At the plenum, Stalin sharply criticized V. M. Molotov and A. A. Molotov. M. Molotov and A. I. Mikoyan, accusing them of intransigence, cowardice, and capitulation to American imperialism. Molotov's proposal to "hand Crimea over to the Jews," his desire to be "an advocate of illegal Jewish claims to our Soviet Crimea," was seen as a gross political error. The political distrust of K.E. Voroshilov

was publicly expressed. The Bureau of the Central Committee Presidium, formed at the plenum, but not provided for in the CPSU Charter, included only Beria, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Saburov, and Khrushchev, in addition to Stalin. Representation of the "old party guard" in Stalin's inner circle was kept to a minimum.

In November 1951, one more "case" fraught with important political consequences began to unravel. The Central Committee of the CPSU(b) adopted a resolution "On bribery in Georgia and the anti-party group of Baramia," which stated that in that republic was disclosed the Mingrelian Nationalist Organization led by the Secretary of the CCCP of Georgia M. I. Baramia. The new resolution of the Central Committee (of March 27, 1952) on the situation in the Communist Party of Georgia "specified" that "Baramia's illegal Mingrelian nationalist group was aiming at tearing Georgia away from the Soviet Union. On this "case" were arrested as "bourgeois nationalists" 7 of the 11 members of the Central Committee Bureau of the Communist Party of Georgia, and 427 secretaries of district, city and regional party committees. The entire Party active of Mingrelia were arrested. In one of the reports to Stalin on this "case" Ryumin and Ignatiev outlined the suspicions of the Georgian State Security Minister N. M. Rukhadze about Beria, who was allegedly hiding his Jewish origin and was secretly preparing a plot against Stalin. Thus, "Mingrelian case" one day could have turned against "the biggest Mingrel". Larry Beria was well aware of this and while under arrest noted in a letter of June 28, 1953, he remarked Malenkov's beneficent role in his fate, "especially when they wanted to tie me to the events in Georgia". It is likely that he did not remain

indifferent to the impending danger. Shortly before Stalin's death, his closest assistants, A. N. K., were arrested.

Poskrebyshev, a member of the Central Committee and from August 1935 the permanent head of the Party leader's office; Lieutenant General N.S. Vlasik, who headed Stalin's personal guard for almost a quarter of a century and had an evident dislike for Beria. On February 15, 1953, Major General P. E. Kosynkin, Stalin's commandant of the Kremlin, who had been appointed to the post from his bodyguard, died.

Remaining at their posts, they would hardly have allowed the criminal tardiness in providing medical care to Stalin, who had suffered from a stroke, which was demonstrated by Beria, Malenkov, and Khrushchev. On their orders, doctors were called to the bedside of the patient only 10 hours after the discovery by his guards of him lying on the floor in a room near Moscow Blizhnyaya Dacha in a semi-paralyzed state.

The "doctors' case" took visible shape in November 1952, when the head of the Kremlin Medical and Sanitary Administration, P. I. Yegorov, and well-known professors of medicine V. N. Vinogradov, V. X. Vasilenko, M. S. Vovsi, and B. B. Kogan were brought to Lubyanka. Stalin was dissatisfied with the indecisiveness of Minister Ignatyev and ordered one of his main authors, Rumin, to be removed from the case. The latter, apparently fearing the fate of Yagoda, Yezhov, and Abakumov, clearly tempered his ardor.

On November 15, a new investigator for the "doctors' case" was appointed instead of Ryumin - Deputy

Minister of State Security S. A. Goglidze. Soon the doctors "gave" the necessary testimony.

The questions of sabotage in the medical business and the situation in the USSR MGB were submitted for discussion to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. The meeting was held on December 1, 1952. According to the diary notes of a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, Commissar V.A. Malyshev, Stalin said: "The more we have success, the more the enemies will try to harm us". The Pasha people have forgotten this under the influence of our great successes; complacency, gloating, and conceit have appeared. Every Jewish nationalist is an agent of American intelligence. The Jewish nationalists think their nation was saved by the United States (there you can become rich, bourgeois, etc.). They consider themselves indebted to Americans. There are many Jewish nationalists among doctors. There is trouble in the GPU (Stalin uses one of the old names for the interior ministry and the MGB. -Author). Vigilance was blunted. They themselves admit that they are sitting in the muck, in failure. It is necessary to treat the GPU. The GPU was treated without any delay.

Already on December 4, a resolution of the Central Committee of the Party was adopted, in which the blame for the activities of the "poison doctors" was placed on V. S. Abakumov. S. Abakumov and N. S. Vlasik. G. I. Smirnov, a friend of Vlasimov, was removed from the post of Minister of Health of the USSR. I. Smirnov, a friend of Vlasika's, who had allegedly "merged" with him on the basis of drunkenness, was removed from the post of Minister of Health of the USSR. They also adopted a resolution "On the situation in the MGB", which pointed

out that "the Party had too much trust in, and poor control over the work of the Ministry of State Security and its bodies" and stressed the need to "put a resolute end to the lack of control over their activities".

On January 9, 1953, the Bureau of the Central Committee's Presidium discussed the IASS's draft report on the arrest of a group of "saboteurs". Stalin avoided participating in this meeting. He apparently left it to himself to shift the responsibility to those who were present. On January 13, the *Pravda* published a "TASS chronicle" about the disclosure by the state security organs of "a terrorist group of doctors aiming to shorten the lives of active figures in the Soviet Union by means of sabotage treatment". Nine persons were named among its participants. Six of them were Jews by nationality, three - Russians.

On February 22, 1953 all regional departments of MGB distributed the order prescribing the immediate dismissal from the MGB of all officers of Jewish nationality, regardless of their rank, age and merits. On February 23 all of them were dismissed "due to reduction of the staff" and had to give up their jobs within a day. However, the trial against the "doctor-poisoner mm" did not come to fruition. The denouement of events according to a scenario known only to its true authors did not follow because of Stalin's untimely death.

Stalin's death. Redistribution of power

During the night of February 28 to March 1 1953 I. Stalin suffered a stroke. The diagnosis of the chief physician of the Ministry of Health of the USSR, Professor P. E. Lukomski, academicians AMS A. L. Myasnikov, E. M.

Tareev and others who arrived at the cottage was fast: a stroke with cerebral hemorrhage. On March 3 it became clear to the doctors that death was inevitable. A government message was broadcasted on the radio about the illness of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. On March 5, at 9:50 p.m., Stalin died. Millions of Soviet people were genuinely saddened by the loss, but many also associated it with hopes for a better life.

This death was the end of one of the most controversial eras in Russian history. It was an era of heroism, enthusiasm, social creativity of the masses, forced modernization of the country, victory in the Patriotic War and the establishment of extremely rigid command methods of achieving them; breakthroughs to democracy and the imposition of the personality cult of the leader, who mercilessly destroyed not only political opposition, but often the shoots of healthy dissent.

The enormous diversity of opinions and assessments of Stalin's historical role still prevents us from reaching any consensus. Obviously, however, the posthumous trial of Stalin, initiated by L. P. Beria, and then N. S. Khrushchev, and attempts to assess his role only negatively and even completely erase this name from history are not successful. Perhaps the most balanced is the characteristic of Stalin, given by the outstanding statesman of England, a vivid opponent of communist ideas, Winston Churchill, who on the occasion of Stalin's 80th birthday (December 21, 1959) said: "Great happiness for Russia was the fact that in the years of difficult trials it was headed by a genius and unwavering commander Stalin. He was an outstanding personality,

imposing a brutal time in which his life took place. In his works there always resounded a giant power.

This power is so great in Stalin that he seemed unique among the leaders of states of all times and peoples. He was the unsurpassed master of finding a way out of the most desperate situation. Stalin was the greatest, unparalleled dictator. He took Russia with a plow, and left equipped with atomic weapons. No! No matter what they say about him, the history and the people do not forget such people. After the collapse of the USSR, when it became possible to compare different periods in the history of the country, they began to say that the Stalin era was "like a supernova explosion, on the fading momentum of which we were moving almost forty years.

March 5, at 8:40 p.m., one hour and 10 minutes before Stalin's death, a joint meeting of members of the CPSU Central Committee and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and government ministers ended in the Kremlin. L. P. Beria, on behalf of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, proposed to elect G. M. Malenkov as Prime Minister. The meeting unanimously supported the proposal. A package of new staff appointments was then offered to the assembly by the new head of the Council of Ministers. L. P. Beria was nominated for the posts of first deputy presidents. Beria, V. M. Molotov, N. A. Bulganin, and L. M. Kaganovich. K. E. Voroshilov was proposed as the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and N. M. Shvernik, being released from this post, was proposed as the Chairman of the All-Union Central Executive Committee. It was also proposed to merge a number of ministries, including the merger of the MGB with the Interior Ministry, and to appoint Beria as the head of the

consolidated Interior Ministry. Molotov was nominated as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulganin as Minister of the Armed Forces, Mikoyan as Minister of Internal and Foreign Trade. Here it was also decided to have one body in the Central Committee of the Party instead of the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium, the Presidium, "as determined by the Party Statute." It was proposed to consist of 11 persons instead of the previously elected 25. They were Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, and Pervukhin. Four people became Secretaries of the Central Committee instead of the eleven former Secretaries: N. S. Khrushchev, S. D. Ignatyev, P. N. Pospelov, and N. N. Shatalin. Khrushchev was the only member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee among them.

The resolution of the meeting was announced on March 7 (already without Stalin's name among the members of the Central Committee Presidium). The new configuration of power was determined. At the very top of the power pyramid returned representatives of the old guard ousted by Stalin. A considerable part of Stalin's nominees of October 1952 (with the exception of M. Z. Saburov, M. G. Pervukhin, P. N. Pospelov, and N. N. Shatalin) had lost their positions. At the meeting it was announced that Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev were instructed to put Stalin's documents and papers in proper order, which was a peculiar indicator of belonging to the true power in the post-Stalinist USSR.

As for the reasons for Stalin's death, many contemporary prominent historians are inclined to interpret in a literal sense the words Beria said on May 1, 1953, on the rostrum of the Mausoleum to Molotov, so that

Khrushchev and Malenkov, who stood nearby, could hear: "I saved you all ... I took him out very much just in time." By the 1960s, this version was widespread. For example, Enver Hoxha, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, said on May 24, 1964, that Soviet leaders "have the audacity to tell openly, as Mikoyan does, that they have secretly prepared a plot to kill Stalin."

Khrushchev at a rally on July 19, 1964 in honor of the Hungarian party-government delegation ended his filibuster against Stalin with an unequivocal statement: "There have been many cruel tyrants in the history of mankind, but they all died as much by the axe as they themselves maintained their power by the axe."

Most significant in the new configuration of power created after Stalin's death is the complete "rehabilitation" of Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Molotov and Kaganovich, who had been ousted from power. V. M. Molotov, who had a large stock of political experience and was more popular in the country than any other member of the "collective leadership", was objectively becoming a possible candidate for the post of Prime Minister, which he had held more than ten years earlier, from December 1930 to May 1941.

§ 2. The restoration and development of the national economy,

Changes in the Social Sphere of Society

In the transition to peaceful construction, there were changes in the management of internal political

activity. The restoration of the national economy was the main task of the internal policy of the USSR in the first post-war years. It began as early as 1943 and was expanding as the occupants were expelled. Immediately after the victory over Germany in late May 1945 the State Defense Committee had decided to transfer part of the defense enterprises to the production of goods for the population. The state budget for the first and the fourth quarter of 1945 and for 1946 was reconsidered. It provided for reduction of assignments for military needs and increase of expenses on development of civil sectors of the economy.

In August 1945 the USSR State Planning Committee had been given the task to prepare a draft plan for reconstruction and development of the national economy. In June 1945 the law on demobilization of thirteen ages of the army personnel was passed. On July, 17th the first trains with demobilized, were met by thousands of citizens with flowers. In 1947 demobilization was largely completed, 8.5 million people returned to peaceful life. The number of the Red Army, which received on February 25, 1946, the new official name of the Soviet Army, decreased from 11.4 million men (May 1945) to 2.9 million (Kone 1948). In accordance with peacetime objectives after the war a number of People's Commissariats were reorganized. The People's Commissariat of Ammunition later became the Ministry of Agricultural Engineering, the People's Commissariat of Mortar Arms - the Ministry of Machine Building and Instrument Making, the People's Commissariat of the Tank Industry - the Ministry of Transport Machine Building. There were created new ministries - the Ministry of Communications Industry; the Ministry of Medicine (June 1946), etc.

Abolition of compulsory overtime, restoration of an 8-hour working day and paid annual vacations contributed to resumption of normal work routine in enterprises and institutions.

On September 4, 1945. On the second day after the end of the war with Japan the GKO (State Defense Committee) was abolished. The basic functions of governing the country were concentrated in the hands of the Council of People's Commissars. On February 10, 1946 the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the second convocation were held. As before the war, the ballots contained the names of candidates for deputies, previously approved by all instances. In March 1946, the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the second convocation was opened. It approved the five-year plan for the restoration and development of the national economy in 1946-1950, and formed a new government.

On March 19, N. M. Shvernik was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and M. I. Kalinin was honorably retired. On March 5, the law transforming the Council of People's Commissars into the USSR Council of Ministers was adopted. As in the case of the army, the new name went in line with the return from revolutionary symbolism to traditionally Russian symbols. "Commissar" reflected, as Stalin remarked at the session, "a period of unsteady order, a period of the Civil War, a period of revolutionary breakdown ... This period has passed."

Apparently, the ambiguous attitude to the commissars of the war period was also taken into account.

"Commissars are a bloody doom," Stalin joked at the March (1946) plenum of the Party Central Committee. - The people are confused. God knows who's higher. There are commissars everywhere, but here is a minister, the people will understand."

In 1945-1952, the Politburo's role as a political course generator decreased considerably in comparison with the pre-war period. During those years only two of its meetings with protocols took place, in other cases decisions were made by oral questioning. Stalin headed the USSR Council of Ministers and was officially referred to as "Head of the Soviet State." The functions of the party and state organs became increasingly intertwined. Within the Politburo, a narrow circle of men close to Stalin (at various times the so-called "Five", "Six", "Seven", "Eight", and later "Nine" leaders). Since March 1946, the "seven" included Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan, Malenkov, Zhdanov, and Voznesensky. The "inner circle" was responsible for foreign policy and foreign trade, state security, armament and functioning of the army, and other issues of purely state administration.

Since February 1947, the Council of Ministers was divided into eight bureaus, each coordinated by related ministries and departments. Malenkov, Voznesensky, Saburov, Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Kosygin, and Voroshilov became bureau chairmen. Only two departments remained in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Party: personnel, agitation and propaganda, as well as two departments - the orgiastic and foreign policy; the branch departments were liquidated. In public speeches, mention of the "leading role of the Communist Party" sounded comparatively

less frequently. In February 1946, Stalin stated that the only difference between communists and non-partyists was that the former were party members and the latter were not, which was also perceived as a disregard for the institution of party membership and a decline in the role of the party as the political vanguard.

The disagreements that existed in the Soviet leadership in defining the outlines of the Fourth Five-Year Plan were determined by the difference of ideas about the main tendencies of postwar development. Politburo member A. A. Zhdanov, chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, Academician N. A. Voznesensky and a number of other figures ("doves") believed that with the return to peace in the capitalist countries an economic crisis would ensue, inter-imperialist contradictions and conflicts would intensify.

This promised a weakening of the threat to the USSR from the Western powers and made it possible to abandon the traditional policy of forced development of heavy industry, to dwell on relatively liberal versions of the plan, to rely more on economic levers (prices, value, credit, profits) in the further development of the national economy.

Politburo members G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria and other ("hawks") relied more on the economic estimates and forecasts of Academician E. S. Varga and did not rule out the ability of capitalism to cope with its internal contradictions. From this point of view, the post-war international situation was seen as extremely alarming, and the enemy's possession of the atomic bomb made it even gloomier. The abandonment of further forced development of industrial and defense industries and the

command-and-control methods of economic management was ruled out. Unfortunately, developments justified the predictions of political "hawks."

The Fourth Five-Year Plan approved in March 1946 provided for the restoration of the war-devastated national economy and an increase in industrial output over the Soviet period, as compared with the prewar level by 48%, and agricultural output – increased by 23%. One of the top-priority tasks of the postwar five-year plan was "ensuring technical progress in all sectors". This plan was considered unrealistic in the West.

Well-known economists predicted that it would take 40-50 years just to restore the Soviet economy. Foreign countries were particularly skeptical of Voznesensky's statement that "Russia, taking advantage of the Soviet system, could surpass the capitalist countries in all avenues of progress, including technology."

Restoration and development of industry. The hard work of the people, the talent of production organizers, scientists and designers ensured that the five-year plan targets were met and exceeded in precisely those areas of the economy where Western skeptics had least expected it. Conversion of the industry (its adjustment to peaceful production), accompanied with reduction of war related production volumes by 17%, was completed in 1946. In October 1947 the country increased to the pre-war level, met the planned targets in 4 years and 3 months, and by the end of the five-year plan had increased the industrial output by 73% as compared with 1940. During the five-year period 6,200 rebuilt and newly constructed enterprises were launched.

Under the plan, priority was given to the development of heavy industry. Substantial funds, material and labor resources were directed there. Already in 1946 the restored Makeyevka pipe foundry, Dneprodzerzhinsk nitrogen-tube plant, Riga electric machine building plant, Minsk machine tool plant were put back into operation. Metallurgical plants (Zaporizhstal and Azovstal) and coal mines of Donbass were restored. At the same time new coal districts were created and the metallurgical base was expanded in the east of the country. New giants of industry emerged in the Urals, and Siberia, the republics of Transcaucasia and Central Asia (Transcaucasian Metallurgical Plant, Ust-Kamenogorsk lead-zinc combine, Kutaisi Automobile Plant). The Kaluga Gurbina Plant, the Kolomna Heavy Machine Tool Plant and the Ryazan Machine Tool Plant were built.

A large amount of industrial work was carried out in the republics and regions included in the USSR on the eve of the war. In the western regions of Ukraine, the Baltic republics created new industrial branches, in particular, gas and automobile, metal and electrical industries. In Western Belorussia, electric power and peat industry were developed. In 1946-1950 the Saratov-Moscow, Kohtla-Yarve-Leningrad gas pipelines were put into operation.

Priority was given to increasing the production of electricity. In 1945 the Volkhov hydroelectric power station was restored, the reconstruction of Dubrovskaya, Svirskaya and other power stations of the Leningrad region started. Dnieper hydroelectric power station, the largest power station in Europe, was rapidly restored. Already in 1947 the station gave its first current, and by

the end of the five-year plan it was operating at full capacity. Rybinskaya and Sukhumskaya hydroelectric power plants began to operate. Nizhneturinskaya and Shchekinskaya State District Power Plants (SDPP) were built. In the late 1940s, the USSR decided to use nuclear power to produce electricity, and construction began of a nuclear power plant in Obninsk, Kaluga Oblast. By the end of the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the electrical work rate in industry had exceeded the 1940 level by one and a half times; enterprises were equipped with new technology, mechanization of labor-intensive processes were increased.

In August 1950, government decisions on the start of construction of the Kuibyshev and Stalingrad hydroelectric stations on the Volga were published. In September, the construction of Kakhovskaya HPP on the Dnieper, the main Turkmen irrigation canal Amu-Darya-Krasnovodsk 1,100 km long, the South-Ukrainian and North Crimean irrigation canals were announced. Together with the plan of creating field-protection strips the grandiose hydraulic structures began to be called in the press as "the great constructions of communism".

A special place in the postwar period was given to the defense industry and, first of all, to the solution of the atomic problem. The impetus for this work, started in 1943. On August 20, 1945 the Special Committee under GKO on realization of the Soviet analogue of the American "uranium project" was established. The committee included state and party figures: L.P. Beria (chairman), G.M. Malenkov, and N.A. Voznesensky, physicists I. V. Kurchatov and P. L. Kapitsa; production organizers B. L. Vannikov, A. P. Zavenyagin, V. A. Makhnev, and M. G. Pervukhin.

For preliminary consideration of scientific and technical questions, submitted for discussion by the Special Committee, the Technical Council was organized under the chairmanship of B.L. Vannikov. Academicians A. I. Alikhanov (Scientific Secretary), A. F. Ioffe, P. L. Kapitsa, I. V. Kurchatov, V. G. Khlopin, I. K. Kikoin, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Professor Yu.

The direct management of research, design and engineering organizations and industrial enterprises involved in solving the nuclear problem was carried out by the First Chief Directorate under the USSR Council of People's Commissars, subordinated to the Special Committee. B.L. Vannikov, who was relieved of the duties of People's Commissar of Ammunition in this connection, was appointed head of the LSU. H. A. Voznesensky undertook to organize in the Gosplan of the USSR a department for this work.

The GKO decree emphasized that no organizations, institutions or persons without special permission of the GKO had the right to interfere in the administrative, economic and operational activities of the Special Committee, its enterprises and institutions or to demand references to the work carried out under its orders. The decree provided for the organization of "foreign intelligence work to obtain more complete technical and economic information about the uranium industry and atomic bombs. In April 1946 KB-11 ("mailbox" Arzamas-16) led by P.M. Zernov and Yu.B. Khariton was organized in PSU system with the clear objective - to produce an atomic bomb. Firstly it was planned to test the plutonium bomb no later than January, and uranium

bomb no later than July 1948. However, in February 1948, these dates had to be postponed until March-December 1949.

Rocket production was developed in parallel, since the decisive role in future wars was given to nuclear warheads and means of their delivery to the targets. In May 1946, the Special Committee on Reaction Technologies under the chairmanship of G. M. Malenkov was created and on October 18, 1947, at Kapustin Yar test site, the Soviet rocket A-4 with participation of S. Korolev in its development was tested. In 1950 the ballistic missile 1M was accepted for service, testing of long-range missiles R-2 with 600 km range and R-3 with a range of 3000 km was in progress. July 10, 1946 under the Council of Ministers of the USSR there was created another special Committee for Radiolocation (headed by G. M. Malenkov, then M.Z. Saburov) which also deployed work on strengthening the defense shield of the country.

In September 1952, Stalin signed a decree on the creation of a nuclear submarine in the Soviet Union. All this required huge expenditures. During the Korean War, direct military expenditures of the USSR alone absorbed a quarter of the country's annual budget. In 1980, one of the participants in solving defense problems, the president of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. P. Alexandrov stated: "It is now possible to say directly and frankly that a significant part of the difficulties experienced by the Soviet people in the first postwar years were due to the need to mobilize enormous human and material resources in order to do everything possible to successfully complete scientific research and technical projects for the production of nuclear weapons

in the shortest possible time".

The nuclear, missile, and other defense problems were solved in dozens of new closed cities with unique enterprises, laboratories, and design bureaus. Later these production centers became known as Arzamas-16, Snezhinsk, Mayak, Priozersk, Shikhany, Gorny, Kamborka, Kapustin Yar, Sungul, entire areas around Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, Moscow. In summer 1948, near Chelyabinsk the first nuclear reactor was started up and a plutonium production plant was put into operation.

On August 29, 1949 successful testing of the Soviet atomic bomb occurred at the Semipalatinsk test site. Priority development of heavy industry, redistribution of funds in its favor led to the deepening of the gap in the production of products of groups "A" and "B". Plans for the development of the light and food industry were not fulfilled. Nevertheless, the years of the first postwar five-year plan became the time of the beginning of mass production of a number of sophisticated consumer goods - "Victory" and "Moskvich" cars, motorcycles, radios, televisions, which significantly transformed the appearance of cities and the life of Soviet people.

Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, destroyed by the war, were renovated under the new general development plans. In November 1945 a special decision was made to restore the 15 largest and oldest Russian towns - Novgorod, Smolensk, Kursk, Orel, Kalinin, Great Luki, etc. Damaged historical monuments and structures were restored. In Moscow there were built pompous "Stalin's" houses, high-rise buildings (from 1947), which determined the new look of the capital for many years. By the end of Five-Year Plan 100 million.

sq. m. of housing was commissioned, but the housing problem was far from being solved, most of the population lived in communal apartments.

Restoration of industry and transport, new industrial and housing construction led to an increase in the working class. Only during the fourth five-year plan the ranks of workers increased by 11 million people. The total number of workers and employees in the national economy in 1950 reached 27.7 million people. Of these, 15.3 million worked in heavy industry, 2.6 million in light industry, about 4 million in transport. Industrial heroism of the Soviet people, expressed in numerous labor actions, contributed to the successful implementation of the plans of the Fourth Five-Year Plan.

Widely known and supported in these years got a wide popularity and support for the initiatives of turners - Leningrader Bortkevich and Muscovite P.B. Bykov (high-speed cutting of metal); mechanic Moscow Watch Factory A. Yakushin; weavers from Kupavna M.I. Rozhneva and L.F. Kononenko (reducing production losses); assistant masters of the Moscow light industry enterprises V.I. Voloshin (improving production culture) and A.S. Chutkikh (the movement for the title brigades of excellent quality) and other causes,

Many hundreds of thousands of prisoners also contributed to the development of national economy of the USSR (in 1945 the number of prisoners was 1.5 million, in 1950 - 2.6 million, in 1953 - 2.5 million); special resettlers (Germans, Karachais, Kalmyks, and others). By the end of 40's there were 2.3 million prisoners of war (1.5 million Germans and 0.5 million Japanese). Many military facilities, mines, the Baikal-

Amur Railway, were built by the labor of prisoners. On the Baikal-Amur Railway, and the Vorkuta-Salekhard-Norilsk railroad; a tunnel under the Tatar Strait to Sakhalin Island was built.

In the Moscow region were laid circular concrete roads within a radius of 50 and 100 km from the center of the capital, a total length of about 2 thousand kilometers for the air defense system. In Bashkiria and Irkutsk were built largest petrochemical plants. An important role was played by reparations, which the Soviet Union received from the defeated Germany in the amount of \$ 4.3 billion. The Soviet Union exported industrial equipment, including entire factory complexes, as reparations from Germany and other defeated countries. This source allowed to equip half of the reconstructed and newly built industrial plants.

Agriculture

The agricultural sector of the economy emerged from the war extremely weakened. The number of able-bodied people in the village was reduced by almost a third. For several years no new machinery was supplied there; almost a quarter of pre-war tractor and combine harvester fleet was destroyed in the occupied territories. The lack of machinery could not be compensated by live draught animals - the number of horses on collective farms was reduced by more than half during the war. In contrast to the 1920s, the state decided to begin the reconstruction of the economy not with the village, but with heavy industry, completely subordinating the interests of the village to the fulfillment of this task. The village was looked upon primarily as a source of raw

materials, manpower and bread for industry. This meant that assistance from the city was minimal. The situation was complicated by the fact that the first post-war year was unfavorable in terms of weather conditions. In 1946 a severe drought hit Ukraine, Moldavia, the right-bank areas of the Lower Volga region, the North Caucasus, and the Central Black Earth regions. In the Kostok region, prolonged rains caused damage to crops. The gross grain harvest in 1946 was 2.2 times less than in 1940. The famine which began led to the death of 770,700 people and caused mass outflow of the rural population to the cities. In the summer of 1946, 87.8 million people were transferred to the centralized state supply. The extreme acuteness of the pro-scholastic problem was relieved only by relatively good harvests in 1947 and 1948.

The obligatory supply of agricultural products to the state remained high. Most of the collective farms fulfilled them at the limit of what was possible, and for many it was unaffordable. As in the thirties, the nyotovitelye prices remained well below the cost of production, but (washing away only a small part of the costs. In 1950 it amounted to 8 rubles per quintal of grain at the cost of 49. Purchase prices for milk in Belarus reimbursed the collective farms one fourth of its cost price, for pork - one twentieth of it. Grain procurement plans in 1944 filled 58% of collective farms of the country, in 1945 – 50%, in 1946 – 42%, in 1948 – 44%.

The remuneration of labor on the collective farms was symbolic in nature. The collective farmers were forced to live mainly at the expense of private subsidiary farms. In the last years of the war these farms often grew at the expense of collective farm land. Urban residents also

developed vegetable gardens and garden plots on public land. The state saw an obvious irregularity in the growth of private subsidiary plots.

On September 19, 1946, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Party adopted the decree "On Measures to Eliminate Violations of the Collective Farm Charter". It noted the facts of "embezzlement" of collective farm land and collective farm property, abuses by the party and social bodies. The resolution obliged leaders of all levels to put an end to "perversions and violations" and to "bring the perpetrators to justice as criminals.

To control the observance of the collective farm charter and to solve the problems of further collective farm construction, the Council on Collective Farms headed by Politburo member of the Central Committee A. A. Andreev was created. The activity of the Soviet and its representatives in the republics, territories, and regions helped to restore order, but it could not provide the rise of the farms. Later, the attitude to individual peasant farms was constantly toughening, and the taxes on homestead lands were increasing.

The poor harvest year of 1946 forced the state government to pay particular attention to the situation in the countryside. In February 1947 the question "On the measures to raise the agriculture in the postwar period" was considered on the plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP(b). In accordance with its decisions, production of tractors, agricultural machinery and fertilizers was increased. This allowed by the end of the five-year plan to create more than a thousand new MTS, to renew the material and technical base of production.

In 1950 the number of tractors and combines on the collective and state farms was 40-50% more than before the war. The governmental plan for the development of rural electrification for 1948-1950 allowed to supply 15% of collective farms (in 1940 - 44), and 80% of MTS and state farms with electricity by the end of the five-year period. However, in the collective farms the energy was used mainly just for lighting.

On October 20, 1948 the Government of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) adopted a resolution "On the plan of erecting shelterbelt forests, introducing of grassland crop rotations, construction of ponds and water bodies to secure high and stable crop yields in the steppe and forest steppe regions of the European part of the USSR". The plan was calculated for the period 1950-1965. In the press of those years it was referred to as "Stalin's plan for the transformation of the nature". Due to its high cost, the program was implemented slowly, and after the death of its author, it was practically phased out. Nevertheless, it was possible to introduce state forest protection strips of more than 6 thousand kilometers in length; millions of trees and bushes were grown in the field protection strips of local importance. This had a beneficial effect on crop yields.

In April 1949 the "Three-year plan for the development of collective and state farm productive livestock farming" was adopted. Due to the lack of capital investment it also failed to be fully implemented. However, by the end of the five-year plan the production of meat, milk and wool in the country as a whole exceeded the pre-war level.

At the turn of the 40-50s in accordance with the course

on the concentration of collective farm production small collective farms were enlarged. From 1950 to 1953 their number decreased from 255 to 94,000. New collective farms were created in the western regions of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, the Baltic republics, and Right Bank Moldavia. Collectivization was carried out on the pattern of the 30's and was accompanied by repressions and deportations of the population. Only from the Baltic Republics the deportees were exiled in 1945-1949. This undoubtedly resulted in the strengthening of nationalist movements.

The measures taken by the state and the sincere desire of the peasants to improve their living and working conditions were not enough to bring the village up to the five-year plan targets. Yields were low because of the lack of agricultural machinery, fertilizers and disinterest of collective farmers in labor. "Brutal" (after Finance Minister A. G. Zverev) taxes stifled peasant household farming.

According to official data, in 1950 the agricultural production of all categories of farms was 97% of the 1940 level; livestock indicators were higher than before the war; gross agricultural production as a whole was 99% of the pre-war level. However, grain production in 1951 was only 82% of the 1940 level, potatoes – 77%, vegetables – 69%. Even in relatively favorable 1952 the gross yield of grain was below the prewar level, and the yield in 1949-1953 was 7.7 centners (tons) per hectare (in 1913 - 8.2 tons).

Plans to increase the level of food consumption by the inhabitants of the country turned out to be unfulfilled. In 1950 it was only close to the pre-war level. During the

years 1946-1951, 1946-65% of the total income of the collective farmers was brought by subsidiary farms, while payment for workdays worked at the collective farm was 15-20%. In some districts the share of private subsidiary plots exceeded 90% at the turn of the 40-50s.

The vast majority of collective farms in the postwar years remained weak and unprofitable. Only some of them headed by such experienced chairmen as F. I.

Dubkovetsky (collective farm "Zdobutok Zhovtnya", Cherkasy region), P. Malinina (collective farm "12th October", Kostroma region), K. Orlovsky ("Dawn" in Belorussia), M. Posmitny (Budyonny in Odessa region), P. Prozorov ("October" in Kirov region), were able to achieve high production results.

One of the most important events in the social sphere was the abolition in December 1947 the ration system, introduced during the war, and the monetary reform, which was largely confiscatory in nature. Deposits in savings banks for the first 3 thousand rubles were kept (for 1 ruble of old money a depositor received 1 ruble of new money); the sums from 3 to 10 thousand were exchanged in the ratio 3:2; over 10 thousand - 2:1. Cash of the population was exchanged at a ratio of 10:1. Thus, all those who kept the income at home lost heavily.

The monetary reform, according to the assessment of Finance Minister A. G. Zverev, "made it possible to eliminate the consequences of the war in the field of monetary circulation, excessive money was withdrawn from circulation. Large savings formed by certain groups of the population as a result of high market prices, as well as speculation, were eliminated. The national debt and related state budget expenditures were reduced".

Simultaneously with the monetary reform it was announced that the retail prices of basic foodstuffs and industrial consumer goods would be reduced. In 1947-1950 they decreased five times for mass consumption goods and by the end of the five-year plan they were 43% lower than in 1947. The standard of living of the population, though still rather low, tended to increase. The socio-economic situation in the early 1950s. The economy at the beginning of the decade developed on the basis of the trends established in the preceding period.

Convened on October 5, 1952, the XIX Congress of the CPSU(b) was held in a situation where the industrial production of the USSR was 223% of the prewar 1940 level, and agriculture was only just brought up from the prewar 1940 level. The theoretical basis of the principles of the further development of the USSR was laid down in the Congress. The theoretical basis of the principles of further economic policy was Stalin's work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", published shortly before the Congress. The guidelines of the Fifth Five-Year Plan for 1951 - 1955, approved by the Party Congress, were to increase the industrial production by 70%, about double the output of mechanical engineering, metal working and capacity of power plants and increase the production of consumer goods by 65%. In implementing the new five-year plan, as before, priority was given to heavy industry, and especially to defense industry. Production of consumer goods (cotton fabrics, footwear, etc.) significantly lagged behind the planned targets and the needs of the population. Agriculture, as before, did not meet the needs of the light and food industry for raw materials. The aggravating

international situation also hindered the adoption of measures to improve the living conditions of the population.

With the transition to the implementation of the five-year plan, the centralization of industrial management intensified. The ministries were consolidated, (coal, oil industry, etc.), new departments were created. This led to the growth of the managerial apparatus and its separation from production. Concentration of efforts on the development of industry and new construction enabled already in 1953 to increase the gross industrial output up to 2.5 times higher than in 1940. At the sites of gigantic new construction projects (Kuibyshev, Stalingrad, Kakhovka hydroelectric station; Volgo-Don canal; Tsimlyansk hydroscheme) the most powerful equipment for those times appeared. July 27, 1952 the Volgo-Don was opened to ship traffic.

On July 20, 1953, the Soviet Union officially announced the testing of the hydrogen bomb, which meant the solution of the most ambitious and one of the most expensive scientific and technological programs in the country's postwar history. Academicians I.E. Tamm, L.D. Sakharov, V.L. Ginzburg, and Ya.

The progressive development of the country in the postwar years is demonstrated by summarizing data on the dynamics of national income and national wealth. According to official statistics, in 1941 - 1950. Despite the devastating war, the production of national income in the Soviet Union (the newly created value in all sectors of material production) grew at an average annual rate of 4.7%, and during the next decade - by 10.3% per year (while in 1922-1940 - by 15.3%). Alternative data

(economists V. V. Popov, N. P. Shmelev; 1990) show that in 1922-1940 the national income increased annually by 8.5%, and in 1941-1950 it was negative, minus 0.6% per year; during the next decade, however, it increased by 9.3% per year.

The research of Academician Fedorenko (2001) established that national wealth of the country (totality of material wealth possessed by the society, mainly created by labor of the people during the whole previous period of its development) in the 20's increased on average by 3,4% per year, in 1931-1940 - by 6% per year, and in 1941-1950 it decreased by 4,6% compared to the previous decade. This means that between 1941 and 1950 the average annual growth rate of national wealth was negative at minus 0.5% per year. In the 1950s, the national wealth of the country increased by an average of 10% annually. In general, the Stalin period of power (1922-1953) was characterized by annual increase of national wealth by 4%. This fact, along with the victory in the Great Patriotic War, should be taken into account in the overall assessment of the result of his historical activity.

§ 3. cultural life. Ideological campaigns and debates

Here are some postwar achievements and problems of Soviet science, education, and culture. The Stalinist government was fully aware of the decisive role of education, science, and culture in the implementation of the tasks facing the country and the further transformation of society itself. Despite the extreme strain on the state budget, funds were found for their development. After the war the system of universal

elementary education was restored and from 1952 seven-year education was introduced and evening schools were opened for working youth. The cultural and political education of the population expanded dramatically with the development of Soviet television and radio broadcasting.

During the Fourth Five-Year Plan, the number of scientific research institutes increased by almost a third, the Academy of Sciences was established in Kazakhstan, Latvia and Estonia, the USSR Academy of Arts was formed. The history of this period is marked by the outstanding achievements of scientists and designers, the emergence of literary works that brightly reflected the past war (A. Fadeev, B. Polevoy, V. Nekrasov) and other stages of the historical past of the Soviet peoples (L. Leonov, F. Gladkov, K. Fedin, M. Auezov); new achievements of composers (S. Prokofiev, D. Shostakovich, N. Myaskovsky), painters (A. Gerasimov, P. Korin, M. Saryan), filmmakers (I. Pyrev, V. Pudovkin, S. Gerasimov), etc.

The war years brought high hopes for the liberalization of the postwar public life, the weakening of the strict state-party control in the field of literature and art, the expansion of freedom of creativity. Personal impressions of millions of Soviet people who were in Europe weakened propaganda stereotypes about the horrors of capitalism. Allied relations with Western countries during the war years gave hope for expanded cultural ties and contacts after the war.

A. Tolstoy, for example, imagined the post-war time as follows: "In Ten years we will rebuild the cities and the economy. After peace there will be the New Economic

Policy, which is nothing like the previous New Economic Policy. The essence of this NEP will be the preservation of the kolkhoz system, the state will retain all the means of production and big trade. But the possibility of personal initiative will be open, which will not contradict the fundamentals of our legislation and system, but will complement and enrich them. There will be a long struggle between the old forms of the bureaucratic apparatus and the new state officials put forward by life itself. The latter will win. The people returning from the war will not be afraid of anything. They will be demanding and enterprising.

Crafts and Artels of all kinds will flourish, struggling to sell their products. Quality will skyrocket. Our ruble will become the world's currency. It may happen that a single currency will be introduced throughout the world. The wall of pre-war Russia will collapse. Russia will attract all eyes by the very fact of its growth and prosperity.

The beginning of the Cold War crossed out such forecasts and hopes. The confrontation with the capitalist world forced us to remember the techniques and methods of the "class approach" in the ideological education of the masses and the creative intelligentsia already developed in the thirties. In 1946-1948, several resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) on culture were adopted.

The August 1946 decree "On the magazines Zvezda and Leningrad" subjected to merciless criticism the work of famous Soviet writers. M. Zoshchenko was branded as a "vulgar and scoundrel of literature," A. Akhmatova was called "a typical representative of the empty poetry alien

to Our People without any ideology. At the Orgbureau of the Central Committee, where this issue was discussed, Stalin said that the magazine in the USSR "is not a private enterprise," he has no right to adapt to the tastes of people "who do not want to recognize our system". The party's chief ideologist, A. A. A. Zhdanov, speaking on September 29 in Leningrad to explain the decree, had to be especially zealous, since it was about the city where he had been the personification of power for many years. The decree denounced one of the main vices, the eradication of which was subordinated to the ideological work of the Cold War period - "the spirit of worshipping the modern bourgeois culture of the West". On the same day in Kiev, Khrushchev made a report on the situation in literature and the arts, which was identical in essence with Zhdanov.

His resolution "On the repertoire of dramatic theaters and the measures to improve it" (of August 26, 1946) demanded to prohibit the theaters from staging the plays of bourgeois authors which were declared as "the provision of the Soviet stage for propaganda of reactionary bourgeois ideology and morality".

The resolutions On the motion picture The Great Life (September 4, 1946), "On the opera 'Great Friendship' by V. Muradeli" (February 10, 1948) gave pejorative evaluations of the work of directors L. Leon, S. Yutkevich, A. Dovzhenko, S. Gerasimov; composers V. Muradeli, S. Prokofiev, D. Shostakovich and V. Shebalin. They were accused of having no ideals, of distorting Soviet reality, of ingratiating themselves with the West, and of lacking patriotism. They accused S. Eisenstein of "discovering ignorance in the portrayal of historical facts, presenting the progressive army of oprichniks of Ivan the

Terrible".

The authors of "The Great Friendship" were accused of "ignorance of the historical facts" for presenting Georgians and Ossetians as enemies of the Russians in 1918-1920, while "interfering with the Russian regime in 1918-1920". The authors of the "Great Friendship of Peoples" were also accused of representing the Ingush and Chechens as enemies of the Russians in 1918-1920, while the "obstacle to the establishment of friendship between peoples in the North Caucasus at that time was the Ingush and the Chechens".

In 1947, it was decided to use the "case" of corresponding member of the Academy of Medical Sciences N.G. Klyueva and her husband professor G.I. Roskin for the widespread campaign to eradicate low worship, who proposed publishing in the USA a book titled "Biotherapy of Malignant Tumors" (published in Moscow in 1946; not accepted for publication in the USA) in parallel with the Soviet edition. The campaign was long and meticulously prepared. In February it was discussed with Stalin and Zhdanov. In May, Stalin approbated the main ideas of a closed letter on the subject to Party organizations in a conversation with the writers A. Fadeev, B. Gorbатов, and K. Simonov. He lamented that our intellectuals of the average level "have an insufficiently educated sense of Soviet patriotism. They have an unjustified worship of foreign culture. Everyone feels still juvenile, not one hundred percent, used to consider themselves in the position of eternal students. This tradition is backward, it goes back to Peter."

In June 1947, the Ministry of Health of the USSR held a

"court of honor" over Klyueva and Roskin, with all the trappings - members of the court, the speech of the chief prosecutor, witness testimony, attempts of the accused to justify themselves. The verdict was passed: a public reprimand. That's when the shooting of "Court of Honor" began (released in January 1949). The seriousness of the campaign was demonstrated by the penalties for the main perpetrators. Academician V. V. Larin, who took the manuscript to the United States on a business trip and offered to publish it, was sentenced to 25 years for "espionage". G. A. Miterev, the Minister of Health, was removed from his post.

On June 17, 1947, a closed letter of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) "On the case of professors Klyueva and ROSKIN" was sent to party organizations of the country. Their anti-patriotic and anti-state act was seen in the fact that, allegedly driven by vanity, ambition and worship of the West, they hurried to inform the whole world about their discovery, passing the manuscript of their work to the American embassy with the help of the spy Parin. The Central Committee stated that the "affair" testified to a serious disadvantage in the moral and political condition of the intellectuals working in the field of culture. The roots of such sentiments were seen in the remnants of the "accursed past" (Russians must always play the role of apprentices to Western European teachers), in the influence of the capitalist environment on the least stable part of our intelligentsia. Such sentiments represented a particular danger in that the agents of foreign intelligence intensively search for weak and vulnerable places, and find among the intelligentsia, infected with the disease of low worship ...

As opposed to the intelligentsia, workers, peasants, and

soldiers were portrayed as being able to stand up for the interests of their state. The letter ended with a proposal to create "courts of honor" for all similar transgressions. They were created in all academic and educational institutions, government agencies, ministries, and creative unions throughout the country, and operated for two years.

The consequence of the policy of isolation aimed at eliminating the potential influence of the capitalist world on the Soviet citizens was the Decree "On Prohibition for Registration of Marriages of the USSR Citizens with Foreigners" issued on February 15, 1947 (abolished in September 1953).

Discussions on the history of bourgeois philosophy and economics. In 1947 two discussions (the first in January, the second in June) of the book by G. F. Alexandrov "The History of Western European Philosophy" (M., 1946) were held. This had more to do with the struggle in the Central Committee for the important post of the head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which the author had occupied, than with the clarification of philosophical truths. The book was criticized for its objectivism, tolerance for idealism and decadentism, and lack of polemical zeal in criticizing philosophical opponents. The condemnation of "toothless vegetarianism" set scientists on a more decisive offensive on the philosophical front and a merciless fight against bourgeois objectivism. The author was relieved of his leadership of the Central Committee Office. True, this did not prevent him from becoming director of the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In May 1947 there was a

discussion of E. S. Varga's book "Changes in the Economics of Capitalism as a Result of World War II" (M., 1946). The provisions of the chapters "The Increased Role of the State in the Economy of Capitalist Countries" and "Economic Regulation and Free Enterprise in Capitalist Countries during the War" were especially criticized in the academician's book.

Varga's conclusion about the possibility of "organized capitalism" in the West was regarded as a scientific and political mistake. If in the past the effectiveness of regulation was not primed for peacetime, it was now interpreted as impossible in times of war. The book's passages devoted to the progress of the productive forces of capitalism were criticized: it was seen as a condemnable "techno-economic bias. The tone of criticism rose rapidly, from accusations of "misunderstanding" to the irritation of an "agent. A pejorative assessment of Varga's analysis was made by N. A. Voznesensky. "The reasoning of some theorists who consider themselves Marxists about the "decisive role of the state in the military economy of capitalist countries," he wrote, "is trifling, not worthy of attention. The result of this "discussion" was the decision, made in the fall 1947 decision to close the Institute of World Economy and World Politics, headed by E. S. Varga since 1927.

The philosophical and economic discussions in 1947 heralded the tightening of ideological control in other fields of science as well, and the futility of hopes for expanding academic contacts with foreign colleagues, freedom of discussion and opinion, and general post-war liberalization. The imposition of ideological dogmas had a negative impact not only on the development of the

humanities, but also on the natural sciences. The monopoly position in agrobiolgy occupied by the group of Academician T.D. Lysenko, led to the dismissal of many of his opponents - geneticists, physiologists, morphologists, soil scientists, and physicians. Cybernetics was called a reactionary pseudoscience. At times it was even claimed that it was necessary for the U.S. imperialists to foment World War III.

In the end of 1948 the preparation of all-union meeting of the heads of physics departments began in order to correct the omissions in science in accordance with the spirit of the time: the physics was not taught in the diamatist branch, the textbooks were full of names of foreign scientists. In December, an organizing committee was formed. After Lysenko's success in defeating "Weizmannism-Morganism-Mendelism" at the August (1948) session of VASHNIL, the ideas to defeat "Einsteinism" in physics were put forward. A collection of articles "Against Idealism in Modern Physics" was published, which attacked the Soviet followers of A. Einstein. Among them were L. D. Landau, I. E. Tamm, and Yu. Y. B. Zeldovich, V. L. Ginzburg, A. F. Ioffe, and many others. The perniciousness of the meeting of physicists scheduled for March 21, 1949, was most likely realized in the committee leading the work on the atomic problem. At one of the meetings in early 1949, Beria asked Kurchatov if it was true that relativity theory and quantum mechanics were idealistic and should be abandoned. Kurchatov replied, "If you give them up, you have to give up the bomb too." Beria immediately responded that the bomb was the most important thing, and everything else was nothing. Apparently, he shared his anxiety with Stalin: the meeting was canceled. Thus, "the bomb saved the physicists."

According to later estimates, if the meeting had taken place, our physics would have been thrown back 50 years to the pre-quantum era, and many leading scientists would have been declared cosmopolitans. Nevertheless, the fight against "physical idealism" and "cosmopolitanism" did not end there; it continued until the mid-50s.

Discussions about patriotism and cosmopolitanism. The basis of the long-term propaganda campaign to educate the peoples of the USSR in the spirit of Soviet patriotism were the provisions of I. V. Stalin at a reception in the Kremlin in honor of the Red Army commanders on May 24, 1945. The famous toast "To the health of the Russian people" essentially acknowledged that the victory was achieved not only by the advantages of the socialist system and the "moral and political unity of the Soviet people," but above all at the expense of the patriotism of the Russian people.

In this speech Stalin proclaimed that the Russian people "are the most outstanding nation of all the nations comprising the Soviet Union," that they had earned in the war "general recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union." Stalin noted not only the "clear mind" of the people, but also such qualities as their steadfast character and patience, their trust in the government in moments of desperate need, and their willingness to make sacrifices.

Politics and patriotic education based on these qualities posed a certain danger of coloring them with Russian nationalism and great power. Some saw a manifestation of nationalism already in Stalin's toast, which singled out

only one 'outstanding' nation among the multinational Soviet people. This could not help but arouse concern for the future of national development among representatives of other nations in the country. For example, a participant of the Kremlin reception, I. G. Ehrenburg, was so stunned and annoyed by the toast that he could not hold back tears.

The leaders of the propaganda apparatus tried to prevent any misunderstanding of Stalin's toast. Cutting-edge articles in Pravda and other publications explained that "the patriotism of the Soviet, Russian people has nothing to do with singling out their nation as 'chosen', 'superior,' with contempt for other nations." It was argued that the Russian people, "the eldest and most powerful brother in the family of the Soviet peoples, had to take the brunt of the fight against Hitler's brigands, and he honorably fulfilled this great historical role. Without the help of the Russian people none of the peoples forming the Soviet Union would have been able to defend their freedom and independence, and the peoples of the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic States, and Moldavia, temporarily enslaved by the German imperialists, could not have freed themselves from the German-fascist bondage".

These interpretations were followed by directives: "Party organizations are obliged to widely propagate the remarkable traditions of the great Russian people as the most outstanding nation of all the nations constituting the USSR". Party organizations must explain that Stalin's assessment of the Russian people as the most outstanding nation and leading force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country is a classic summary of the historical path that the great Russian

people have taken." It was also required to explain that "the history of the peoples of Russia is a history of overcoming enmity and their gradual rallying around the Russian people", and the liberation mission of the Russian people, its leading role is only "to help all the other peoples of our country to rise to their full height and stand beside their elder comrades - the Russian people".

Victory in the war allowed a new appreciation of the importance of Russian culture to the culture of other peoples of the USSR and the world. This was due not only to the fact that Soviet scientists and cultural figures contributed enormously to the efforts of the Red Army to defeat Germany and thereby averted the threat of extermination by the Nazis of all the centuries-old achievements of human culture. Another factor contributing to this reassessment of Russian culture was the desire to pit its achievements in Russia and the Soviet Union against the culture of the West, which many millions of Soviet people who had traveled to Europe during the war years and returned home after the victory could imagine the high level of culture in its everyday manifestations.

Molotov probably wanted more than anybody to be sure of the correctness of his words when he said on November 6, 1947: "Hired bourgeois scribes abroad predicted during the war that the Soviet people, having learned the order and culture in the West during their military campaigns and visited many European cities and capitals, would return home with a desire to establish the same order in their homeland. And what happened? The demobilized with even greater fervor to strengthen collective farms, develop socialist competition in

factories and plants, and join the leading ranks of Soviet patriots."

Acknowledging that "not all of us have yet freed ourselves from low worship and servility to the West, to Western culture," he inspired himself and tried to inspire his listeners with Stalinist historical words: "The last Soviet citizen, free from the chains of capital, stands head and shoulders above any foreign high-ranking official, dragging on his shoulders the yoke of capitalist slavery."

The authorities sought to nourish the historical optimism of the Soviet man not only with the heroism of the Soviet period of history, but also with the entire centuries-old culture of the country. The glorification of its figures, whose names were associated with "great contributions to world science, outstanding scientific discoveries that constitute the most important milestones in the development of modern culture and civilization," began at the final stage of the war and was continued with renewed vigor after its end. In the greeting sent on June 16, 1945. to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR on the occasion of its 220th anniversary by the SNK of the USSR and the Central Committee of the VKP(b), stated: "The Soviet people are rightly proud of the founder of Russian science, Lomonosov, the brilliant chemist Mendeleev, the great mathematicians Lobachevsky, Chebyshev and Lyapunov, the greatest geologist Karpinsky, the world geographer Przhevalsky, the founder of military field surgery Pirogov, biologists, great innovators: Mechnikov, Sechenov, Timiryazev and Pavlov, Michurin, the great natural reformer, Lebedev, the great experimental physicist, Popov, the creator of radio communications, Zhukovsky and Chaplygin, the

founders of modern aviation, and outstanding military men. The great pioneers of Russian revolutionary thought, Belinsky, Dobrolyubov, Chernyshevsky, and the great pioneer of Marxism in our country, Plekhanov.

On January 2, 1946 Kapitsa P.L. sent a letter to Stalin in which he lamented that we "have little idea what a large reservoir of creative talent our engineering thought has always been". Especially strong were our builders. Recommending the publication of the book of L. I. Gumilevsky "Russian Engineers" (published in 1947 and 1953), he argued: "A large number of major engineering initiatives originated with us," "we ourselves have almost never been able to develop them (except in construction)," "the reason for not using innovation is that we usually undervalued our own, and overvalued the foreign". Underestimating theirs and overestimating overseas forces, excessive modesty, valued Stalin, who called it a flaw even greater than "excessive self-confidence. Kapitsa suggested supplementing the book with stories about such extremely large electrical engineers as Popov (radio), Yablochkov (voltaic arc), Lodygin (incandescent light bulb), Dol and Vo-Dobrovolsky (alternating current) and others.

All this was at the origins of the anti-Western campaign, which promoted the concept of historical priority of our country in all major areas of science, technology, culture. The well-known excesses in this propaganda, the desire to declare the brainchild of Russian talents almost any invention, from the bicycle to the plane, gave rise to humorous statements such as "Russia is the home of elephants.

However, the authorities also tried to keep the postwar

manifestations of the "nationalist neopas" within certain limits. After receiving a note from A. A. Zhdanov in July 1947 containing materials for a new draft Program of the Party, Stalin countered: "A particularly prominent role in the family of the Soviet peoples was and is played by the great Russian people. He rightly occupies a leading position in the Soviet community of nations" - he wrote expressively: "Not that." Soon there were again harsh demands: to avoid misunderstanding, ignoring the class content of Soviet patriotism; slipping into positions of *krass* patriotism. "The basis of such errors," the editorial "Against Objectivism in Historical Science" (Questions of History. 1948. No. 2) pointed out, "was the desire to embellish history". No less dangerous and harmful were also qualified mistakes that were on the line of slandering the past, downplaying the role of the Russian people in world history. It was stressed that "any underestimation of the role and importance of the Russian people in world history is directly linked to the worship of foreigners. Nihilism in the evaluation of the greatest achievements of Russian culture and other peoples of the USSR is the reverse side of the low admiration of the bourgeoisie culture of the West. Thus, a certain balance was restored with regard to the national question.

In this connection the works of the academician E.V. Tarle were unjustly criticized for "the erroneous statement about the defensive and just character of the Crimean War", for justifying Catherine II's wars "with the consideration that Russia was allegedly striving for its natural frontiers"; for reconsidering the character of the campaign to Europe in 1813. That the Soviet Army, "presented it as a liberation march to Europe" was condemned.

The "demands to reconsider the question about the gendarme role of Russia in Europe in the first half of XIX century and about tsarist Russia as a prison of peoples", the attempts to raise the generals M.D. Skobelev, M.I. Dragomirov, A.A. Brusilov as heroes of the Russian people were condemned. Proposals to replace "the class analysis of historical facts with their evaluation from the standpoint of progress in general, from the standpoint of national-state interests" were condemned as unacceptable objectivism in science.

Historians were reminded that all these "revisionist ideas" were condemned by the Central Committee of the Party. The criticism of A. T. Tvardovsky's works by literary critics and the literary authorities of that time was a striking example of criticism of the allegedly erroneous understanding of Soviet patriotism and ignoring its class content. On December 20, 1947, an article by V. V. Ermilov, editor-in-chief of the Literary Gazette, was published about Tvardovsky's book *Homeland and Alienation*. The famous writer's reflections on the war, on the nature of patriotism; on the properties and qualities of the people manifested in the years of disaster, were characterized as "fake prose," "an attempt to poetize that which is alien to the life of the people."

The influential critic D.S. Danin discerned in the book "the Russian national limitation of Tvardovsky's prose," which "is no better than the Azerbaijani, Yakut, Buryat-Mongolian limitation. Looking at the root of the phenomenon, he saw there "some of the overhead costs of the war, which now as quickly as possible must be eliminated" and begin again to realize themselves as advanced people of humanity, "not to think of our

nationality in the narrow, limited sense of the word," to take the word "Soviet" as a "new, broad nationality." In Vasily Terkin, Danin discovered the same vices - the literary hero's admiration for his own little world, his lack of signs of internationalism, his national narrow-mindedness. Recalling Mikhail Svetlov's poems in which the Civil War hero sings: "I am glad that in the fire of the world's fire my little house is burning," Danin concluded: "If Tvardovsky is happy about it, we will rejoice with him."

B. V. V. Ovechkin also found himself among Tvardovsky's admonishers. "Man's idiocy must be hated with all your soul, to the point of trembling in all your being," he said. - I don't see this hatred in Tvardovsky. You have to take this man by the scruff of the neck... and shove his nose into it.

If it's not sweet today, it will be sweet in ten years. In "The House by the Road" and in everything Tvardovsky started to write after it, Ovechkin found "misunderstood" the resolution of SNK of June 21, 1945 "About the improvement of living conditions of generals and officers of the Red Army", according to which the land lots were given to demobilized colonels and generals. "Get land, build, get a farm - chickens, geese, and other things. Alexander Trifonovich took this decree too seriously. This decree is not for us, not for writers.

The secretary of the board of the Writers' Union, L. M. Subotsky, in Notes about the Prose of 1947. (Novy Mir. 1948. No. 2) brought the problems discussed to the level of great generalizations. In many books written during the war, he noted, "the patriotic feeling and consciousness of the war heroes were portrayed impoverished.

Sometimes the primordial ancient features of patriotism were put in the first place, displacing those features which were brought up in the Soviet people by our epoch, the quarter-mark practice of the struggle for socialism, the educational work of the party and the Soviet power - everything that distinguishes the socialist patriotism of the Soviet people from the patriotism of other peoples and epochs". The truth of life consisted, he argued, in the fact that "ordinary Soviet people were encouraged in their exploits by their devotion to the Soviet state and the Soviet social order." A.T. Tvardovsky's "Homeland and Alienation" appeared to the high-ranking critics as "an ideologically flawed work in general", a product of "political limitation and backwardness", expressing "tendencies alien to Soviet literature, which is fighting for the establishment of new, advanced consciousness, for educating the people in the spirit of communism." Subotsky saw the present day of literature in M. Bubennov's novels *The White Birch* and I. Ehrenburg's *The Tempest*.

The proponents of national narrow-mindedness kept the attitude towards A. T. Tvardovski's work even afterwards. In 1953. The writer I. L. Selvinsky, in a letter to G. M. Malenkov, continued to insist that "the work of this poet, while very talented in itself, is conservative in poetic terms, and reactionary in ideological terms. He considered extensive evidence of this to be superfluous. One Vasily Terkin, who "over the course of 5. In 5,000 lines he saw neither revolution, nor party, nor collective farm system, but regarded the battle with German fascism as a war with a German".

The story of the sweeping criticism of the book

Homeland and Alienation, in the fair judgment of the contemporary literary scholar A.V. Ognev, makes one wonder why the fight against cosmopolitanism began in its time. Its extremist forms cannot be justified. But at the same time, it should be taken into account that some cosmopolitanism, did not take proper account of the national feelings of Russian writers, and in fact did not distinguish between internationalism and cosmopolitanism.

The first post-war theoretical consideration of cosmopolitanism's phenomenon compared with patriotism and nationalism was given by the well-known party theorist O. V. Kuusinen in his article "On patriotism", which opened the first issue of *Novoe Vremya* (1945, No. 1). Noting the rise of the patriotic movement in various countries during World War II, the author acknowledged that in the past the patriotism of supporters of communism and socialism had long been disputed, and accusing communists and all leftist workers of lacking patriotism was allegedly characteristic only of "enemies" of the labor movement. The author attributes the beginning of the era of the development of patriotism in the ranks of conscious workers in centuries past to the birthday of Soviet patriotism - the time when the working class of Russia won the position of master of its country. It was then, according to the theorist, that conscious workers in other countries began to feel a special attachment to the Soviet country and began to call it the fatherland of workers of all countries. But this affection also aroused in them a special feeling of love for their own countries as the hearths of a better future for the workers of their nation. The strength of such patriotism was especially evident in the partisan struggle against the German occupiers. Revived during the war

years, patriotism was defined as "selfless struggle for a free, happy future of its people". In the Soviet Union, the level of development of patriotism was recognized as much higher than in other countries. Nationalism in a socialist country was excluded by definition. "Even moderate bourgeois nationalism," Kuusinen argued, "means opposing the interests of one's own nation (or its upper classes) to the interests of other nations.

Nor could true patriotism have anything in common with nationalism. "There has never in history been a single patriotic movement which has had as its object the attack on the equality and freedom of any foreign nation." Cosmopolitanism - an indifferent and contemptuous attitude toward one's fatherland - is also organically opposed to the communist movement of every country. "Communism does not oppose but combines genuine patriotism and proletarian internationalism." Summarizing his reasoning, the author wrote: "Cosmopolitanism is an ideology completely alien to the workers. It is an ideology characteristic of the representatives of international banking houses and international cartels, of the largest stock speculators, of the world's arms suppliers ("merchants of death") and their agents. These circles are really operating according to the Latin proverb 'ubi bene, ibi patria' (where there is good, there is fatherland). Thus, it turns out, in our country, only "enemies of the people," supporters of bourgeois cosmopolitanism and nationalism, could be cosmopolitans.

Stalin attached great importance to the phenomenon of cosmopolitanism, linking it primarily to the postwar struggle for world domination by the United States. On a page of the draft of the new program of the Party in the

summer of 1947, he wrote: "The theory of 'cosmopolitanism' and the formation of a United States of Europe with one [government]. "World Government." The note explains the main reasons for the campaign against cosmopolitans from outside to inside the USSR. G.F. Alexandrov made one more attempt to give a common theoretical basis to anti-patriotism and cosmopolitanism in the beginning of 1948 in the article "Cosmopolitanism - the Ideology of the Imperialist Bourgeoisie" (Problems of Philosophy. 1948. № 3). He explained that the ideologists of the bourgeoisie abroad and "petty renegades - anti-patriots in the USSR" operate under the flag of cosmopolitanism, because it is most convenient to try to disarm the working masses in the struggle against capitalism, to eliminate the national sovereignty of certain countries and suppress the revolutionary movement of the working class. The cosmopolitans in the article are represented by the cadets of the P. N. Miliukov, A. S. Yashchenko; "outright cosmopolitans" are "enemies of the people" Pyatakov, Bukharin and Trotsky. However, the article provoked a negative reaction because it "devotes too much space to various trash like the stillborn writings of reactionary bourgeois professors.

A much more topical example of cosmopolitanism was discovered in May 1947 in the book *Pushkin and World Literature*, published in 1941 by the living professor-literaturist I. M. Nusinov. The review, written by the poet Nikolai Tikhonov, noted that Pushkin and with him all Russian literature were presented in this book "only an appendage of Western literature", lacking "an independent value". According to Nusinov it turns out that everything in Pushkin "is borrowed, everything is repeated, everything is a variation of plots of Western

literature," that "the Russian people have not enriched the world culture". This position of the modern "hopeless vagabond and humanity" was declared a consequence of "bowing down" to the West and forgetting the commandment that only our literature "has the right to teach others a new universal morality".

Soon afterwards (in June) this topic was brought up at the plenum of the board of the Union of Soviet Writers, where A.A. Fadeev developed his criticism of Nusinov's "very harmful" book. In particular, he noted that "in this book there is not a single word about the fact that there was such a Patriotic War of 1812", that Pushkin "was made as a non-national and universal, all-European, all-human. As if it is possible to be such by jumping out of a historically established nation." The basic idea of the book was condemned: "The light comes from the West, but Russia is an Eastern country. It was from this speech that began to unfold a vociferous campaign in literary studies and other humanitarian spheres against the low-worship identified with cosmopolitanism.

The campaign had other objectives. It was directed against the "Harvard project", developed in the United States, aimed at the destruction of the Soviet patriotism and replacing it with "universal values", quite compatible with the traditional patriotism of Americans and the attitude to America of "cosmopolitans" in the rest of the world, who have nothing against this country as a metropolis of the future One World Republic. The famous statement in President Truman's speech to voters in Kansas that "it will be as easy for nations to live in good harmony in a world republic as for Kansans in the United States" had an unambiguous reaction in the Soviet Union. In the article "For the Soviet Patriotic

Science of Law" the famous legal scholar E. A. Korovin wrote: "Its first and main task is to defend by all available means national independence, national statehood, national culture and law, giving a crushing rebuff to any attempt to encroach on them or at least to diminish them" (Soviet State and Law. 1949. № 7).

The campaign was headed by A. A. Zhdanov, who was by that time the second in command of the country, and by the new leaders of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Party: M. A. Suslov, who replaced G. F. Aleksandrov as head of the department on 17 September 1947, and D. T. Shepilov, the editor of Pravda in the Propaganda Department, who became Suslov's deputy on 18 September.

The campaign guidelines were given in the article "Soviet Patriotism" by D.T. Shepilov published in Pravda on August 13, 1947. It shows that the Soviet leaders were ready to suspect anyone who did not agree that it was not us who were now catching up with the West in historical development, but "the countries of bourgeois democracies, which in their political structure were a whole historical epoch behind the USSR, had to catch up with the first country of true democracy". Accordingly, it was asserted that the Soviet system was "a hundred times better and superior to any bourgeois system"; "The Soviet Union is a country of expanded socialist democracy"; "Now there can be no talk of any civilization without the Russian language, without the science and culture of the peoples of the Soviet country. They have priority"; "The capitalist world has long since passed its zenith and is convulsively rolling downward, while the country of socialism, full of power and creative forces, is steeply on the ascent. Worship of the West was

recognized in the USSR, but was portrayed as a characteristic of certain "intellectuals" who had still not freed themselves from the vestiges of the "cursed past of tsarist Russia" and who only regarded everything foreign with menial subservience. Because it's foreign, even the garbage cans in the streets of Berlin are revered.

The most vociferous mouthpiece in this campaign was A.A. Zhdanov. Speaking in February 1948 at a meeting with Soviet musicians in the Central Committee, he advanced a universal justification for a sharp turn from internationalism as a kind of socialist cosmopolitanism to internationalism as the highest expression of socialist patriotism. Applied to the situation in art, he said, "Internationalism is born where national art flourishes. Forgetting this truth means losing your guiding line, losing your face, becoming a homeless cosmopolitan.

However, all of these provisions throughout 1945-1948 were abstract and abstractly theoretical. They served both "patriots" and "internationalists" equally. For example, in November 1948. D. T. Shepilov sanctioned a meeting in the arts section of the propaganda and agitation department of the Central Committee in which the theater critic A. M. Borshchagovsky and other future "cosmopolitans" also took part. There was talk about the need to criticize A. A. Fadeev for his shortcomings in the field of drama, to remove him from the post of general secretary of the Writers' Union and to appoint to this post K. M. Simonov, who seemed more manageable and predictable. The idea failed to materialize, not for theoretical reasons, but for more important ideological and political reasons.

The campaign to strengthen the Soviet Union was

increasingly unfolding, beginning in 1947, and in order to overcome the low regard for the West, began to take on an expressly anti-Semitic undertone by the end of 1948. While at first cosmopolitans were often represented by anonymous adherents of certain schools of thought - the school of Academician A. N. Veselovsky in literary studies, M. N. Pokrovsky in history, and others - over time representatives of the Jewish intelligentsia began to appear among them more frequently. This was happening for an objective reason: Jews were represented in the Soviet intelligentsia in large numbers, many times greater than in the population of the country, and actively participated in the political and ideological struggle on different sides of the barricades. After the war, Jews accounted for 1.3% of the country's population.

At the same time, according to data for the beginning of 1947, their number of heads of departments, laboratories and sectors of the USSR Academy of Sciences in the Department of Economics and Law was 58.4%, in the Department of Chemical Sciences – 33%, physical and mathematical sciences - 27.5%, engineering sciences – 25%. By early 1949 26.3% of teachers of philosophy, Marxism-Leninism and political economy in the country's universities were Jews. In the Institute of History, they represented 36% of the staff in the beginning of 1948 and 21% in the end of 1949.

When the Union of Soviet Writers was founded in 1934, its Moscow organization employed 351 people, of whom 124 (35.3%) were Jewish; in 1935-1940, 34.8% of Jewish writers were employed; in 1941-1946 - 28.4%; in 1947-1952 - 20.3%. In 1953 there were 662 (60%) Russians (1,102 members of Moscow organization of

the Union of writers, 329 (29,8%) Jews, 23 (2,1%) Ukrainians, 21 (1,9%) Armenians and 67 (6,1%) other nationalities. As the heads of the Union of Soviet Writers noted in the certificate addressed to N. S. Khrushchev in March 1953, the situation was close to this. The Leningrad Writers' Organization and the Union of Writers of Ukraine. According to some estimates, these figures for the following years were much higher.

In such a situation, any ideological battles and pressure on the "intelligentsia" on the part of the authorities were presented as affecting mainly the Jewish nationality. Rather simple considerations "worked" in the same direction: the U.S. had become our probable adversary and Jews played a prominent role in the economy and politics there. Israel, barely born, declared itself a supporter of the United States. Soviet Jews, who had wide connections with their American and Israeli relatives and were most focused since the war on developing economic and cultural ties with the bourgeois countries of the West, must be seen as dubious Soviet citizens and potential traitors.

After the activists of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were arrested at the end of 1948, a campaign against cosmopolitanism soon followed. One of the main roles in unleashing it is attributed to G. M. Popov, the first secretary of the MK and MGK VKL(b), simultaneously the chairman of the executive committee of Mossovet and secretary of the Central Committee.

In the first half of January 1949, while at a reception for Stalin, he reported that at the 12th plenum of the Union of Writers of the USSR, with the connivance of the agitprop of the Central Committee, an anti-patriotic

attack was made on A. A. Fadeyev: "the cosmos of the writer". Fadeev: the "cosmopolitans" made an attempt to remove him and elect their protégé; Fadeev, because of his modesty, did not dare to ask Comrade Stalin for help. When D. T. Shepilov, in turn accepted by Stalin, began to speak of the complaints of theater critics about persecution by the SSP leadership and as proof put A. M. Borschgovsky's letter on the table, Stalin, without looking at it, said irritably: "A typical anti-patriotic attack on a member of the Central Committee, Comrade Fadeev. Shepilov had no choice but to organize to repel the attack. V. M. Kozhevnikov and D. I. Zaslavsky, who worked in Pravda, with the help of K. M. Simonov, A. A. Fadeev and A. V. Sofronov, hastily prepared an article entitled "The Afterbirth of Bourgeois Aesthetics" by January 27. The layout, at Stalin's behest, was refined. The flamboyant title was replaced and the article was entitled "On one anti-patriotic group of theater critics". The criticized phenomenon was referred to in the text of the article in three different ways: "vpn-cosmopolitanism," "rabid cosmopolitanism," and "unreasonable cosmopolitanism. The article was published in Pravda on January 28, 1949.

It was followed by a volley of newspaper articles with the headings: "Esthetic Slanderers"; "To Defeat the Anti-Patriotic Group of Theater Critics to the End"; "Against Cosmopolitanism and Formalism in Poetry"; "Cosmopolites in Cinema Criticism and Their Patrons"; "Homeless Cosmopolitans at the GITIS"; "Against Cosmopolitanism in Music Criticism"; "Decisively expose the machinations of bourgeois aesthetes"; "Against Cosmopolitanism in Philosophy"; "Defeat Bourgeois Cosmopolitanism and Film Art"; "Denounce Cosmopolitan Saboteurs"; "Na-unie the preaching of the

homeless cosmopolitan"; "Expel the bourgeois cosmopolites from Soviet architectural science"; "Get the cosmopolites out of the way"; "Against bourgeois cosmopolitanism in literary studies", etc.

Scientific journals published accounts of the ensuing meetings designed to eradicate cosmopolitanism in less emotionally colored articles with headings such as "On the Tasks of Soviet Historians" in the Girdle against Manifestations of Bourgeois Ideology," "On the Tasks of the Fight Against Cosmopolitanism on the Ideological Front." Cosmopolitans were found everywhere, but mainly in literary and artistic circles, newspaper and radio editorial boards, research institutes and universities.

In the course of this campaign, on February 8, 1949, the Politburo decided to disband the associations of Jewish writers in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk and to close the almanacs "Heimland" (Moscow) and "Der Shtern" (Kiev). It was not limited to criticism, dismissals from prestigious jobs, and relocations of "cosmopolitans" to less important positions. According to information cited by I.G. Ehrenburg, their persecution often resulted in arrests. Up until 1953 they had arrested. 47 writers, 108 actors, 87 artists, and 19 musicians.

From the 20s of March, the campaign waned. In its midst Stalin gave instructions to the editor of Pravda, P. N. Pospelov: "It is not necessary to make a cosmopolitan phenomenon. We should not greatly expand the circle. It is necessary to fight not with people, but with ideas." M.A. Suslov, summoning ideological workers, asked them to pass on Stalin's opinion that the deciphering of pseudonyms "reeks of anti-Semitism" ... Stalin (who,

according to A.A. Fadeev, instructed him to start a campaign of pro-IHH anti-patriots) apparently decided that the job was done.

Those who were arrested were not released, and those who were fired from their jobs were not rehired. The most zealous participants in the campaign against cosmopolitanism were also removed from their posts. Among them was Professor F.M. Golovenchenko, Deputy Head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee, who spoke everywhere with a report on the struggle against bourgeois cosmopolitanism in ideology, and V. G. Vdovichenko, editor of the newspaper Soviet Art. The latter, as it was noted in a letter of March 30, 1953, from D.T. Shepilov to G. M. Malenkov. Until recently, he attracted critical patriots to his newspaper, and after their exposure he made a fuss in the newspaper, portraying the situation as if cosmopolitans penetrated everywhere. In all this the handwriting of the author of "Vertigo" was apparent. The rumor attributed the arbitrariness to the executors, and Stalin allegedly stopped it.

It should be taken into account, however, that in the period of the campaign the most widespread displacements in the highest structures of power took place, and the victims were not only Jews. According to estimates by Israeli researchers, they were not a significant minority in the total number of victims. Among those arrested in the "medical case," there were three times more people of other nationalities than Jews. It is incorrect to explain the "anti-Jewish" campaigns in the USSR solely by Stalin's anti-Semitism. As in the 1930s, they were connected with the political struggle in the international arena, and with the deep social, national-

political processes and the change of elites in Soviet society.

The wide range of opinions on the causes of the campaign allows us to highlight some of them. K. M. Simonov draws attention to the fact that in the post-war life and consciousness "in addition to brazenly manifested anti-Semitism," there was "hidden, but persistent reciprocal Jewish nationalism," which revealed itself "in the selection of personnel. M.P. Lobanov sees the reason in the fact that Jewry came out of the war "with an unheard of reputation as martyrs, which armed it with far-reaching activity," the fight against cosmopolitanism was a reaction to "the Jewish pretensions to become the openly dominant force in the country. In dissident circles, the fight against cosmopolitanism was explained by Stalin's departure from "the basic communist dogma - cosmopolitanism and anti-nationalism" and his transition to patriotic positions. "Patriotism is a huge leap from supranational communism.

From the communist point of view," Chalidze wrote, "an appeal to patriotism, even during the war, is heretical. I. Danishevsky presents the post-war struggle against cosmopolitans as a campaign "against communism, because communism is essentially cosmopolitan, communism does not need ancestors, because it itself is without lineage or tribe.

In our opinion, the processes of 1948-1949 are most adequately characterized by Academician I. R. Shafarevich. Comparing two of the most celebrated "cases" of those years, he writes in his book *Three Thousand Year Round Table* (2002): "If we consider the

EAK case. "As a vivid manifestation of "Stalinist anti-Semitism," then the "Leningrad case" should be considered an equally vivid manifestation of Stalinist Russophobia.

In fact, in both cases the regime sought to take control of some of the national impulses it had allowed during the war and for propaganda purposes. These actions were only elements in the chain of measures taken after the war to consolidate a victorious and communist order.

Discussions on linguistics and political economy

In 1950. Stalin personally took part in a debate on the problems of linguistics. By this time the doctrine of N. Y. Marr, proclaimed in the late 20's as "the only right one," was revealing the inconsistency of its foundations. Contrary to the usual linguistic notions about the gradual breakdown of a single protolanguage into separate but genetically related ones, the "new doctrine" asserted the exact opposite, namely that languages arose independently of each other. Marr believed that the primary sound speech consisted of only four elements - Sal, Ver, Ion, Rosh. These elements ("diffuse shouts", as the most influential follower of Marr, Academician I. I. Meshchaninov, said), were thought to have arisen together with the other arts in the evolution of the labor process, which represented magic, and for a long time had no vocabulary meaning. Elements (most often in a modified form) were easily found in each of the words of any language. According to Marr, languages underwent processes of interbreeding in their development: as a result of interaction, two languages were transformed into a new, third one, which was equally a descendant of

both.

Marr's theories were in harmony with the ideas of the 20s about the coming world revolution and the hopes of many people to still have time to talk to the proletarians of all the continents in a world language. In the same way, Marr wrote, "as humanity moves from artisanal disjointed economies and forms of sociality to one common world economy, in the same way language is moving by giant steps from its initial diversity to a single world language". In the Soviet Union Marr saw not only the creation of new national languages, but also how, as a result of their interbreeding (interpenetration) a process of "the removal of the multitude of national languages by the unity of language and thought" this develops.

By the beginning of the 50's the proposals to force the creation of an artificial world language were clearly losing their relevance. Time has revealed the special role of the Russian language in the transition to a future world language within the USSR. This was discussed in particular in Stalin's previously written, but just published, article "Leninism and the National Question". After its appearance, the successive change of world languages was portrayed by D. I. Zaglavsky in Pravda as follows: Latin was the language of the Ancient world and the early Middle Ages; French was the language of the tepid class of the feudal era; English became the world language of the capitalist era; looking into the future, we see there were clearly histrionic speeches, and there were vulgar, utterly unqualified ones."

On the basis of the discussion materials, the authors of the textbook prepared and sent to Stalin suggestions for

improving the layout, eliminating errors and inaccuracies, and a note on controversial issues. On February 1, 1952, Stalin responded to the discussion and materials sent by the theoretical work "Remarks on economic issues related to the November 1951 discussion.

Having made a number of his own comments on the contents of the textbook, Stalin disagreed with the dissenting criticism of the layout, believing that "the draft textbook stands a full head above the existing textbooks." By decision of the Politburo, its authors were given one more year to finalize the textbook. Stalin reduced his role in the preparation of the textbook to writing remarks on the draft and answering questions addressed to him by the economists ("Reply to T. Sh. Notkin, Alexander Ilyich", "On the Errors of T. Yaroshenko L. D. ", "Reply to Comrades Sanina A. V. and Venzher V. G."). Their content was included in the book "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", which became the last theoretical work of I. V. Stalin.

This theoretical testament essentially rejected the market economy; justified an even greater governmentalization of economic life in the country; prioritized the development of heavy industry; necessitated the curtailment and transformation of cooperative collective farm property into state ownership; and reduced the sphere of commodity circulation. The book contained politically important provisions: "The inevitability of wars between capitalist countries remains in force"; "Imperialism must be destroyed in order to eliminate the inevitability of wars." From the heights of our days we can see that in this work, as L.A. Openkin writes, the innovative approaches

of scientists who argued for consideration of the interests of the broad masses of workers and "advocated a broader inclusion of economic methods in the production process" were not supported. The degree of internal contradictions of the capitalist system was also significantly overestimated and its capacity for self-regulation was not taken into account. This is explained by the fact that Stalin "was in a state of euphoria over the seemingly near final victory of socialism".

Some provisions of the classics of Marxism-Leninism were declared obsolete or untenable by Stalin. For example, F. Engels' position that the liquidation of commodity production should be the first condition of the socialist revolution was called incorrect.

Stalin argued that the laws of commodity production were also valid under socialism, but that their effect was limited. Substantial corrections were made to Marxist assessments between physical and mental labor, which, according to the positions of Marx and Engels, considered the most important conditions for the triumph of the communist order. Stalin rejected as erroneous Engels' position that the blurring of the line between town and countryside must lead to the demise of the big cities.

Lenin's 1916 thesis that "despite the decay of capitalism as a whole, capitalism is growing immeasurably faster than before" was declared obsolete. Stalin also abandoned his own pre-war thesis "about the relative stability of markets" during a general crisis of capitalism. Regarding the development of the leading capitalist countries, he said: "The growth of production in these countries will occur on a narrowed basis, because the

volume of production in these countries will be reduced. Molotov remarked in this connection later on, "And nothing of the kind has happened" -and was perplexed: - How could he write such a thing?"

Obviously, the members of the Politburo did not agree with certain provisions of "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR." Recalling how the book was discussed in the narrow circle of Politburo members, Mikoyan wrote that Molotov seemed to say something in support, but in such terms and so vaguely that it was unmistakable: he was not convinced of the correctness of Stalin's thoughts. Mikoyan himself was silent, but, according to the same recollections, he was surprised by Stalin's statement that "the stage of commodity turnover in the economy has exhausted itself, that it is necessary to move to the product exchange between town and countryside. This was an unbelievably leftist bent. I attributed it to the fact that Stalin apparently planned to carry out the construction of communism in our country during his lifetime, which, of course, was an unrealistic thing.

After Stalin's direct question about what Mikoyan thought about the turnover and trade, he expressed his doubts: "The turnover and trade will long remain a means of exchange in a socialist society. I really doubt that now is the time to switch to product-exchange. Stalin remarked in this connection with a note: "Ah, so! You have fallen behind! Now is the time!" Stalin suggested not including Mikoyan in the presidium of the 19th Party Congress. Reflecting on the reason, Mikoyan believed that "it was directly influenced by my disagreement with his statement in the book on the transition to product-exchange." At the congress, Mikoyan made a speech

praising Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR as "an outstanding contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory. However, this did not change Stalin's attitude toward him.

Perhaps the most significant point in this book was the possibility of building communism in the USSR even in a capitalist environment. To solve this historical problem, according to Stalin, three conditions had to be met. 1) To ensure not only the rational organization of the productive forces, but also the constant growth of all social production with the predominant development of the means of production, which made it possible to carry out expanded reproduction. 2) Gradually raise collective farm property to the level of national property, and gradually replace commodity circulation with a system of product exchange in order to cover all the products of social production. 3) To achieve such a cultural growth of society that would ensure to all members of society the full development of their physical and mental faculties.

To summarize the materials presented in this section

We can say that in the political process of 1945-1953 two opposing courses were closely intertwined. The two opposing trends – 1) the preservation and development of the repressive role of the state and 2) the formal democratization of the political system - were closely intertwined, not entirely consistent with the popular notion of a constant increase in the features of totalitarianism during Stalin's rule.

The first tendency manifested itself in large numbers of

those arrested and convicted for counterrevolutionary crimes and anti-Soviet agitation. The following data give an idea of the scale of repressions.

In a certificate drawn up at the request of N. S. Khrushchev at the beginning of 1954. From 1921 to February 1, 1954 in the USSR 3,777,880 persons were convicted for counter-revolutionary crimes by the OGPU Board, the NKVD troikas, the Special Board, the USSR Supreme Court Military Board and military tribunals.

642,980 of them were sentenced to the highest penalties, 236,922 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and 765,180 were deported. Each year 0.5 to 1.5 million people were held in the correctional labor camps, of which political prisoners accounted for up to 35% in the 30s, and in the first postwar years their number increased because of the conviction of traitors and former prisoners of war.

In 1946-1950 the total number of political prisoners increased from 338,883 to 578,912, but their share in the total number of prisoners decreased to 23%. Their total number in the USSR in 1953, together with the contingent of correctional labor colonies (children, women and other persons who were not sent to the camps where political prisoners and major criminals were held) was 2,468,524.

All subsequent attempts to clarify this data have not led to any significant change in the order of the figures cited. According to KGB data as of February 1990. From 1930 through 1953, 3,778,234 people were convicted of state and counterrevolutionary crimes in the USSR. Of these, 786,098 were sentenced to death; 844,470 were

rehabilitated (during life or posthumously). In essence, this is unjustified repression. From 1930 through 1953 11.8 million people passed through corrective-labor camps, 422,422 passed through colonies. Of the total number of prisoners (18.3 million), 3.7 million (20.2%) were convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes.

Collection of documents "Rehabilitation: as it was" (Moscow, 2000. V.1) contains data on the number of arrested and convicted by VChK-OGPU-NKVD-MGB bodies of the USSR in 1921-1953.

Data on persons sentenced to capital punishment for counter-revolutionary and other especially dangerous crimes show that in 1937-1938; 681,692 persons were sentenced to capital punishment by NKVD organs. In other words, during the years of the "Great Terror" the country lost 970 to 900 people every day by this article. In 1939-1940 there were 7-5 such sentences per day (about as many as in 1932-1934, and almost twice as many as in 1935-1936); " 1946 – 8 per day, in 1947 - 3; in 1950 - 1-2 per day, in 1951-1952. - 4-5per day, in the first half of 1953 - one sentence per day. Violence in the post-tsento political and ideological struggle was on the decrease in comparison with the 30s. From May 26, 1947, to January 12, 1950, there was no capital punishment.

The second trend in the postwar political process was the revival of public life and the resumption of congresses of social and political organizations of the USSR after a long break. In 1949 there were the X Congress of Trade Unions and the XI Congress of Komsomol (17 and 13 years after the previous ones, respectively). And in 1952 the XIX Congress of the Party

was held, which decided to rename the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) in the CPSU. In 1946-1947 was developing the drafts of the new Constitution of the USSR and the Program of the CPSU(b). The Constitutional Draft provided for the development of democratic principles in the life of society. During the discussion of the draft, there were wishes to decentralize the economic life and expand the economic independence of the local government organizations.

The draft Program of the Party was based on the doctrine of outgrowing the dictatorship of the proletariat into a nationwide state. "The development of socialist democracy on the basis of the completion of the construction of a classless socialist society," it said, "will more and more transform the proletarian dictatorship into the dictatorship of the Soviet and the masses. With the involvement of the whole population in the daily management of state affairs, and the growth of its communist consciousness and culture, the development of socialist democracy will lead to the growing disappearance of coercive forms of dictatorship of the Soviet people, to the increasing replacement of coercive measures by the influence of public opinion, to the increasing narrowing of political functions of the state, to the transformation of it mainly into a body for the management of economic life of society".

An important place in the project was given to the social aspects of the country's development. The idea of expanding the housing construction industry was to provide each worker with a comfortable separate room and each family with a separate apartment.

It was proposed to establish mass production of automobiles and to provide every citizen with automobile transport. It was said that it was necessary to make preparations for providing the citizens with free food and first-class canteens, laundries and other cultural and household establishments.

The draft program of the Party stipulated that with the progress towards communism, the principle of electing all the officials of the state apparatus should be realized, and independent voluntary organizations should be developed as much as possible. Attention was paid to the necessity of development of the work on communistic changes of people's consciousness, education of the socialist citizenship, labor heroism, Red Army valor among the broad masses of people; raising the whole people to the level of noble people of the Soviet country.

Work on the drafts of the USSR Constitution and the Party Program ceased because of the tightening of domestic political course and condemnation of the main leaders of the developments, figures of the Leningrad "anti-party group". Attention was again directed not so much to the development of effective measures for economic recovery, as to the search for specific "culprits" of its unsatisfactory development. The question of a new CPSU program was once again raised at the 19th Party Congress in 1952. Recognizing many provisions of the current program outdated, the Congress decided to be guided by the provisions of Stalin's book "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" in preparing the new main party document. The basic tenets of this work, as well as the developments of the program commission of A. A. Zhdanov in 1947, can

be easily found in the Third Program of the CPSU, which was adopted many years later, in 1961. The Third Program of the CPSU.